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David F. Capps 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-I 1 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) Case No. CV-2005-36747 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) ADDENDUM TO THE 
) BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY 
v. ) OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE 
) IDAHO CREDIT CODE 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2006-37320 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
Defendant, 
) 
) 
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COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll (hereinafter "Capps 
and Carroll") and submits this ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE 
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE. In 
their brief, Capps and Carroll referenced the Lake-Snell survey. Capps and 
Carroll have been trying for some time to acquire a copy of the survey for the 
court's consideration. Having just now received a copy of the Lake-Snell survey, 
Capps and Carroll submit the survey to the court for its consideration. 
Dated this 2 ~ \ d .  day of March. 2007. 
Miriam G. Carroll, in propria persona 
ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of this ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE 
LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE to the attorneys for the 
DefendantslPlaintiffs by Certified Mail # 7006 21580003 4551 1132 (Wilson) and 
# 7006 2150 0003 4551 1149 (Bishop) this 2 day of March, 2007 at the 
following addresses: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
William L. Bishop 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 1 1 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle. WA 98101 
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To: Paul Bland 
Trial Lawyen for Public Justice 
From: Celinda Lake, Alysia SneU, and Dee Brown 
Lake Suell Peny & Associates 
Re: 
Date: September 27,2001 
Lake, Snell, Perry & Associatea was paid $23,000 to conduct the origOnal rosearoh for a 
nine minute statewide survey of 800 AT&T customers in the State of California. 
Celinda has been an expert witness in two cases - Daggett v. Webster in tb District 
Court in Maine and - Marcella Landell, et al., v. !TilWiliam if.  Sonell, et al., And Vemont 
Pubtic Iatemt Research Group, kc., et al., Neil Randall, et al., v. W i k  H. Sonell, et 
ai., And Vermont Public Interest Reear& Group, Lnc., et a1 in DisIrict Court in Vermont. 
To: Paul Bland 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 
From: C e W a  Lake, Alysia Snell, and Dee Brown 
Lake Snell Perry &Associates 
Re: Findings from ~csearch' 
Date: September 27,2001 
A recent survey of AT&T customers shows that AT&T customers are unlikely to read 
solicitations from AT&T and they do not remember receiving a mailing Born AT&T 
concerning a Consumer Service Agreement. Additiody, strong majorities do not 
remember seeing anything about an arbjtlation provision and they do not W a 
contract was formed between AT&T and themsefves. 
AT&T customers say they are unlikely to read solicitations they receive in 
the mail Only 14 percent of customers say they are extremely or very lkely to 
read solicitations, whiie 87 percent say they are less likely to read solicitations, 
including 37 oercent who say they are not at aJl likely to read them. Given 
people's gen&al survey behavior tiappear smart and demonstrate sociafly correct 
behavior, these are very high levels admitting they do not read solioitatious. 
o mere is little differonce between men and women, younger and older 
customers, and coUege andnon-college educated customers, with eight out 
of tencustomers saying they are less likely to read soEcitations. 
They are also unlikely to read soficitations they receive from AT&T. %'hen 
they think about solicitations from AT&T three-quarters of customers say they are 
unlikely to read tbek solicitations (77 percent, inoluding 27 pment who say not at 
all likely), Twenty-two percent say they are extrmely or very likely to read the 
solicitations. 
o Again thore is little difference between men and women and college and 
non-college educated customers with at least threequartem saying they 
are less lkely to read the solicitations. SB~~OTS, those over tbe age of 64, 
- -- 
'73-e findings are based one statewideRDD sample of 800 AT&TcusWmm in Celifoma, intervitiwai 
bohvm Septemba 17 and Se~tecdxr 20,2001 by profedsional intaviewers 1Rt d of enor for this S W C V  
is i-1-3.5 percent. 
in6 M  beet, NW, su~te sw wahing~1, M rW.76. w. 20W76i90ti6 fax 2 0 ~ 1 7 ~ 0 7 4 .  inb@(qa.mm 
are slightly more Iikely to say they read AT&T solicitations (30 percent 
extremely or very likely) than are younger customen under 45 (20 
percent). 
a Signincant numbers of customers do not remember receiving the Consumer 
Service Agreement. Nearly nine out often customers do not remember receiving 
a mailing from AT&T concaning a Consumer Service Agreement - 74 percent 
say they don't remember receiving it and an additional 13 percent say they are 
unsure. Only 13 percent say thcy remember receiving tltc Agreement. Again, 
compared to other sweys we have done on recall of advd ing ,  these are very 
low numbers. 
o Across dl demogapllic poups at least eigtac out of ten ctinomers say they 
either don't remember receiving tbe Agreement or they are unsure. 
o For the customers who remember receiving the Agreement (13 percent of 
customers), half read parts of the Agreen~ent (35 percent) or all of it (21 
percent). Almost half did not read it  An additional 30 percent said they 
scauned it and 10 percent said they did not read it (4 percent don't know). 
Customers are even iess likely to recall seeing an arbitration provision* 
Overall, nine out of ten customers (91 percent) either don't remember seeing an 
arbitration provision (85 percent) or say they are unsure (6 percent). 
o Across demographic groups ne- nine out of ten customers do not 
remember seeing an ahitration provision 
o Fm the fav customers who remember the Agreement (I3 percent of 
customers), 40 percent say they remember seeing an arbitration provision 
while 60 percent don't remember it. 
o For thc customers who do not remember the Agreement (87 paccnt of 
customers), 95 petcent do not rcmember seeing an arbitration prevision. 
o For the oustomem who remember the arbitration provision (9 percent of 
customers) a majority (58 percent) read aI2 or parts of it, while 42 percat 
did not read it. 
AT&T customers do not thiik a confract was fanned as a result of the 
Consumer Service Agreement, Only 10 percent of the customers feel a contlact 
was formed, while a strong majority of customers do not thiofr a contract was 
formed (58 percent), and 32 percent are unswe. 
o Solid majorities across demographic groups say they don't think a conhacl 
was formed. 
LAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOCLATES 
5 Customers beIieve they should stlll have the right to take the company to 
court and the right to talk to others arbout their dispute. Customers believe 
that if there were a dispute with AT&T they would be able to take that dispute to 
wwt (60 percent yes, 22 percent no, 18 percent don? know). Again majorities 
across demographic groups believe they will be able to take disputes to court. 
Younger customers under 45 are more likely to believe they can take a dispuh3 to 
cowt than are older customers over 45 (66 percent and 54 percent respectively). 
Though a solid majority of both agree. 
o Even more customers believe that if there was a dispute with AT&T they 
would be able to talk to other people about it (80 percent yes, 12 pwcent 
no, 9 percent don't know). JVhile there are some slight variations among 
goups, threequartem of customers across demographic groups think they 
will be able to talk to other people - women are slightly more likely than 
men to think they will be able to talk to others (82 percent to 76 percent 
for men); and, younger customers under 45 are more likely Ulan customers 
over 45 to thinlc they can still talk to other people (84 pacent and 75 
percent respectively). 
e Customers do not believe that continned use of service or paying a bill showg 
agreement with the Consumer Service Agreement Customers were asked if 
continued use of service, making calls &or August 1,2OOl or paying theL normal 
phone bill, suggest agreement with the C o m e r  Service Agreement, or if 
customers should only be assumed to have agreed to the Consimw Service 
Agreement if they knowingly and voluntarily opt into the Agceement. They 
believe customers should bave to knowingly and volunWily opt into the 
Agreement (78 percent), rather than have continued use of the service suggested 
agreement (1 1 percent). When they hear there may be limits on the right to free 
speech in the Apement, custome115 continue to believe that customers should 
have to opt into the Agreement (79 percsnt). 
Bearing parts of the arbitntion provision do= not jog customers' lnemoriw 
about receiving infomation. When customers are read portions of the 
arbitration provision, most say they have not heard of it or don't know (92 
percent), only 9 percent say they remember reading or seeing it.' At least eight 
out of ten customers across demographic groups do not remember this provision. 
'This section orovides for resolution of &&s thmu& Snal and binding arbiblion before a neutral 
dimtor insread of iu a coun by pdge or j&y or &roGha class action. % include8 any disputc based 
on any product, senice or advcnuug having a cnmectiao with h Ageancut h'o dispur may be jovlcd 
with another lawsuir, or in arbitration with a dispute of any otbsr person, or resolved on a class-wide bas15 
7he arbiham m y  not a w a r d b g c s  that an not expressly authorized by this Agrcemenr aad may not 
aaard punitive damages or alromcys' f e a  MLzss such darnages arc expressly a u t h b d  by a stauitz. h y  
ubibation shall remain conljdcntial. Neither you nor AT&T may disclose l hc  exislcnce, contenr, or rcsulrn 
of any arbimtion or award Any dab or dispute a d i i  out of or relating lo this Agtemmtn~lst be 
brought within two years after thc date the basis for the claim or dispute first arises. Bach party will pay its 
ownexxocnses to ~anici~ate in the arbitralioa irichdinz atiomeys' fees sad c m e s  for wimesscs, 
d&t pr&iiion, a& presentation of @videnee. 
" 
ZAKE SNELL PERRY & ASSOClATES 
There is little difference between men and women, younger and oIder customsrs, 
and wfiege and non-college educated oustomcts. 
e HYnally, even after being reminded of the agreement, customers 
overwhelmingly believe they have not agreed to this provision. Ninety-four 
pemnt of customers say they have not agreed to this provision or are unsure (74 
percent haven't apeed, 20 percent don't know). Only six percent o f  customers 
@ink they have agreed to this provision, Across demographic gmups nearly nine 
out of ten customen say they have not a& to this provisioa 
LAKE S N E L L  PERRY & ASSOCIATES 
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A Lake Sneli Perry 
& A S S O C I A T f S  I N C  M A  
Public Justice 
September 1 71h - 2oth, 2001 
1326 M Sweet NW, Suite 500 s Wshingmn, DC im36 tel. 2021776-9066 fax 202I776-9074 a iniodlrpa.com 
1000 Bmadway. Suite 294 a Oakland, CA 94607 . tel. 510,286-2097- fax 51W286.2022 . infadispa.com 
e p e  .em 
IC~:CLIEN~CATRIAL\OIQUE.F~ -7 
September 2001 FINAL WEIGHTED FREQUENCY 
Gaiiornla Statewide 800 Sample 
9 Minutes 
Gender of respondent 
male .................................................... 45 
......................... ................... female . 55 
CALIFORNIA 
September 2001 
Hello. My name i s .  I'm calling for California Opinion Surveys. We are canducting a public 
opinion survey and I would like to ask you some questions. We are not selling anything, and 1 will not ask 
you for a contribution or donation and your name will not be added to any mailing list. 
I. Are you a current AT&T customer? 
Yes ................................................................................ 100 
No ................................................................ TERMINATE 
(don't know) ASK: Could I please speak with romeone In your household &at la familiar 
with your phone servioe? [ I f  they say no one k n o w  then mark TQi.] 
2. How likely are you to read solicitations that you receive in the mail - extremely likeiy, very likeiy, 
somewhat likely, a little likely, or not likely at all? 
............................................................................................... Extremely likely 6 14 
Very likely ............................................................................................ : ......... 8 
4 
................................. A little likely 4 
Not likely at all 7 85 
......................... 2 
3. How likely are you to read solicitations you receive from AT&T - extremely likely, very likely, 
somewhat likely, a little likely, or not likely at ail7 
4. Do you remember receivtng a mailing from AT&T concerning a Consumer Service Agreement or do 
you not remember receiving this mailing or are you not sure? 
.................................................................... Remember receiving GO TO 12.6 13 
Don't remember receiving GO TO Q.5 ........................... ... ......................... 74 
................................................................................... Not sure GO TO Q.5 13 
IF Q.d-2 or 3, ASK: 
5 Do you remember seeing anything from AT&T about an arbitration provision7 
Yes GO TO Q.8 
No GO TO (2.9 ..................... ... .................................................................. 
(don't know) GO TO Q.9 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 7 - 1 Cslifornia Statewide page 2 
IF QA.1, ASK: 
6. What did you do when you received the AT&TConsumerSewice Agreement- did you read all of it, 
did you read parts of it, did you scan it did you not read it, or aren't you sure? 
Read allof it ............................................................................................. 21 
.................................................................................. ............. Read parts of it : 35 
............................................................................................................. Scan it 30 
Did not read it .................................................................................................. 10 
.......... Not sure .......................... .. 4 
IF Q.4=1, ASK: 
7. Do you remember seeing anything in the Consumer Service Agreement about an arbitration 
provision? 
.................................................. .................................... Yes GO TO Q.8 .. 40 
NO 00 TO Q.9 .............................................................................................. 48 
(don't know) GO TO Q.9 ............................................................................. $2 
IF Q.5 or 0.7-1.l, ASK: 
8. Thinking about the arbitration Provision, did you read all of the arbitration provision, did you read parts 
of it, did you scan it, did you not really read it, or aren't you sure? 
Read all of it .................... .. ................................................................... 27 
Read parts of i ............................ 31 
Scan it .......................................................................................................... 27 
Did not read ..................................................................................................... 70 
..................................................................... Not sure .................................. . 5 
RESUME ASKING ALL 
9. Based on what you know do you think a contract was formed between AT&T and yourself as a result 
of this Consumer Service Agreement or do you NOT think a contract was formed? 
Contract forme 10 
No contract formed .......................................................................................... 58 
(don'l know) ......................  ...... 32 
10. If you had a major dispute with ATST that you wanted to have resolved, would you expect that you 
would be able to take that dispute to court? 
Yes .................................................................................................... 60 
No ..... 22 
(don't know) ................................................................................................ l a  
11. If you had a major dispute with AT&T that you wanted to have resolved, would you expect that you 
would be able to talk to other people about it? 
Trial Lawyers for Public Justice -7 --' California Statewide page 3 
12. Now th~nklng abodt the Consumer Service Agreement which AT&T sent out to its customers and 
which deals with major customer disputes with ATRT end customers' nghh in those situations. 
The company says bzit if customers continued the~r Service and msde long dtstance calls after August I ,  
2001 or paid their normal phone blll, then they agreed to abide by the Agreement Other W O D ! ~  sav that 
customers shouid only be assumed to have agreed to the Consumer Service ~greement if they kniwingly 
and voluntarily signed something or notrfisd the company that they will pattinpate. 
Which statement comes closer to your vlew- that continued use of the service or paying a bill shows 
agreement with the Consumer Service Agreement Or  that Customers' ShoUid have to knowingly and 
-. 
voluntarily opt into the Agreement? 
................................................. Continued use of service shows agreement 1 I 
Customers should have to opt into ....................... .. .................................... 78 
(don't know) ................................................................................................... 11 
13. Now what if the Consumer Service Agreement included limits on fundamentai rights such as the right 
to free SDeeCh when vou have a dis~uie wifh the companv. Which statement cames closer to vour 
~ .- , 
view- that continueduse ofthe service shows agreement with the Consumer ~ e r v i c i ~ ~ r e e r n e n t  or 
that customers' shouid have to knowingly and voluntarily opt into the Agreement? 
.............. ........... .................... Continued use of service shows agreement . : 8 
Customer6 shouid have to opt into ............................. .......... ........................... 7Q 
(don't V.now) ................................................................................................... 13 
Now let me read to you portions of the arbitration provision in the Consumer Service Agreement 
This section provides for resoiution of disputes through final and binding arbitration before a neutral 
arbitrator instead of in a court by a judge or jury or through a class action. This includes any dispute 
based on any product, service or advertising having a connection with this Agreement. No dispute may be 
joined with another lawsuit, or in arbitration with a dispute of any other person, or resolved on e class-wide 
basis. The arbitrator may not award damages that are not expressly authorized by this Agreement and 
may not award punitive damages or attorneys' fees unless such damages are expressly authoriied by a 
statute. Any arbitration shall remain confidential. Neither you nor ATeT may disciose the existence, 
conlent or results of any arb.tratton or award Any claim or dispute arls ng out of or relat~ng to th~s 
agreement must ce brouqht wlthtn two vears alter the date the basts for the clam or olspute first arlses 
~ a c h  party will pay its orin expenses td participate in the arbitration, inciuding attorneys;fees and 
expenses for witnesses, document production, and presentation of evidence. 
14. Do you remember reading or seeing this section in the Consumer Service Agreement? 
15. Do you think you have agreed to this provision In the Consumer Service Agreement or do you think 
you have NOT agreed to it? 
.Trial ~Bivyers for Public Justice -f - Callfornla Statewide page 4 
RESUME ASKING ALL 
Thank you . The few remaining questtons are for dasslficalion purposes only . 
16 . What is your age? (CODE 101 FOR DON'T KNOW) 
IF REFUSED: I am gong to read you some age categories. Stop me v r h ~  we get to your category 
18-24 years .............................................................................................................. 7 
25-29 ..................................................................................................................... 8 
30-34 ................................................................................................................... 10 
35-39 ..................................................................................................................... 9 
40-44 .................................................................................................................. 12 
45-49 ....................................................................................................................... 9 
50-54 .................................................................................................................... 8 
55-59 ...................................................................................................................... 6 
60-64 .................................................................................................................... 5 
Over 64 ........................................ ; .......................................................................... 21
................................................................................................. (refusedldon't know) 4 
17 . Are you married. single. separated. widowed. or divorced? 
Married ......................... . ................................................................................... 80 
Single .................... . ............................................................................................ 20 
Separatedldivorced ................................................................................................ 8 
Widowed ....................................................................................................... 10 
(don't know) ........................................................................................................... 2 
18 . {IF FEMALE RESPONDENTJ Do you have a paid job. half-time or more. ouhide your home or 
would you say that your work is mainly at home? 
Employed ...................................................................................................... 60 
At  hom 
(don' 
19 . How would you describe the area in which you live-Do you live in a city with over a million people. in 
a smaller city. in a suburban area outside a dty. in a small town. or in a rural area? 
City (i million+) .................................................................................................... 2 9 6 4  
.......................... ....................................................................... Smallercity ... 35 
Suburban area .................................................................................................... 20 
I - Triei iakyert: for Public Justice ' California Statewide page 5 
I 
0 20. What is the last year of schooling that you have w 
I [CIRCLE ONE - DO NOT READ] I - llthgrade .............................. . .,...... .......................................................... 7 
High school graduate .................................................................................... 31 
Non-college post H.S.(e.g. tech) ......................................................................... 4 
Some college (incl. jr. college or associate degree) ........................................ 2t
Qllege graduate .......................... .... ................................................................ 28 
Post-graduate school ...................................................... : ................................ 8
................................................................................................ (don? know) I 
21/22. Just to make sure we have a representative sample, what is your race') 
DO NOT READ 
White ................................................................................................................. 67 
Black ....................................................................................................................... 7 
............................................... Hispanic (Puerto Rican. Mexican-American, etc.) 'i6 
Asian ............................ ............ ......................................................................... :..... 5 
(ot!er) ................................................................................................................. 2 
(don't knowlrefused) ............................................................................................... 3 
23. What is your zip code? 
And finaiiy, strictiy for verification purposes, can I have just your first name? 
And your phone number to make sure it is correctly marked off of our iist? 
That completes our public opinion survey. Thank you very much for your time and cooperation, 
and have a pleasant (daylevening). 
EDUCATION 
Young men 
Men underthe age of 45 
Young women 
Women under the age of 45. 
Older men 
Men aged 45 or older. 
Older women 
Women aged 45 or older. 
B.S. Grad 
Respondents with no more than a high school diploma 
Post-14,s. 
Respondents with some post high school education, such as 
technical or vocational school or some college education. 
Non-coil 
Respondents who do not have a coilege diploma. 
Coli prad 
Respondents with at least a colIege degree. 
GENDERiEDUCATION No coilege men 
Male respondents who have not graduated from college 
College men 
Male respondents who have graduated from college. 
No college women 
Female respondents who have not graduated from college. 
College women 
Female respondents who have graduated from college. 
FEMALE 
WORK STATUS Working women 
Female reswndents who have a  aid iob, half-time or 
. - 
more, outs;de the home. 
Homemakers 
Female respondents work mainly at home. 
Female respondents over the age of 64 whose work is 
mainly at home. 
MARITAL STATUS Married 
Respondents who are married. 
@i& 
Respondents who are single and have never been married. 
Separated/Divorced/Wldowed 
Respondents who are separated, divorced, or widowed 
DEIMOGWIHC AREA City lmi14 
Respondents who live in a city with a population over one 
million. 
Small city 
Respondents who live in a city with a population under one 
million. 
Suburbs 
Respondents who Iive in areas surrounding a big or smaller 
ciry. 
Small town 
Respondents who live in a smail town. 
Rural 
-
Respondents who live in a rural area. 
Urban 
-
Respondents who live in a city with a populaiion over one 
million or Iive in a city with a population under one 
million. 
Rural/ Small town 
Respondents who live in a rural area or small town 
RACE 
Respondents who identify themselves as White. 
Black 
-
Respondents who identify themselves as black or African 
American. 
Hisaanic 
Responden* who identify themselves as Wispanic. 
Asiap 
Respondents who identify themselves ;is Asian 
LA Coune  
Los h g e l e s  
Orange County 
Orange 
Inland Empire 
Riverside, San Bemadino 
San Diego 
Imperiaf, San Diego 
Central Coast 
Monterey, San Louis Obispo, SantaBarbara, Ventura 
Fresoa 
Fresno, Invo, Kern, Kings, Madera, Mariposa, Merced, San 
Benito, Tulare 
Sacramento 
Alpine, Arnador, Calveras, Colusa, El Dorado, Mono, 
~evada,  Placer, Sacramento, San Joaquin. Solano, 
Stanislaus, Sutter, Toulumne, Yoio, Yuba. 
Bay Area 
Alameda, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa 
CNZ 
North 
-
Butte, Del Norte, Glenn, Humboldt, Lake, Lassen, 
Mendocino. Modoc, Plumas, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou. 
Tehma, Trinity 
North Bay Area 
Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, Sonoma 
STJRVEY METHODOLOGY 
Lake Snell Peny & Associates designed and administered this survey which was 
conducted by telephone using professional interviewers. The survey reached a total of 800 
AT&T customers, at least 18 years old in the state of California . The survey was conducted 
statewide September 17* through September 20*, 2001. 
Telephone numbers for the surrey were drawn from a random digit dial sample (RDD). 
The sample was stratified geographically by county based on the population in each region. The 
data were weighted slightly by race. 
In intemreting survey results, all sample surveys are subject to possible sampling error; 
that is, the results of a survey may differ fiom those which would be obtained if the entire 
population were interviewed The size of the sampling error depends upon both the total number 
of respondents in the surrey and the percentage distribution of responses to a particular qwstion. 
For example, on question 9, which all respondents answered, 58% said there was not contlaot 
formed based on AT&T consumer service agreement. We can be 95% confident that the tnte 
percentage will fall within +/- 3.5 percentage points of this percentage, or from 54.5% to 61.5%. 
The table below represents the estimated sampling error for different percentage distributions of 
responses. The sampling error for subgroups is greater. 
Sampling Error by Percentage 
(at 95 in 100 confidence level) 
Lakc Snel l  Perry and Assmietes: Page 1 
2 . LIKELIHOM Of 
ReADlNG WAIL 
SOLICITATIONS ....... 
€xt~eme<y l i k e l y  ...,.. 
V e r y t i k e l y  ........... 
Scnawhsr ( i k e l y  ....... 
A l i t t l e  l i k e l y  ....... 
N o t l i k e l y s t a l l  .... (Oon'tkmw) ......... 
L i k e l y  ...... : ......... 
Unl!kely .............. 
( D o n ' t  knou ) ......... 
3 . LIKELIHOM OF 
READING AT&i HAIL 
SOLlClTATlON5 ...... 
E x r r e n e t y l i k e l y  ...... 
V e r y l i k e l y  ........... 
Senevhat I l k e l y  ...,. .. 
A l i t t l e  likeiy ....... 
Not l i t e l y a t a l l  ..... 
tbon' tkwu)  ......... 
Ltke ly  ................ 
Unl i ke ly  .............. (Don'tknow ).. ....... 
4 . RENEWER RECElVlUG 
AYbl CONSUHER 
SERVICE AGREEHEHT 
NAILING ............ 
aemmtRrrecciuing .. .. 
.......... (&ofsure) ........... 
?oral ................. 
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David F. Capps 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 
PlaintiffIDefendant 
IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COL, x i  
FILED 
AT /D;od O'CLOCK-.P&.M. 
0 B MAR 2 0 2007 &P 43 UTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F CAPPS, ) 
MIRIAM G CARROLL, ) Case No CV-2005-36747 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
) MEMORANDUMBYMBNA 
vs ) AMERICA BANK IN 
) OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N A ,  ) MOTION FOR 
) RECONSIDERATION 
Defendant, ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
) Combined with 
Plaintiff, ) Case No. CV-2006-37201 
) 
VS. 1 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
, 
COMES NOW David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll ("Capps and 
Carroll") and hereby submits their Rebuttal of Plaintiff's Memorandum by MBNA 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion for Reconsideration regarding 
Delaware choice-of-law provisions and related matters, as follows: 
I 
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW 
There is a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the agreement between 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. ("MBNA) and Capps and Carroll. That choice-of-law 
provision was not valid when it was placed in the agreement by MBNA undei 
Delaware law and constitutes a misrepresentation of a material fact by MBNA in 
the construction of the agreement. 6 Del. Code S2708 clearly states that "a 
Delaware choice of law provision shall not apply to contracts, agreements or 
undertakings less than $100,000." The Delaware choice-of-law provision lacked 
legality when it was placed in the agreement and was thus void ab initio. 
In addition, the ldaho Credit Code, § 28-41-201(8) provides that "the 
following agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated 
credit sales, regulated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this act applies: 
(a) That the law of another state shall apply;" The ldaho Credit Code, in § 28-41- 
106 also provides that "(I) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a debtor may 
not waive or agree to forgo rights or benefits under this act." 
Clearly, under both Delaware law and ldaho law the Delaware choice-of- 
law provision in the agreement is not valid. MBNA argues that because Capps 
and Carroll and this court were deceived by MBNA before this court's September 
14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, and their deception has now been 
discovered, that because of the passage of time, the deception should now be 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
accepted as truth. MBNA either knew, or should have known, that the Delaware 
choice-of-law provision in their agreement was not valid under 6 Del. Code fj 
2708 when it was placed in the contract. This is a misstatement of a material 
fact. MBNA's continued insistence on the Delaware choice-of-law in this case 
constitutes a fraud upon the court. MBNA also argues that because Capps and 
Carroll have discovered this fraud late in the judicial process, that this court 
should accept the fraud as truth and not allow the fraud to be presented to this 
court. In doing so, MBNA is asking this court to assist in perpetuating the fraud 
upon the court, thus becoming complicit in this fraud in the process. 
I1  
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS NOT VALID 
MBNA states that "CarrolllCapps assert that the Delaware choice-of-law 
provision, admittedly in the credit card agreement between the parties, is 
nevertheless invalid, claiming that 6 De. Code $2708 "prohibits contracts less 
than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision." 
CarrolllCapps have raised this same objection on at least two previous 
occasions, MBNA has provided legal argument on both occasions demonstrating 
I 
that CarrolllCapps' repeated assertion in this regard is legally wrong and the 
court has rejected this same argument by Carroll/Capps on those previous 
occasions. This argument is no more meritorious the third time around." 
(Emphasis added). There is no record of this court having rejected the argument 
by Capps and Carroll on any occasion. This is another misstatement of a 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
material fact. To date, this court has rendered no such decision rejecting Capps 
and Carroll's argument that the Delaware choice-of-law provision is invalid 
IDAHO RECOGNITION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS 
MBNA asserts that "Intentionally or otherwise, CarrolllCapps mis-read 
ldaho Code 528-41-201(8) which, in truth, provides that an agreement may be 
invalidated if it provides that the laws of another state applies and that the parties 
consent to the jurisdiction of another state, and that fixes venue." (Emphasis 
added). MBNA then argues that because the card agreement does not fix 
jurisdiction and venue in Delaware, the claim of Capps and Carroll that this 
section of the ldaho Credit Code invalidates the Delaware choice-of-law is 
without support or merit 
The ldaho Credit Code 5 28-41-201(8) states: 
"(8) Except as provided in Subsection (7) of this section, the following 
agreements by a buyer or debtor are invalid with respect to regulated 
credit sales, regulated loans, or modifications thereof, to which this act 
applies: 
(a) That the law of another state shall apply; 
(b) That the buyer or debtor consents to the jurisdiction of another 
state; and 
(c) That fixes venue." 
There is no statement that an agreement may be invalidated. It states that 
the following agreements are invalid. There is no and in this section of the Code. 
There is nothing combining the elements (a) through (c). There is only a list of 
the agreements which are invalid, "That the law of another state shall apply" 
being one of them. Delaware law is not valid for modifying this agreement 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
MBNA argues that the distinction between the "business based contract" 
in Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 ldaho 366, 913 P. 2d 582 (1996) and the regulated 
consumer "credit card agreements" used by MBNA is meaningless. The 
distinction is not meaningless t~ the State of Idaho, which has chosen to let 
business based contracts alone and to regulate consumer credit contracts. The 
fact that these consumer credit contracts are regulated by the State of ldaho and 
the business based contracts are not is the only distinction necessary. The State 
of ldaho has regulated consumer credit agreements, transactions, and any 
modifications thereof, and this agreement falls under that regulation. 
IV 
DOES IDAHO LAW LEAD TO THE SAME RESULT? 
While Delaware law may appear to authorize a unilateral amendment to 
an open ended credit card agreement (an interpretation which is contested by 
Capps and Carroll), ldaho rejects unilateral amendments to agreements. 
Therefore the result of the application of Delaware law and ldaho law do not lead 
to the same conclusion. While the ldaho Credit Code provides that a creditor 
may change terms of an open-end consumer credit account, there is no 
authorization to do so unilaterally. Under ldaho law there must be a "meeting of 
the minds" and a common understanding of the terms for an agreement to exist. 
Lacking that "meeting of the minds" or common understanding, there is no 
agreement. In addition, where the agreement deals with the waiver of a 
substantial, constitutionally protected (7th Amendment - U.S. Constitution), right, 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSlTlON TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, neither of which is present in this 
case. Under ldaho law no valid arbitration agreement was created. 
v 
CONCLUSION 
Capps and Carroll seek, as they have from the very beginning, to have the 
arbitration awards against them overturned. MBNA argues that this must have 
been done through a timely ldaho Code §7-912 motion to vacate, which MBNA 
claims was never filed by Capps andlor Carroll. MBNA cites Driver v. SI Corp., 
139 ldaho 423,426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003) and Bingham County Comm'n v. 
Interstate Electric Co., 105 ldaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983) in support of this 
position. The issue in both cases is whether an application was submitted within 
90 days of notification of the arbitration award, specifying the grounds for 
vacating the arbitration award. The five recognized grounds are specified by 
statute: 
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(2) there was evidence of partiality by an arbitrator; 
(3) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(4) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing to the prejudice of a 
party; and 
(5) there was no arbitration agreement and the party did not participate in 
the hearing without objecting. 
In the case of Capps, an award letter was issued on September 30'~ 2005 
by the National Arbitration Forum which was received on October 7'h 2005. 
Capps filed an application (Complaint and Summons) with the District Court on 
November 3rd 2005, well within the 90 day time limit. The complaint specified 
that Capps had filed a MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
OBJECTION TO ARBITRATION with the National Arbitration Forum based on 
the lack of an agreement to arbitrate. The complaint also specified in "(29) That 
the arbitrator exceeded his authority to decide the matter and illegally entered an 
award against Plaintiff, absent jurisdiction when no agreement existed between 
the parties to arbitrate." This establishes the required conditions: ( I )  that 
application be made within the 90 day limit (application was filed 27 days from 
notice to filing in the bistrict Court) and that the grounds for vacating the award 
be specified (the Complaint specified that a timely objection was made to 
arbitration and that there was no agreement to arbitrate - (5) above). The 
Complaint also asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his authority (item 3 of the 
grounds for vacating an arbitration award). The complaint urged the District 
Court to (43) grant immediate relief from the arbitration award and "(44) That the 
award must be vacated immediately before further harm is done to Plaintiff" 
( C ~ P P ~ ) .  
In the case of Carroll, an award letter was issued on August 3rd 2005 by 
the National Arbitration Forum which was received on August 6'h 2005. Carroll 
filed an application (Complaint and Summons) with the District Court on 
September 3oth 2005, 55 days after receiving the notice of award letter, well 
within the 90 day time limit. The rest of the conditions are exactly the same as 
with Capps. The conditions required by ldaho Code §7-912 have been met by 
both Capps and Carroll. 
MBNA argues that Capps and Carroll's Motion for Reconsideration 
presents no new evidence nor does it provide any grounds under the ldaho 
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OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This is not true. Capps and Carroll provided new 
evidence regarding the validity of the Delaware choice-of-law provision upon 
which this court based its September 14'~ 2006 Memorandum Decision and 
Order. Capps and Carroll demonstrated that their Motion for Reconsideration 
was based on errors in fact as well as errors in law - results of MBNA's 
deception before this court. 
Capps and Carroll also became aware of new evidence regarding bias on 
the part of the National Arbitration Forum, (item 2 of the grounds for vacating an 
arbitration award) and presented the court within 90 days of discovery with this 
new evidence as required. Capps and Carroll also discovered new evidence 
indicating that the arbitration award was procured by fraud or other undue means 
(item 1 of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award) and presented that to 
the court as well within 90 days as required. In reconsideration, the arbitration 
award is being challenged on four different grounds: (1) Fraud or other undue 
means; (2) Arbitrator bias; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his authority; and (5) no 
agreement to arbitrate. Any one of these grounds is sufficient for this court to 
change its decision and vacate the award letters. This is a proper use of a Rule 
I I (b) Motion for Reconsideration or a Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a 
Judgment. 
Before the court are four reasons, with appropriate evidence, for changing 
its September 141h 2006 decision and vacating the arbitration awards against 
Capps and Carroll. Capps and Carroll therefore pray that this court will change 
its September 14 '~  2006 decision and vacate the award letters against them. 
REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN 
OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Dated this / I ? ~ d a y  of March, 2007 
BV\ \ ~ a m \ J .  L q c - r p . .  
Miriam 
\ I 
G. ~ a r r ~ l l ,  P l a e f e n d a n t ,  in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F, Capps, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a 
true and correct copy of this REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM BY 
MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION to the attorneys for MBNA America Bank, N.A. by Certified 
mail # 78&1(60 U802 7 2+ (Jeffrey M. Wilson) and Certified 
Mail # 7w @&Jr 7$&"04+2~3 1 (William L. Bishop) this 19 
day of March, 2007, at the following addresses: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
William L. Bishop Jr. 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 11-2186 
720 Olive way, Suite 1301 
Seattle, WA 98101 
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Pg 9 of 9. 
- - 
ba 61 n 
Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
&? ?y .' 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 
PlaintifflDefendant, in propria persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
) Case No. CV-36747 
Plaintiff, ) 
I 
) POST-HEARING 
\ MOTION TO OPEN 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) LIMITED DISCOVERY 
ON THE ISSUE OF 
Defendant, ) STANDING 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., j 
1 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. 1 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, 1 
) 
Defendant, ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2006-37320 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
) 
Defendant, 1 
1
POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE 
OF STANDING Pg. 1 of 4. 
- 2 54 5 
COMES NOW the PlaintiffIDefendant, David F. Capps and Miriam G. 
Carroll, (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and respectfully moves this court to 
open limited discovery on the issue of standing in this case. This motion is 
necessary because jurisdiction cannot be assumed, but must be proved by 
MBNA in this case before this court can properly render judgment on the validity 
of an agreement to arbitrate. Without proper jurisdiction, any judgment rendered 
by this court is open to collateral attack as a void judgment. it is therefore 
prudent for this court to allow limited discovery on the issue of standing (subject 
matter jurisdiction) so this issue can be fully resolved before rendering judgment 
on any other issues. 
While this motion may appear late in the process, jurisdiction is not a time 
related issue, and can be raised at any point. Judgments rendered without 
proper jurisdiction are void ab inifio and can be attacked at any time, even 
decades after the judgment has been rendered. In the interest of truth and 
justice, Capps and Carroll seek limited discovery on the BA Credit Card Master 
Trust and whether MBNA sold the Receivables in question to the trust, and if the 
receivables were in the trust, when and if the Receivables were re-purchased by 
MBNA. Capps and Carroll also will seek information regarding MBNA's role as 
Servicer for the BA Credit Card Master Trust and the capacity in which MBNA 
has filed this action in this court. 
The proposed limited discovery would entail the following: 
POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE 
OF STANDING - Pa. 2 of4. 
1. Identification of the person or persons responsible for determining which 
accounts are dedicated to the BA Credit Card Master trust. 
2. Deposition of the identified person or persons involved in the 
determination and inspection of the documents on which they rely. 
3. Documents relating to the sale andlor transfer of the Receivables from 
MBNA to the BA Credit Card Master Trust. 
4. Documents relating to the sale andlor transfer of the Receivables from the 
BA Credit Card Master Trust to MBNA. 
5. The Pooling and Servicing Agreement between MBNA and the BA Credit 
Card Master Trust. 
6. The factual determination of the true ownership of the Receivables in 
question and the history of that ownership. 
7. The true role of MBNA in this action. 
The answers to these questions are necessary for this court to determine the 
true standing of MBNA in this case. Standing (subject matter jurisdiction) must 
be resolved before any other judgment can be rendered. 
Dated this z 4 % a y  of May, 2007. 
Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona 
POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE 
OF STANDING Pg. 3 of 4. 
- 2 8 '7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of this POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED 
DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING to the attorneys for the 
DefendantIPlaintiff (MBNA) this day of May, 2007, by Certified Mail # 
7005 1160000276304330(Wilson)and#7005 1160000276304347(Bishop) 
at the following addresses: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
~o ise .  ID 83701 
William L. Bishop 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 11 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle. WA 981 01 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL 
DAVID F. CAPPS 
) 
) Case No. CV-2005-36747 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) MEMORANDUM ON 
) COURT JURISDICTION 
vs . ) COVERING DISCOVERY 
1 ON STANDING ISSUE 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A , 1 
) 
Defendant, ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Combined with CV-2006-37320 
VS. ) 
) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON 
STANDING ISSUE Pg. 1 of 7. 
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COME NOW the PlaintiffslDefendants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. 
Carroll (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and submit their MEMORANDUM ON 
COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON STANDING ISSUE as 
follows: 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Capps and Carroll have raised the issue of standing, claiming that MBNA 
does not have standing in this court. There is sufficient information in publicly 
available documents to demonstrate that MBNA America Bank, N.A. (hereinafter 
"MBNA) has sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit to a third party, and 
either does not own the debt receivables involved, or has adopted the role of 
debt collector for a non-lender and has acquired the alleged debt receivables 
after they have gone into default or were delinquent. If MBNA has sold the 
alleged debt receivables and/or acquired them after they were in default, then 
MBNA needs a permit from the Director of Finance for the State of ldaho in order 
to gain standing in an ldaho state court. A search of the collection agency permit 
holders in the State of ldaho reveals that MBNA does not have the required 
permit. Discovery into the standing issue is necessary to establish whether or 
not MBNA can maintain the above titled actions against Capps and Carroll. 
This court has requested briefing on whether this court has jurisdiction to 
open discovery on the standing issue, or whether that issue should have been 
decided by the arbiter in arbitration. 
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON 
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The jurisdiction of the arbitrator in arbitration is strictly dependant on the 
agreement to arbitrate established between the parties involved. In Hecla Mining 
Co., v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 ldaho 557, the court stated, 
[9] "It is beyond cavil that arbitrator's powers stem from the agreement of 
the parties. United Steelworkers o f  America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358,4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960); Swift 
Industries Inc., v. Botany Industries, Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131, (3d Cir. 
1972); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104 (gth Cir. 1962). See also, H. 
S. Cramer and Co., v. Washburn-Wilson Seed Co., 68 ldaho 416, 420-1, 
195 P.2d 346, 349 (1 948); Western Const., Inc. v. Oregon-Southern ldaho 
and Wyoming Disf. Council of Laborers and Laborers Local Union 267, 
101 ldaho 145, 609 P.2d 1136 (1980). The matters submitted for 
arbitration by the parties are relevant in determining the scope of the grant 
of power, and must be considered along with the original agreement to 
arbitrate." 
The jurisdiction of the court is equally established. In Oil, Chemical & 
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-C/O Local 2-652 v. EG & G Idaho, lnc., 
11 5 ldaho 671, the court stated, 
[ I ]  "A preliminary issue involves the role of the courts: whether the court 
has jurisdiction and authority to determine the arbitrability of these 
differences. On this question, there is no dispute. Both parties cite AT  & 
T Technologies, Inc., v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 106 
S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986), which supports our preliminary holding 
that the question of arbitrability is a question of law properly decided by 
the court." 
See also, Lewis v. CEDU Educational Services, Inc., 135 ldaho 139 
The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate is a critical factor in 
arbitration proceedings. In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 87 S 
Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270, the U.S. Supreme Court divided arbitration cases into 
two distinct categories: where the challenge is to the contract as a whole, and 
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON 
STANDING ISSUE 
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where the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself. The court clearly 
established that a challenge to the contract as a whole which contained an 
arbitration clause was for the arbitrator to decide, while a challenge to the 
arbitration clause itself was for the courts to decide. The arbitrator, deriving 
hislher only authority from the arbitration agreement itself, cannot decide on the 
validity of the arbitration clause. Only a court can make that determination. See 
also Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 
L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006). 
While the Federal Arbitration Act [FAA] specifies a federal district court for 
making decisions on agreements to arbitrate, the arbitration law appl~es in state 
court as well as federal court, see Soufhland Corp., v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 
S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). The validity of an arbitration clause must be 
decided by a court, not the arbitrator. With the adoption of the Title 7, Chapter 9 
of the ldaho Code, the Uniform Arbitration Act, courts in the State of ldaho have 
jurisdiction over the validity of arbitration agreements. Once a court validates the 
arbitration agreement, then, and only then, does an arbitrator gain jurisdiction 
over the parties. Until that happens, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to decide 
anything. 
111 
STANDING 
There are two issues which cannot be assumed in the beginning of a 
lawsuit: the jurisdiction of the court, and the standing of the Plaintiff. The Uniform 
Arbitration Act of the ldaho Code establishes this court's iurisdiction. The issue 
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION COVERING DISCOVERY ON 
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of standing is for the Plaintiff to prove. In Miles v. ldaho Power Co., 116 ldaho 
635, the court stated, 
[5] "The doctrine of standing focuses on the party seeking relief and not on 
the issue the party wishes to have adjudicated. Valley Forge College v. 
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464,102 S.Ct 752,70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). 
While the doctrine is easily stated, it is imprecise and difficult in its 
application. O'Hair v. White, 675 F.2d 680 (Former 5'h Cir. 1982). 
However, the major aspect of standing has been explained: 
The essence of the standing inquiry is whether the party seeking to 
invoke the court's jurisdiction has "alleged such a personal stake in 
the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete 
adversariness which sharpens the presentation upon which the 
court so depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions." As refined by subsequent reformation, this requirement 
of "personal stake" has come to be understood to require not only a 
"distinct palpable injury" to the plaintiff, but also a "fairly traceable" 
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged 
conduct. (Citations omitted.) 
Duke Power Co., v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72, 98 S.Ct. 
2620, 2630, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). 
Thus, to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of standing, litigants 
generally must allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial 
likelihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the 
claimed injury. Id. At 79, 98 S.Ct at 2633." 
NIBNA sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit to a third party and was 
paid for those receivables. MBNA cannot now come back and claim it was 
injured. That is the prerogative of the actual owner of the receivables, not 
MBNA. 
Since an arbitrator has no jurisdiction until a court of competent jurisdiction 
has validated the agreement to arbitrate (once challenged), an arbitrator cannot 
decide standing, or anything else without a court order validating the agreement 
to arbitrate. This court has jurisdiction to decide both the question of the validity 
of the arbitration agreement and the Plaintiff's standing. 
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The real question becomes: which question gets decided first, the validity 
of the arbitration agreement, or the standing issue? The simple fact is: if MBNA 
does not have standing in this court, it does not matter what issue MBNA would 
like to have decided, they are not entitled to relief of anything. The standing 
issue must be decided first. If MBNA actually has standing in this court, then, 
and only then, can the court entertain the issue of whether the alleged arbitration 
agreement is valid. Without standing MBNA can request nothing of this court 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Capps and Carroll have presented publicly available information indicating 
that MBNA has sold the receivables involved in this lawsuit and does not have 
standing in this court. According to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, this court 
is in control of discovery. This court therefore has the jurisdiction and the 
authority to order limited discovery to be re-opened on the issue of standing in 
order to establish whether MBNA is entitled to be a party to this lawsuit or not. 
This is a fundamental threshold Issue and it needs to be established and decided 
before any other issue is addressed by this court 
Capps and Carroll are well within their rights to request that limited 
discovery be re-opened on the issue of standing in this case. This court has the 
jurisdiction and authority to make such an order, and in the interest of justice 
should do so. The standing of MBNA cannot be assumed, but must be proven. 
Capps and Carroll are seeking that proof. This court should order the requested 
discovery. 
MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICr'ION COVERING DISCOVERY ON 
STANDING ISSUE 2 9 4  Pg. 6 of 7. 
- 
- .  
9.P Dated this day of July, 2007 
- 
Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of this MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION 
COVERING DISCOVERY ONSTANDING ISSUE to the attorney for the 
~efendantl~laintiff this '23q day of July, 2007, by Certified Mail # 
70t75- ((66 i%DP 763O-WA at the following address: 
Alec T. Pechota 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MI'RIAM G. CARROLL, 
DAVID F. CAPPS, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2005-36747 
f 
Plaintiffs, i 
VS. ) MOTION TO VACATE 
) VOID JUDGMENT 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
) 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
Plaintiff. 
) 
) Combined with: CV-2006-37320 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, 1 
) 
Defendants, ) 
) 
COME NOW the PlaintiffsIDefendants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. 
Carroll, (hereinafter "Capps and Carroll") and submit their MOTION TO VACATE 
Pg. 1 of 8 
VOID JUDGMENT under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as 
follows: 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
MBNA America Bank, N.A., (hereinafter "MBNA") has come into this court 
seeking confirmation of arbitration award letters issued by the National Arbitration 
Forum (hereinafter "the NAF") against both Capps and Carroll. Those award 
letters are based on an alleged arbitration agreement purportedly added to the 
cardholder agreement by MBNA. MBNA submitted a claim to the NAF. Capps 
and Carroll both sent an objection and motion to dismiss to the NAF based on no 
agreement to arbitrate, see EXHIBIT 1 & 3. The NAF received these objections 
along with a Motion to Dismiss, see EXHIBIT 2 & 4. The NAF ignored the 
objections and proceeded to issue award letters against both Capps and Carroll. 
The arbitrator either knew, or should have known, that once the arbitration 
agreement itself was challenged, as was the case with Capps and Carroll, that 
the NAF had no jurisdiction to proceed without a court order compelling 
arbitration. The award letters were thus without proper jurisdiction and are void 
ab inifio. The arbiter cannot be clothed with jurisdiction after the fact If the 
award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever void. 
I1 
JURISDICTION OF THE ARBITRATOR 
In Prima Paint, v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395, 106 S.Ct. 1801, 18 
L.Ed.2d 1270, (see also, Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 
MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT 
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440, 126 S.Ct. 1204, 163 L.Ed.2d 1038 (2006)) the U.S. Supreme Court divided 
arbitration cases into two distinct categories: where the challenge is to the 
contract as a whole, and where the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself. 
The court clearly established that a challenge to the contract as a whole which 
contained an arbitration clause was for the arbitrator to decide, while a challenge 
to the arbitration clause itself was for the courts to decide The arbitrator, 
deriving hislher only authority from the arbitration agreement itself, cannot decide 
on the validity of the arbitration clause. Only a court can make that 
determination. Once a party objects to arbitration based on no agreement to 
arbitrate, the arbitrator has no jurisdiction or authority to proceed. The Federal 
Arbitration Act [FAA] in Title 9, § 4 provides that, 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitrationmpetition any United 
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or inadmiralty of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement. 
MBNA failed to obtain a court order to compel arbitration. Without a court order 
to compel arbitration, the NAF could not gain jurisdiction. ldaho has followed the 
same principle. In adopting the Uniform Arbitration Act under ldaho Code § 7- 
On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 7- 
901, ldaho Code, and the opbosing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court 
shall order the parties to'proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party 
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed 
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order 
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall be 
denied. 
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A party's refusal to arbitrate based on the denial of the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate must be resolved by the court, not the arbitrator. 
The matter is also spelled out in MBNA America Bank, N.A., v. Boafa, 94 
Conn.App. 559, 893 A.2d 479, (2006) where the court held, 
"Because the arbitrator's jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the 
parties, a party who contests the making of a contract containing an 
arbitration provision cannot be compelled to arbitrate the threshold issue 
of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, only a court can make that 
decision", "In any given case, whether a particular dispute is arbitratable is 
a question for the court, and deference need not be given to the 
arbitrator's decision", . . ."  The arbitration provision in an agreement is, in 
effect, a separate and distinct agreement". 
Other states are deciding this issue in the same way. In MBNA America 
Bank, N.A., v. Credit, No.94380 (April 28, 2006), 132 P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006), the 
court held 
"An agreement to arbitrate bestows such jurisdiction. When the existence 
of the agreement is challenged, the issue must be settled by a court 
before the arbitrator may proceed. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402." "All 
we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent an apparently 
timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the existence of an agreement 
to arbitrate. Although no copy of this objection is in the record, MBNA's 
counsel admitted at oral argument before this court that his client 
'probably' has a copy of the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the 
appellant to demonstrate that the objection was so'mehow ineffective to 
trigger its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration. 
See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a demonstration, 
we, like the district court, have no choice but to accept Credit's version of 
events. Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the 
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the issue of the 
agreement's existence. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; K.S.A. 5-402. Neither MBNA, 
as the party asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the 
arbitrator was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though 
Credit had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. If there 
is a challenge to the arbitration, it is for the courts, not the arbitrator, to 
decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and whether the issue in 
dispute falls within the agreement to arbitrate." 
MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT 
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A party resisting arbitration may dispute the existence or validity of the 
agreement to arbitrate (see E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 347 Ark. 132, 60 
S.W.3d 436 (2001)). Before a court compels arbitration, it must resolve any 
claim concerning the validity of the contract containing the arbitration clause (see 
Mid-America Surgery Center, L.L.C. v. Schooler, 719 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999)), however, once it is satisfied that the parties contracted to submit their 
dispute to arbitration, the court is required to compel arbitration in accordance 
with the terms of that agreement. Conversely, in the absence of a contract 
conforming to the requirements of the applicable statute, the relief will be denied 
(see Moff v GaerBros., Inc., 22 Conn. Supp. 449, 174 A.2d 549 (Super Ct 
1961)) 
The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of seeking a 
prel~minary judicial determination as to the existence of a valid agreement to 
arbitrate (see Arrow Overall Supply Co. v. Peloquin Enterprises, 414 Mich. 95, 
323 N.W.2d 1 (1982)), and of proving the existence of such a contract (see Ex 
Parte Webb, 855 So. 2d 1031 (Ala. 2003)). 
MBNA has improperly come into this court seeking confirmation of void 
award letters. MBNA should have come into this court seeking to compel 
arbitration, and if successful, that court order would have established the 
arbitrator's jurisdiction and authority. The arbitrator cannot be clothed in 
jurisdiction retroactively. Jurisdiction must be established first. Without proper 
jurisdiction, any decision of the arbitrator is void ab initio. 
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VOlD JUDGMENTS 
In Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 ldaho 644 (App.) the court held that, 
[I-31 ... Rule 60(b) enunciates a variety of grounds upon which relief from 
a judgment may be obtained. Discretionary relief is permitted, under 
subsection (b)(l), for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect. Knight Ins., lnc., v. Knight, 109 ldaho 56, 58-59, 704 P 2d 960, 
962-63 (Ct.App 1985). However, relief from a void judgment pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) is nondiscretionary. Id. At 59, 704 P.2d at 963. 
[4] In order for a judgment to be considered void under Rule 60(b)(4), 
there generally must have been some jurisdictional defect in the court's 
authority to enter the judgment, because the court lacked either personal 
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 ldaho 
302, 306, 669 P.2d 191, 195 (1983); Dufur v. Nampa & Meridian lrr. Dist., 
128 ldaho 319, 324, 912 P.2d 687, 692 (Ct.App.1996). Accord 
Cockerham v. Zikratch, 127 Ariz. 230, 61 9 P.2d 739, 743 (Ariz. 1980); 
Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791, 795 (Utah 1988). Additionally, a 
judgment is void when a "court's action amounts to a plain usurpation of 
power constituting a violation of due process." Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1,6 
(1" Cir. 1995); accord Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 448 P.2d 490,494 
(1968); I 1  Charles A. Wright et al, Wright Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 2862, at 326-29 (2d ed.1995). 
The same essential rules apply to arbitrators as apply to courts. Once the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate was challenged by Capps and Carroll in 
arbitration, the NAF and the arbitrator no longer had subject matter jurisdiction, 
nor did they have personal jurisdiction over Capps or Carroll. The arbitrator, in 
deciding the arbitration claim, exerted a plain usurpation of power, constituting a 
violation of due process. Capps and Carroll have a Seventh Amendment 
protection of their right to a jury trial which was not knowingly, voluntarily, or 
intelligently waived. By proceeding to a decision, the arbitrator violated Capps 
and Carroll's right to due process 
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In State v. Bullis, 93 ldaho 749, the court held, 
17-91 A judgment rendered without jurisdiction is void and unenforceable. 
Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 ldaho 614, 8 P.2d 461 (1932); Wright v. Atwood, 
33 ldaho 455, 195 P. 625 (1921); Salifan v. Dashney, 219 Or. 553, 347 
P.2d 974 (1959); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, § 22, p. 327. It IS also 
fundamental that a writ of execution based on an invalid or void judgment 
is itself invalid. Garren v. Rollis, 85 ldaho 86, 375 P.2d 994 (1962); Evans 
v. City of American Falls, 52 ldaho 7, I I P.2d 363 (1 932). 
The award letters issued by the NAF against Capps and Carroll were 
issued without proper jurisdiction and are void and unenforceable. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
MBNA and the NAF erred in proceeding with arbitration once Capps and 
Carroll had challenged the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. MBNA should 
have proceeded to court to obtain an order compelling arbitration. If the court 
found that a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, that court order would have 
given the arbitrator jurisdiction to proceed. Without that court order, the award 
letters issued by the NAF lack jurisdiction and are void ab inifio. Capps and 
Carroll therefore move this court to vacate the award letter against Miriam G. 
Carroll in the amount of $30,241.41, file numberFA0503000443990, and to 
vacate the award letter against David F. Capps in the amount of $28,156.49, file 
number FA0506000498945 issued by the NAF as void judgments. 
Dated this w V d a y  of July, 2007. 
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Miriam G. Carroll, PlaintiffIDefendant, in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I. David F. Cams. do herebv certifv, under penaltv of perjury, that I mailed 
a true and correct coby of this MO~ION YO I3 JUDGMENT to the 
attorney for the DefendantlPlaintiff (MBNA) day of July, 2007, by 
Certified Mail # 1(60 0002 at the following 
address: 
Alec T. Pechota 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Of% E NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 4 1 
David F. Capps 
C/O HC- 11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION, OBJECTION TO 
ARBITRATION 
RESPONDENT, I 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two lrvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rockville, MD 20850 
240-386-3900 
CLAIMANT. 
Fonun File Number: FA0506000498945 
Account Number: 5490-3536-0367-4374 
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-3323 
I, David F. Capps, Respondent, hereby declare and state: 
1. That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of 
arbitration or any provision that allowed, for new terms to be added, such as arbitration. 
2. The agreement attached to the Claim filed with the National Arbitration Forum is not the 
agreement I entered into with Claimant and does not represent the original agreement. 
3. I have never been notitied or received any amendment containing arbitration clause, 
thus' giving me an opportunity to opt out of imy such change of terms; 
. . . . 
4. That thereis no igre&ent between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the 
Natibnal ~rbitrahon for& (~erehaftei' "Fonun"), or *'other Arbitration forum, or at all 
. . 
, , 
. ,  . .  
. . 
. . .  . 
. . 
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5. That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any 
way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceedmg; 
6 .  That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by 
proceeding on the claim; 
7. That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action 
whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack ofjurisdiction. 
I, David F. Capps declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under penalty 
of perjury. 
Signed by David F. Capps 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed 
on the 8th day of July, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1 160-0006-1461-3316 to 
the following party: 
Dated this 8th day of July, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted and signed by 
. . .  : ,) 
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NATIONAL 
ARBITRATION , "Jr- ,,,A i nA:.?:lj, 
,.sg?; .. '- -.<h \ July 12,2005 
FORUM' i i. 
.. ' ' ;uL 
1 8j) David F Capps Hc 11 Box 366 
- .  3, ~ 2 .  9.p Kamiah, ID 83536-0000 ..., ,. 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
C/O Wol~off & Abramso~ L.L.P. 
Paraleg& Department 
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection 
702 Kina Farm Blvd. 
TWO ~rv&ton Centre 
Rockville, MD 20850-5775 
RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v David F Capes 
File Number: PA0506000498945 
Claimant File Number: 5490353603674374 
Claimant Reference Number: 0138076967 
Dear Parties: 
 ti^& Arbitration Forum is receipt of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for h c k  of 
Jurisdiction; Objection to Arbitration, dated July 8,2005 for the above case. 
~~l~ 4 1 ~  of the Fo-'s Code of Procedure states, "If a Requst for i nvo lun t~  m a  is 
the only  quest for a Dirpositive Order, that Request may be determined at theD0cmentor 
Participatory Hearing." 
a 1  docmen& r u b ~ f t &  by the Respondent will be forwarded to the Arbitrator for review and 
consideration at the Document Hearing. 
hitule co~spondence received fkom the Pdiea regarding this matter will also be f~rwarded 
to the Arbitrator for review at the Document Hearing. 
Sincerely, 
Tom Cieslukowski 
Case Coordinator 
The Fwum $0. Box 50191 Mmneapds USA 55405.0191 H n w v a ~ ~ ~ ~ o n m m  8004742371 651 6 3 1 3 7 ~  631 0802 
- ' 3 0 7  
Miriam G. Carroll 
C/O HC-1 I Box 366 
Kamiah, ID, 83536 
208-935-7962 
IN THE NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM 
RESPONDENT, 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P 
Two Inrington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rockville, MD 20850 
1-800-830-2793 
CLAIMANT. 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION; OBJECTION TO 
ARBITRATION 
Forum File Number: FA0503000443990 
Claimant File Number: 0135832603 
Account Number: 43 13-033 1-1 100-6016 
Cert. Mail: 7004-1 160-0006-1461-2487 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, Respondent, hereby declare and state: 
1. That the original agreement I entered into with Claimant did not contain any provision of 
arbitration or any provision that allowed for new terms to be added, such as arbitration. 
2. I have never been notified or received any amendment containing an arbitration clause, 
thus giving me an opportunity to opt out of any such change of terms; 
3. That there is no agreement between the parties to resolve a dispute using arbitration or the 
National Arbitration forum (Hereinafter "Forum"), or any other Arbitration forum, or at all; 
4. That this Motion to Dismiss should not be construed as a submittal to Arbitration in any 
way whatsoever, and that I object to any such arbitration proceeding; 
Motion i6 Dismiss Page 1 of 2 
-- , 3 0 8  
5. That the National Arbitration Forum would be acting illegally and without jurisdiction by 
proceeding on the claim; 
6. That I discharge and prohibit the Forum from making any award or taking any other action 
whatsoever, except to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, declare that the statements herein and above are true and correct under 
penalty of perjury. 
Signed by Miriam G. Carroll 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was caused to be deposited and mailed 
on the 4th day of April, 2005, via Certified Mail Number 7004-1 160-0006-1 161-2494 to 
the following party: 
Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Two Irvington Centre 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Rochille, MD 20850 
Dated this 4th day of April, 2005. 
Respecthlly submitted and signed by 
Miriam G. Carroll, 
Motion to Dis 
- 1 ,  
- . -  
T6'Y Of 
NATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 
.- 
F O R M  
Miriam G Carroll 
Hc 11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410 
April 1 1,2005 
MBNA America Bak, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Ronald M. Abramson, Esq. 
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection 
702 King Farm Blvd. 
Two Irvington Centre 
Rockville, MD 20850-5775 
RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll 
File Number: FA0503000443990 
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016 
Claimant Reference Number: 0135832603 
Dear Parties: 
The National Arbitration Forum is in receipt of the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction; Objection to Arbitration dated April 4,2005 for the above case. 
All documents submitted by Respondent will be forwarded to the Arbitrator for review and 
consideration at the Document Hearing. 
All hture correspondence received from the Parties regarding this matter will also be forwarded 
to the Arbitrator for review at the Document Hearing. 
Sincerely, 
Tom Cieslukowski 
Case Coordinator 
The Forum PO. 80x50191 Minneapolis USA 55105.0191 600,4742371 651.631.3700 ~~651.631.0802 
-- 
. .. 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
00 
'+ IDAHO COUNN DISTRICT COURT David F. Capps a FILED 
HC-I 1 Box 366 
~ ~ a o c L o c K _ P ~  
Kamiah, ID 83536 
% 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 
PlaintiffslDefendants, in propria persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) Case No. CV-2005-36747 
PlaintiffslDefendants, ) 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
VS. ) 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF IDAHO ) 
I, Miriam G. Carroll, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes, 
and if called upon to testify, would state as follows: 
I. That I am over the age of 18 years of age. 
2. That I am a resident of ldaho County, State of ldaho. 
3. That I am a patty to the above titled lawsuit. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT - 3 1.1 
- 
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4. That I open all mail which I receive addressed to me. 
5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope. 
6. That I do not recall any offer or notice to amend the card agreement with 
MBNA America Bank to include arbitration. 
7.  That I have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to 
arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any time. 
8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate this 
dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank. 
9. Further deponent sayeth not. 
Dated this (6% day of August, 2007 
Miriam G. Carroll 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
The above identified person appeared before me this W-$h day of August, 
2007. 
, 
County of Idaho, State of ldaho. 
My Commission expires 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
- 3 1 2  
- * A 
Pg. 2 of 2. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of this SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT this day of 
August, 2007, to the attorney for the DefendantJPlaintiff by Certified Mail #7005 
1160 0002 7630 4446 at the following address: 
Alec Pechota 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
IDAHO COUNN DISTRICT c URT 
Miriam G. Carroll ,qT6 ;/JoFfLED OCLOCK-.M. B 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
208-935-7962 
FAX: 208-926-4169 U N  
PlaintiffslDefendants, in propria Persona 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
) Case No. CV-2005-36747 
PlaintiffslDefendants, j 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
VS. 1 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
) 
Defendanffplaintiff, ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF IDAHO ) 
I, David F. Capps, having been duly sworn upon oath, hereby deposes, 
and if called upon to testify, would state as follows: 
1. That I am over the age of 18 years of age. 
2. That I am a resident of ldaho County, State of ldaho. 
3. That I am a party to the above titled lawsuit. 
- -- 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT - ij 'j 4 Pg. 1 of 2. 
4. That I open all mail which I receive addressed to me. 
5. That I examine all of the contents of the envelope. 
6. That I do not recall any offer or notice to amend the card agreement with 
MBNA America Bank to include arbitration. 
7. That I have never voluntarily, knowingly or intelligently agreed to 
arbitration with MBNA America Bank at any time. 
8. That to the best of my knowledge there is no agreement to arbitrate this 
dispute, or any dispute, with MBNA America Bank. 
9. Further deponent sayeth not. 
Dated this 1/0e day of August, 2007. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
The above identified person appeared before me this 
2007. 
Countv of Idaho, State of Idaho. 
My Commission expires ah\ li 
.. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT - 2 1; 
/ 0 &day of August, 
Pg. 2 of 2. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, David F. Capps, do hereby certify under penalty of perjury, that I mailed 
a true and correct copy of this SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT this /& %ff day of 
August, 2007, to the attorney for the DefendantlPlaintiff by Certified Mail #7005 
1160 0002 7630 4446 at the following address: 
Alec Pechota 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
On September 28,2006, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll moved for reconsideration or 
in the alternative to alter or amend a judgment on the basis of that the Bank's claim was 
fraudulent, that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction, that National Arbitration Forum 
(NAF) was biased in favor of the Bank, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the 
arbitration provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Arbitration Agreement 
(Agreement) was illusory and deceptive. Each of these issued was raised for the first 
time in the motion for reconsideration. 
On October 10,2006, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps amended their motion for 
reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment to include their argument that Delaware 
law did not apply to the Agreement because of 6 Del. C. § 2708. The Bank responded 
that any faults with the arbitration awards should have been brought by a motion to 
vacate the awards pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-912(5). 
Briefing on the motion went through April of 2007. On May 24,2007, Ms. 
Carroll and Mr. Capps moved to open limited discovery on the issue of whether or not 
the Bank had standing to bring the underlying action. On July 12,2007, the hearing was 
held on the standing and reopening discovery issues. I indicated I would have a decision 
by the end of August. However, on July 23,2007, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps questioned 
this court's jurisdiction to issue its decision in the first instance. Since the court's 
jurisdiction over the subject is a predicate to the other two motions, I have deferred ruling 
on them until I could review the jurisdiction issue. 
11. FACTS 
In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card 
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to the Bank alleging a dispute in 
their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in 
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a 
debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. The Bank did not reply to these letters. 
Rather the Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with the NAF, requesting 
that the disputes be arbitrated. 
In April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms. Carroll moving to dismiss the 
claim tiled with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between 
Ms. Carroll and the Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to 
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement 
which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out. 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her 
dispute with the Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent letter was sent by Mr. Capps to NAF. 
After acknowledging receipt of the April motion to dismiss and requesting 
submission of evidence from the parties to the dispute, the NAF issued a decision on 
August 3,2005. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement 
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon 
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to the Bank in the amount of 
$30,241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made a 
similar finding in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against 
him to the Bank in the amount of $28,156.49. 
On September 30,2005 Ms. Carroll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made 
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On 
November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against the Bank alleging the 
same causes of action and requesting the same relief. 
On January 17,2005 the Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award 
against Mr. Capps. On March 29,2006 the Bank moved for summary judgment in its 
favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps. On May 11, 
2006 the cases were consolidated. Both parties moved for summary judgment and they 
were denied. 
On September 14,2006 I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I 
found that an arbitration agreement did exist between the Bank and Mr. Capps and 
between the Bank and Ms. Carroll. I then confirmed both the arbitration award in favor of 
the Bank against Ms. Carol in the sum of $30,241.41 and the arbitration award in favor of 
the Bank against Mr. Capps in the sum of $28,156.49. 
In. CONTENTIONS 
1. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank's claim was fraudulent, that 
NAF was biased, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration provision 
was obtained by stealth and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive. 
2. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank lacks standing because it 
allegedly transferred the accounts receivables from Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll to a third 
party. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also request discovery on the standing issue to be 
reopened. 
3. The Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll have waived the standing 
issue because they raised it for the first time in their amended motion for reconsideration. 
4. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that this court must vacate the arbitration 
awards entered by their arbitrators due to the arbitrators' lack of jurisdiction on the basis 
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to enter the arbitration awards, this 
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm them. They argue that the arbitrators 
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to LC. 5 7-902(a) since they continued to arbitrate without 
seeking a court order compelling arbitration after receiving notice of Mr. Capps' and Ms. 
Carroll's challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement with the Bank. 
5 .  The Bank contends that the arbitration awards Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll seek to 
vacate do not constitute "judgments" that can be vacated by this court under I.R.C.P. 5 
60(b)(4). 
6. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that Delaware law, 6 Del. C. 5 2708, does not 
allow a Delaware choice of law provision in contracts that involve less than $100,00 and 
that my reliance on Delaware law was therefore in error. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion for Reconsideration: Fraud, Bias, Unconscionability, Stealth, Zllusion 
and Deception. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll timely moved for reconsideration of my Memorandum 
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, on the basis that the Bank's claim was 
fraudulent, the NAF was biased, the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration 
provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive. 
To the extent that new material was presented or legal arguments made that had 
not already been considered, they did not establish admissible or relevant facts or legal 
predicates that gave rise to a meritorious defense. 
For example, the affidavit of Gregory Duhl explains his dissatisfaction with the 
NAF procedures. This testimony confirms that arbitration procedures are much less 
formal than court procedures. That is always the case because the purpose of arbitration 
is to make the proceedings less formal and less expensive. In any event there is no 
evidence that what Mr. Duhl experienced reflected the procedures used in this case. The 
same can be said of Edward Anderson's deposition testimony. 
Ms. Carroll complains in her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
about the structure, power, and motives of banks that issue credit cards. And she may be 
right. My role, however, is not to legislate. Making statutory and regulatory changes in 
the banking and credit card industry is a quintessential legislative hc t ion .  I am obliged 
to apply the law as it exists. 
On these bases the motion for reconsideration or to alter the judgment should be 
denied. 
B. Motion for Reconsideration: Lack of Standing 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their motion for reconsideration on October 
10,2007 to include a defense that the Bank did not have standing because it had sold its 
accounts receivabIe. Civil Rue 1 l(a)(2)(B) requires a motion for reconsideration to be 
brought "not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The 
Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006 was a final appealable order 
and was dispositive rather than interlocutory. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also viewed the 
Memorandum Decision and Order as a final judgment because they moved in the 
alternative to alter the judgment on the same bases that they asserted to support the 
motion to reconsider. 
The motion is not timely. More than fourteen days elapsed from the time my 
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued until the standing motion was brought. 
The fact that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their timely motion to reconsider does 
not cure the timing flaw. While Civil Rule 15(c) permits the effective date of an 
amended pleading to relate back to the date of the original pleading, that does not apply 
to motions. O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 116 Idaho 507, 509 (1989). Civil Rule 7(a) defines 
pleadings and that definition does not include motions. As such motions do not relate 
back to the date of the original pleading. Id. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion for 
reconsideration based on lack of standing should therefore be denied. 
C. Motion to Vacate: Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion to vacate is based upon this court's lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. A contest to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time. State Dep 't of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 101,90 P.3d 321,326 
(Idaho 2004). 
1. The Applicable Standard 
The rule for vacating a judgment is outlined in I.R.C.P. 60(b), which states: 
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void . . . . 
Mr. Capps and Ms. C m l l  specifically move to vacate my September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60@)(4), alleging that my 
judgment is void. Plaintiffs 'Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 1-2. 
Generally in order for a judgment to be void under I.R.C.P. 60@)(4) "there 
must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, 
either because the court Iacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the suit." Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302,306,669 
P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1993) (citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice 5 60.25[2] (2d ed. 
1975); First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,605 at n. 4,570 P.2d 276, 
283 at n. 4 (Idaho 1977)). 
The Bank contends that an I.R.C.P. 9 60@)(4) is not available to Mr. Capps and 
Ms. Carroll. It posits that the true purpose of Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is to 
have vacated the underlying arbitration awards rather than my September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards. Because the arbitration 
awards are not "judgments," the Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll are 
misapplying 1.R.C.P 9 60(b)(4). 
On the other hand, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll implicitly contend in their motion 
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards, this 
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm those awards. My September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards would consequently be void 
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus vacatable under I.R.C.P. 9 60@)(4). 
Thus, the issues I must determine are, first, whether the underlying arbitrators had 
jurisdiction to issue the awards despite the challenges of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll as to 
the existence an arbitrations agreement, and second, whether this court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards 
2. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement. 
An arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority to arbitrate arises from an agreement 
between the parties to arbitrate. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc. 141 Idaho 809, 816, 118 P.3d 
141, 148 (July 2005); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 101 Idaho 557, 565,617 P.2d 
at 868 (Idaho)). Under Idaho law it is the role of the court to determine whether or not an 
arbitration agreement exists which would grant an arbitrator jurisdiction. Oil, Chemical 
&Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIOLocal2-652 v. EG & GIdaho, Inc., 
115 Idaho 671,674,769 P.2d 548,551 (Idaho 1989); Accomaszo v. CEDUEducational 
Sewices Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147,15 P.3d 1153,1155 (Idaho 2000); AT& T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,649,106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 
89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). The lack of an arbitration agreement is a basis under which the 
court can be asked to stay an arbitration under LC. 5 9-702 or to vacate an arbitration 
award under I.C. 5 9-712. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll do not contend in their motion to vacate that this court 
did not have jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration agreement existed between 
themselves and The Bank. Rather, they contend that this court did not have jurisdiction 
to confirm the arbitration award letters because the underlying arbitrators granting the 
awards failed to have jurisdiction to arbitrate. 
3. Jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards. 
Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's argue that the NAF arbitrators did not have 
jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards because Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll 
notified the arbitrators that they challenged the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, thereby tolling the arbitrators' jurisdictional authority until a court 
determination about whether an arbitration agreement existed. Plaintiffs Motion 
to Vacate, at 3-4. Because an arbitrator does not have jurisdiction unless the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate and because it is the role of the court to determine 
whether such an agreement has been made, this issue is squarely presented. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll argue that it does not matter that I decided that 
an arbitration agreement existed. September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision 
and Order, at 6. In their words an "arbitrator cannot be clothed with jurisdiction 
after the fact. If the award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever 
void." Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 2. To support of their 
argument, they rely on MBNA American Bank, N.A. v. Credit, 281 Kan. 655,132 
P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006) (bereinafter MBNA v. Credit), the Federal Arbitration Act, 
and a portion of the Idaho Arbitration Act addressing proceedings to compel or 
stay arbitration (Idaho Code 7-902(a)). Plaintiffs motion to vacate voidjudgment 
at 2-5. 
In MBNA v. Credit, MBNA submitted a dispute to arbitration regarding a 
credit card debt allegedly owed to it by Credit. MBNA v. Credit, at 655-56. 
Credit sent a letter to MBNA objecting to the proceeding because it believed ther 
was not an agreement to arbitration. Otherwise Credit did not participate in the 
arbitration. Id. at 656. Despite Credit's objection letter, the arbitrator proceeded 
to enter an arbitration award against Credit in favor of MBNA. Id. When MBNA 
filed a motion to confirm the award, Credit moved the court to vacate the award. 
Id. at 657. The district court held and the appellate court affirmed that no 
arbitration agreement existed between MBNA and Credit making the arbitration 
agreement void and the award vacatable. Id. at 655,660. 
On appeal, MBNA challenged Credit's timeliness in moving to vacate the 
award. In this context the court discussed when it is proper for the court and the 
parties to address disputes regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. In 
this regard the court stated: 
We note first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness 
in challenging the award if the arbitrator never had jurisdiction to 
arbitrate and enter an award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows 
such jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is 
challenged, the issue must be settled by court before the arbitrator 
may proceed. See U.S.C. 3 4; K.S. A. 3 5-402. 
All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent 
an apparent timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this 
objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral 
argument before this court that his client '"probably" has a copy of 
the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to 
demonstrate that the objection was somehow ineffective to trigger 
its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration. 
See 9. U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a 
demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice but to 
accept Credit's version of events. 
Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the 
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the 
issue of the agreement's existence. Neither MBNA, as the party 
asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator 
was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though Credit 
had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. "If 
there is a challenge to the arbitration it is for the courts, not the 
arbitrator to decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and 
whether the issue in dispute fails within the agreement to 
arbitrate." MBNA v. Creidt, 281 Kan. at 658-59, 132 P.3d at 900- 
01. 
The Kansas Supreme Court interprets the Federal Arbitration Act and 
Kansas's analogous arbitration act to require parties to seek court intervention 
before proceeding with arbitration whenever the existence of the arbitration 
agreement is challenged. Unfortunately the Kansas Supreme Court did not 
discuss its interpretation of these statutes. 
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision is instructive but it is not binding. I 
am free to make my own interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
analogous Idaho Arbitration Act (which is almost verbatim to the Kansas 
Arbitration ~ c t ) ' .  Thus, while I may look to the Kansas Court's decision for 
guidance, I am free to draw my own conclusions. 
The MBNA v. Credit case lends support to Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's 
argument. Nevertheless, I decline to follow MBNA v. Credit because it is 
factually distinguishable from this case in an important regard. In MBNA v. 
Credit, the district court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that no 
arbitration agreement existed. Without a valid arbitration agreement it did not 
matter whether the arbitrator's jurisdiction was tolled by party's challenge to the 
arbitration agreement's existence. The arbitrator never did and never would have 
jurisdiction to arbitrate, and thus any arbitration award would have been void. 
In contrast to MBNA v. Credit, I have found that an arbitration agreement 
existed between the parties. As such, there was a jurisdictional basis for the 
arbitrators to make an award in favor of the Bank against Mr. Capps and Ms. 
Carroll. In this situation it does matter whether or not a party's challenge to an 
arbitration agreement tolls the arbitrator's jurisdiction until a judicial 
determination of the arbitration agreement's existence is made. If a challenge 
does in fact toll the arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators failed to 
have jurisdiction when they issued their awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. 
Carroll because the awards were made after Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contested 
the existence of an arbitration agreement's existence and before a judicial 
determination was made on the matter. However, if a challenge does not toll an 
arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators' had jurisdiction to enter their 
' The Relevant portion of the Kansas Arbitration Act is K.A.S. 5 5-402. The relevant portion of the Idaho 
Arbitration Act is I.C. 5 7-902. 
awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll because I have found that an 
arbitration agreement does exist between MBNA and Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll. 
The issue of a whether an arbitrator's jurisdiction is tolled by a challenge is 
determined statutorily. 
a. Federal and Idaho Arbitration Acts 
There is nothing in the language of the Federal Arbitration Act or the Idaho 
Code explicitly requiring an arbitrator to cease action on an arbitration 
proceeding upon notification that a party challenges the existence of an arbitration 
agreement. While the Idaho Code and the Federal Arbitration Act do provide a 
mechanism for a party to compel arbitration if the other party contests the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, I conclude that option is permissive. 
The Federal Arbitration Act states: 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United 
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement. 
9 U.S.C. 5 4 (emphasis added). Under this statute a party is not obliged but is 
permitted to petition the court for an order to compel arbitration if the other party 
refbes to arbitrate. 
An order to compel arbitration is similarly authorized in the Idaho Code. 
The Idaho Code, like the Federal Arbitration Act, allows but does not require a 
party to petition the court to order arbitration when another party contests the 
arbitration due to an alleged lack of an arbitration agreement. Idaho Code Section 
7-902 states: 
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 
7-901, Idaho Code, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court 
shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party 
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed 
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order 
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall 
be denied 
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding 
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to 
arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall 
be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the 
moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the 
parties to proceed to arbitration. Idaho Code 3 7-902 (emphasis added). 
While there are competing policies that could be argued to buttress an obligatory 
or permissive interpretation of the statute, I am permitted to determine what the 
legislature intended only if the statute itself is ambiguous. Whether or not a statute is 
ambiguous is a question of law. Silliam v. Sump, 140 Idaho 266 (2004). If the plain 
words of the statute make the legislative intentions clear, there is nothing to construe. 
State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240,244 (2000). I am not permitted to add or 
delete statutory provisions by judicial construction because to do so would intrude on the 
quintessential function of the legislature to legislate. Conty v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 182 (2002). The only time the literal interpretation of a 
statute does not prevail is if that interpretation is obviously out of harmony with the 
objective and policy of the statute or leads to an otherwise absurd result. Danaz v. Preist 
River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,336-37 (2004). It is in the context of these mandates 
that the arbitration statute must be construed. 
There has been nothing presented that persuades me that there are two reasonable 
interpretations of the statute. As a result I conclude it is not ambiguous. See Stvuhs v. 
Protection Technologies fnc, 133 Idaho 715,719 (1 999). 
The statute permits but does not require an application to the court. The statute 
says that "[ulpon application of a party.. ." the court must then act. It does not condition 
the viability and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on application to the court. 
The purpose of arbitration is to permit an informal and hopefully less expensive 
resolution of disputes in lieu of more formal court proceedings. Interpreting the statute to 
force a party to invoke a court process if one party objects to the existence of an 
arbitration agreement could defeat the objective of avoiding litigation. What the statute 
does permit is to force a recalcitrant party to participate in the determination of the 
legality of the agreement before arbitration begins. 
The statute unequivocally contemplates that parties or a party can go to arbitration 
or decline to go to arbitration and then question the legality of the arbitration agreement. 
If there had been any doubt that section 902 of the Idaho Arbitration Act was permissive 
rather than obligatory, section 912(5) removes that doubt. It provides that "[ulpon 
application of aparty the court shall vacate an award where . . . [tlhere was no arbitration 
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 7- 
902, Idaho Code, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without 
raising the objection." 
In other words, so long as a party either raises the issue of arbitratability before 
the arbitration occurs or during the arbitration if the objecting party participates, that 
party may move to vacate the arbitration award based on the absence of an agreement to 
arbitrate. See Cody v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667,669 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The statute as a whole does not reasonably submit to any other interpretation, 
given the options of preempting an arbitration proceeding before it begins under section 
902 or vacating an award after the arbitration precedes and has been completed under 
section 912(5). 
D. Amended Motion for Reconsideration: Choice of Law 
The next issue is whether Delaware law, 6 De1.C. 5 2708, allows a choice of law 
provision in the Agreement that involves less than $100,000 and whether my reliance on 
Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006, was 
therefore in error. 
In my decision I applied Delaware law to the provision in the Credit Card 
Agreement (Agreement) that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll signed with MBNA. Mr. Capps 
and Ms. Carroll now direct my attention to 6 Del. C. 3 2708. Both parties have briefed 
the issue. 
6 Del. C. 5 2708 provides in part: 
(a) The parties to any contract . . . may agree in writing that the contract . . . shall 
be governed or construed under the laws of this State without regard to the 
principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole 
or in part, any or all of their rights . . . if the parties are . . . (i) subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be served 
with legal process. 
(b) Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, 
agreement or other undertaking for which a choice of Delaware law has been 
made in whole or in part and which contains the provision permitted by 
subsection (a) of this section. 
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract . . . (i) to the extent provided to the 
contrary in $ 1-301(c) of this title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000. 
Section 301 of 1 De1.C. provides: 
The rules of construction and the definitions set forth in this chapter shall be 
observed in the construction of this Code and all other statutes, unless such 
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General 
Assembly, or repugnant to the Code or to the context of the same statute. 
6 Delaware Code § 2708 is not a choice of law statute in the traditional sense of 
agreeing to the law that will be used to interpret the agreement. Rather it is a choice of 
Delaware courts as the fonun to resolve contractual disputes of $100,000 or more and a 
consent to jurisdiction by those courts for that purpose. Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, 
Lawyers, and Contractual Choice oflaw, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 999, 1003-1004 (1994). 
According to the synopsis of the statutory amendments enacting 6 Delaware Code section 
2708, its purpose is to "supersede all Delaware common law limitations [due to the lack 
of a material relationship with Delaware] on the enforceability of Delaware choice of law 
provisions . . . , as well as limitations on contractual consent to jurisdiction or service of 
process." 6 Del. C. $2708, Synopsis of the Amendments. However this override of 
common law principles applies only to contracts that exceed $100,000.00. See 6 Del. C. 
$2708(c) stating that "[tlhis section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other 
undertaking to the extent [it] . . . (ii) involv[es] less than $100,000."). 
6 Delaware Code Section 2708(c) merely overrides any common law limitations 
on contractual consent to jurisdiction by Delaware courts when contracts are over 
$100,000. It is not intended to nor does it "alter the case law development with respect to 
choice of law provisions in contracts," such as the contracts between the Bank and Mr. 
Capps and Ms. Carroll, that are specifically excepted from the Delaware court 
jurisdiction provisions of 6 Delaware Code section 2708(a) and (c). 6 Del. C. 5 2708, 
Synopsis of the Amendments. This is made manifest by subsection (e) which specifically 
states that "[tlhis section shall not limit any jurisdiction otherwise existing in a court 
sitting in the State and shall not affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions 
in any contract, agreement or other undertaking." 6 Del. C. § 2708(e). 
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice of law provision in the 
Agreement the parties entered into. This Delaware choice of law provision is authorized 
under 6 Del. C. 5 2708(e). The Delaware statute governing choice of law in matters 
regarding revolving credit provides that "[a] revolving credit plan between a bank and an 
individual borrower shall be governed by the laws of this State." 5 Del. C. $956. 
Because Idaho is the fonun state, I must also consider whether the choice of 
Delaware law conforms to Idaho's choice of law principles. In my Memorandum 
Decision and Order of September 14,2006,I held that using the Delaware choice of law 
clause did not violate Idaho's choice of law principles. I am not persuaded that decision 
was wrong. 
Because I iind I did not err in applying Delaware's law, I do not address Mr. 
Capps and Ms. Carroll's discussion of the Idaho Credit Code. 
K CONCLUSION 
1. Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for reconsideration based on fraud bias, 
unconcsionability, stealth, illusion, and deception is denied for lack of factual and 
legal merit. 
2. Ms. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's amended motion for reconsideration based on lack 
of standing is denied as untimely. 
3. The NAF arbitratofs had jurisdiction over the Bank and Mr. Capps and the Bank 
and Ms. Carroll because arbitration agreements existed between both the Bank 
and Mr. Capps and the Bank and Ms. Carroll. 
4. This jurisdiction was neither tolled nor stripped by Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's 
challenges to the existence of arbitration agreements between themselves and the 
bank. 
5. This court had subject matter jurisdiction both to determine whether an arbitration 
agreement existed between the parties and to confirm the arbitration awards 
against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll pursuant to the Idaho Arbitration Act, Idaho 
Code Section 7-902. 
6. The parties' Delaware Choice of Law term in their Agreement is valid under 
Delaware Law and is consistent with Idaho's choice of law principles; therefore, 
my reliance on Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of 
September 2006 was not in error. 
VI. Order 
Mr. Cappss snd Ms. Carroll's motions to vacate and for reconsideration and to 
alter the judgment are DENIED. 
It is so ORDERED, this the 2 day of November, 2007. 
L' JOHN BRADBURY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
, -\, 
\ 
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This case comes before me on a motion by Miriam Carroll and David Capps 
questioning this court's jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards, a motion to 
reconsider the confirmation decision, a motion questioning the standing of the Bank to 
bring its complaint, and a motion to reopen discovery on the issue of standing. MBNA 
American Bank (Bank) has opposed the motions. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 14, 2006, I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I 
confirmed arbitration awards against Miriam Carroll in the sum of $30,242.42 and 
against David Capps in the sum of $28,156.49. I also held that Delaware law applied to 
the agreement to arbitrate and other contractual issues. 
On September 28,2006, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll moved for reconsideration or 
in the alternative to alter or amend a judgment on the basis of that the Bank's claim was 
fraudulent, that the arbitrators did not have jurisdiction, that National Arbitration Forum 
(NAF) was biased in favor of the Bank, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the 
arbitration provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Arbitration Agreement 
(Agreement) was illusory and deceptive. Each of these issued was raised for the first 
time in the motion for reconsideration. 
On October 10, 2006, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps amended their motion for 
reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment to include their argument that Delaware 
law did not apply to the Agreement because of 6 Del. C. 3 2708. The Bank responded 
that any faults with the arbitration awards should have been brought by a motion to 
vacate the awards pursuant to Idaho Code 3 7-912(5). 
Briefing on the motion went through April of 2007. On May 24,2007, Ms. 
Carroll and Mr. Capps moved to open limited discovery on the issue of whether or not 
the Bank had standing to bring the underlying action. On July 12,2007, the hearing was 
held on the standing and reopening discovery issues. I indicated I would have a decision 
by the end of August. However, on July 23,2007, Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps questioned 
this court's jurisdiction to issue its decision in the first instance. Since the court's 
jurisdiction over the subject is a predicate to the other two motions, I have deferred ruling 
on them until I could review the jurisdiction issue. 
TI. FACTS 
In December 2004, after receiving a monthly statement for their credit card 
agreement, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll mailed a letter to the Bank alleging a dispute in 
their credit card liability. Ms. Carroll's letter purported to place in dispute a debt in 
excess of twenty-four thousand dollars. Mr. Capps' letter purported to place in dispute a 
debt in excess of twenty-one thousand dollars. The Bank did not reply to these letters. 
Rather the Bank filed claims against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll with the NAF, requesting 
that the disputes be arbitrated. 
In April 2005 the NAF received a letter from Ms. Carroll moving to dis~niss the 
claim filed with them. The motion to dismiss alleged that the original agreement between 
Ms. Carroll and the Bank did not include an arbitration agreement. The motion to 
dismiss also alleged that she had not received notice of an amendment to the agreement 
which added an arbitration clause that would have allowed her the opportunity to opt-out. 
Therefore, the motion to dismiss posited that NAF did not have authority to arbitrate her 
dispute with the Bank. In July 2005, an equivalent Ietter was sent by Mr. Capps to NAF. 
After acknowledging receipt of the April motion to dismiss and requesting 
submission of evidence from the parties to the dispute, the NAF issued a decision on 
August 3,2005. The NAF arbitrator found that there was a valid arbitration agreement 
between the parties thereby granting it authority to hear the dispute. The arbitrator, upon 
considering the evidence submitted, issued an award to the Bank in the amount of 
$30,241.41 against Ms. Carroll. On September 30,2005 a different arbitrator made a 
similar finding in the claim against Mr. Capps. The arbitrator issued an award against 
him to the Bank in the amount of $28,156.49. 
On September 30,2005 Ms. Cmoll filed a complaint in Idaho County. She made 
several claims including one for injunctive relief invalidating the arbitration award. On 
November 3,2005 Mr. Capps filed an equivalent complaint against the Bank alleging the 
same causes of action and requesting the same relief. 
On January 17,2005 the Bank filed a request to confirm its arbitration award 
against Mr. Capps. On March 29,2006 the Bank moved for summary judgment in its 
favor regarding the complaints filed by both Ms. Carroll and Mr. Capps. On May 11, 
2006 the cases were consolidated. Both parties moved for summary judgment and they 
were denied. 
On September 14,2006 I issued a Memorandum Decision and Order in which I 
found that an arbitration agreement did exist between the Bank and Mr. Capps and 
between the Bank and Ms. Carroll. I then confirmed both the arbitration award in favor of 
the Bank against Ms. Carol in the sum of $30,241.41 and the arbitration award in favor of 
the Bank against Mr. Capps in the sum of$28,156.49. 
111. CONTENTIONS 
1. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank's claim was fraudulent, that 
NAF was biased, that the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration provision 
was obtained by stealth and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive. 
2. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that the Bank lacks standing because it 
allegedly transferred the accounts receivables from Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll to a third 
party. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll also request discovery on the standing issue to be 
reopened. 
3. The Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll have waived the standing 
issue because they raised it for the first time in their amended motion for reconsideration. 
4. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that this court must vacate the arbitration 
awards entered by their arbitrators due to the arbitrators' lack ofjurisdiction on the basis 
that if the underlying arbitrators lacked jurisdiction to enter the arbitration awards, this 
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm them. They argue that the arbitrators 
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to LC. § 7-902(a) since they continued to arbitrate without 
seeking a court order compelling arbitration after receiving notice of Mr. Capps' and Ms. 
Carroll's challenges to the existence of an arbitration agreement with the Bank. 
5. The Bank contends that the arbitration awards Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll seek to 
vacate do not constitute "judgments" that can be vacated by this court under I.R.C.P. 5 
60(b)(4). 
6. Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contend that Delaware law, 6 Del. C. 9 2708, does not 
allow a Delaware choice of law provision in contracts that involve less than $100,00 and 
that my reliance on Delaware law was therefore in error. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Motion for Reconsideration: Fraud, Bias, Unconscionability, Stealth, Illusion 
and Deception. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll timely moved for reconsideration of my Memorandum 
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, on the basis that the Bank's claim was 
fraudulent, the NAF was biased, the arbitration was unconscionable, that the arbitration 
provision was obtained by stealth, and that the Agreement was illusory and deceptive. 
To the extent that new material was presented or legal arguments made that had 
not already been considered, they did not establish admissible or relevant facts or legal 
predicates that gave rise to a meritorious defense. 
For example, the affidavit of Gregory Duhl explains his dissatisfaction with the 
NAF procedures. This testimony confirms that arbitration procedures are much less 
formal than court procedures. That is always the case because the purpose of arbitration 
is to make the proceedings less formal and less expensive. In any event there is no 
evidence that what Mr. Duhl experienced reflected the procedures used in this case. The 
same can be said of Edward Anderson's deposition testimony. 
Ms. Carroll complains in her Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
about the structure, power, and motives of banks that issue credit cards. And she may be 
right. My role, however, is not to legislate. Making statutory and regulatory changes in 
the banking and credit card industry is a quintessential legislative function. I am obliged 
to apply the law as it exists. 
On these bases the motion for reconsideration or to alter the judgment should be 
denied. 
B. Motion for Reconsideration: Lack of Standing 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll amended their motion for reconsideration on October 
10,2007 to include a request for additional discovery for the purpose of establishing a 
defense that the Bank did not have standing because it had sold its accounts receivable. 
Civil Rule 11(a)(2)(B) states that "[a] motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory 
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but 
not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." The 
Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006 is not a final judgment, nor has 
a final judgment been entered. Consequently Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for 
reconsideration of my September 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order was filed 
within the time limits provided by Civil Rule 11(a)(2)(B). See Devil Creek Ranch, Znc., 
v. Cedar Creek Reservoir di Canal Co., 126 Idaho 202 (1994). 
While Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is framed as one for reconsideration, 
it does not point to established facts that were overlooked. Compare Coeur d' Alene 
Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Idaho 812 (1990). Rather the motion is to reopen 
discovery for the opportunity to see if there are facts that would provide a defense that the 
Bank does not have standing. The time for that endeavor is long past. 
The Scheduling Order of February 24,2006, amended on May 15,2006, required 
the parties to file all motions not later than May 4, 2006, and to complete discovery by 
June 8,2006. Scheduling Order, at 1 (February 24,2006). The amended motion for 
reconsideration seeks to reopen discovery almost a full year after discovery was supposed 
to have been completed. The motion and the request for discovery are therefore 
untimely, and as such should be denied. 
C. Motion to Vacate: Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll's motion to vacate is based upon this.court's lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction. A contest to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any 
time. State Dep 't ofHealth and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 101,90 P.3d 321,326 
(Idaho 2004). 
1. The Applicable Standard 
The rule for vacating a judgment is outlined in 1,R.C.P. 60(b), which states: 
On Motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party 
or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
kaud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void . . . . 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll specifically move to vacate my September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4), alleging that my 
judgment is void. Plaint@ss' Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 1-2. 
Generally in order for a judgment to be void under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) "there 
must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, 
either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the suit." Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302,306,669 
P.2d 191, 195 (Idaho 1993) (citing 7 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.25[2] (2d ed. 
1975); First Security Bank v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598,605 at n. 4,570 P.2d 276, 
283 at n. 4 (Idaho 1977)). 
The Bank contends that an I.R.C.P. 9 60(b)(4) is not available to Mr. Capps and 
Ms. Carroll. It posits that the true purpose of Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion is to 
have vacated the underlying arbitration awards rather than my September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards. Because the arbitration 
awards are not 'Sudgments," the Bank contends that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll are 
misapplying LR.C.P $60(b)(4). 
On the other hand, Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll implicitly contend in their motion 
that if the underlying arbiixators lacked jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards, this 
court necessarily lacked jurisdiction to confirm those awards. My September 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order confirming those awards would consequently be void 
due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and thus vacatable under I.R.C.P. 9 60(b)(4). 
Thus, the issues I must determine are, first, whether the underlying arbitrators had 
jurisdiction to issue the awards despite the challenges of Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll as to 
the existence an arbitrations agreement, and second, whether this court had subject matter 
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards 
2. Existence of an Arbitration Agreement. 
An arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority to arbitrate arises from an agreement 
between the parties to arbitrate. Moore v. Omnicare, Inc. 141 Idaho 809, 81 6, 118 P.3d 
141, 148 (July 2005); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker H I  Co., 101 Idaho 557, 565,617 P.2d 
at 868 (Idaho)). Under Idaho law it is the role of the court to determine whether or not an 
arbitration agreement exists which would grant an arbitrator jurisdiction. Oil, Chemical 
&Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO Local 2-652 v. EG & G Idaho, Inc., 
115 Idaho 671,674,769 P.2d 548,551 (Idaho 1989); Accomazzo v. CEDUEducational 
Sewices Inc., 135 Idaho 145, 147, 15 P.3d 1153, 1155 (Idaho 2000); A T &  T 
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643,649,106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 
89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986). The lack of an arbitration agreement is a basis under which the 
court can be asked to stay an arbitration under LC. 3 9-702 or to vacate an arbitration 
award under LC. $9-712. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll do not contend in their motion to vacate that this c o w  
did not have jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration agreement existed between 
themselves and The Bank. Rather, they contend that this court did not have jurisdiction 
to confirm the arbitration award letters because the underlying arbitrators granting the 
awards failed to have jurisdiction to arbitrate. 
3. Jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration awards. 
Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's argue that the NAF arbitrators did not have 
jurisdiction to issue the arbitration awards because Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll 
notified the arbitrators that they challenged the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, thereby tolling the arbitrators' jurisdictional authority until a court 
determination about whether an arbitration agreement existed. Plaintzfls Motion 
to Vacate, at 3-4. Because an arbitrator does not have jurisdiction unless the 
parties have agreed to arbitrate and because it is the role of the court to determine 
whether such an agreement has been made, this issue is squarely presented. 
Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll argue that it does not matter that I decided that 
an arbitration agreement existed. September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision 
and Order, at 6. In their words an "arbitrator cannot be clothed with jurisdiction 
after the fact. If the award was made without proper jurisdiction, it is forever 
void." Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Void Judgment at 2. To support of their 
argument, they rely on MBNA American Bank, NA. v. Credit, 281 Kan. 655, 132 
P.3d 898 (Kan. 2006) (hereinafter MBNA v. Credit), the Federal Arbitration Act, 
and a portion of the Idaho Arbitration Act addressing proceedings to compel or 
stay arbitration (Idaho Code 7-902(a)). Plaintiff's motion to vacate voidjudgment 
at 2-5. 
In MBNA v. Credit, MBNA submitted a dispute to arbitration regarding a 
credit card debt allegedly owed to it by Credit. MBNA v. Credit, at 655-56. 
Credit sent a letter to MBNA objecting to the proceeding because it believed ther 
was not an agreement to arbitration. Otherwise Credit did not participate in the 
arbitration. Id. at 656. Despite Credit's objection letter, the arbitrator proceeded 
to enter an arbitration award against Credit in favor of MBNA. Id. When MBNA 
filed a motion to confirm the award, Credit moved the court to vacate the award. 
Id. at 657. The district court held and the appellate court affirmed that no 
arbitration agreement existed between MBNA and Credit making the arbitration 
agreement void and the award vacatable. Id. at 655,660. 
On appeal, MBNA challenged Credit's timeliness in moving to vacate the 
award. In this context the court discussed when it is proper for the court and the 
parties to address disputes regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement. In 
this regard the court stated: 
We note first that MBNA cannot rely on Credit's tardiness 
in challenging the award if the arbitrator never had jurisdiction to 
arbitrate and enter an award. An agreement to arbitrate bestows 
such jurisdiction. When the existence of the agreement is 
challenged, the issue must be settled by court before the arbitrator 
may proceed. See U.S.C. 5 4; K.S. A. § 5-402. 
All we have in the record is Credit's assertion that she sent 
an apparent timely objection to the arbitrator, contesting the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Although no copy of this 
objection is in the record, MBNA's counsel admitted at oral 
argument before this court that his client "probably" has a copy of 
the objection; thus we look to MBNA as the appellant to 
demonstrate that the objection was somehow ineffective to trigger 
its responsibility to seek court intervention to compel arbitration. 
See 9. U.S.C. 5 4; K.S.A. 5-402. In the absence of such a 
demonstration, we, like the district court, have no choice but to 
accept Credit's version of events. 
Under both federal and state law, Credit's objection to the 
arbitrator meant the responsibility fell to MBNA to litigate the 
issue of the agreement's existence. Neither MBNA, as the party 
asserting existence of an arbitration agreement, nor the arbitrator 
was simply free to go forward with the arbitration as though Credit 
had not challenged the existence of an agreement to do so. "If 
there is a challenge to the arbitration it is for the courts, not the 
arbiirator to decide whether the agreement to arbitrate exists and 
whether the issue in dispute falls within the agreement to 
arbitrate." MBNA v. Creidt, 281 Kan. at 658-59, 132 P.3d at 900- 
01. 
The Kansas Supreme Court interprets the Federal Arbitration Act and 
Kansas's analogous arbitration act to require parties to seek court intervention 
before proceeding with arbitration whenever the existence of the arbitration 
agreement is challenged. Unfortunately the Kansas Supreme Court did not 
discuss its interpretation of these statutes. 
The Kansas Supreme Court's decision is instructive but it is not binding. I 
am gee to make my own interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
analogous Idaho Arbitration Act (which is almost verbatim to the Kansas 
Arbitration ~ c t ) ' .  Thus, while I may look to the Kansas Court's decision for 
guidance, I am free to draw my own conclusions. 
The MBNA v. Credit case lends support to Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's 
argument. Nevertheless, I decline to follow MBNA v. Credzt because it is 
factually distinguishable from this case in an important regard. In MBNA v. 
Credit, the district court found, and the appellate court affirmed, that no 
arbitration agreement existed. Without a valid arbitration agreement it did not 
matter whether the arbitrator's jurisdiction was tolled by party's challenge to the 
arbitration agreement's existence. The arbitrator never did and never would have 
jurisdiction to arbitrate, and thus any arbitration award would have been void. 
In contrast to MBNA v. Credit, I have found that an arbitration agreement 
existed between the parties. As such, there was a jurisdictional basis for the 
arbitrators to make an award in favor of the Bank against Mr. Capps and Ms. 
Carroll. In this situation it does matter whether or not a party's challenge to an 
arbitration agreement tolls the arbitrator's jurisdiction until a judicial 
determination of the arbitration agreement's existence is made. If a challenge 
does in fact toll the arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators failed to 
have jurisdiction when they issued their awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. 
Carroll because the awards were made after Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll contested 
' The Relevant portion of the Kansas Arbitration Act is K.A.S. $5-402. The relevant portion of the Idaho 
Arbitration Act is LC. 6 7-902. 
the existence of an arbitration agreement's existence and before a judicial 
determination was made on the matter. However, if a challenge does not toll an 
arbitrator's jurisdiction, then the NAF arbitrators' had jurisdiction to enter their 
awards against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll because I have found that an 
arbitration agreement does exist between MBNA and Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll. 
The issue of a whether an arbitrator's jurisdiction is tolled by a challenge is 
determined statutorily. 
a. Federal and Idaho Arbitration Acts 
There is nothing in the language of the Federal Arbitration Act or the Idaho 
Code explicitly requiring an arbitrator to cease action on an arbitration 
proceeding upon notification that a party challenges the existence of an arbitration 
agreement. While the Idaho Code and the Federal Arbitration Act do provide a 
mechanism for a party to compel arbitration if the other party contests the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, I conclude that option is permissive. 
The Federal Arbitration Act states: 
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to 
arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United 
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have 
jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject 
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement. 
9 U.S.C. 4 4 (emphasis added). Under this statute a party is not obliged but is 
permitted to petition the court for an order to compel arbitration if the other party 
reiitses to arbitrate. 
An order to compel arbitration is similarly authorized in the Idaho Code. 
The Idaho Code, like the Federal Arbitration Act, allows but does not require a 
party to petition the court to order arbitration when another party contests the 
arbitration due to an alleged lack of an arbitration agreement. Idaho Code Section 
7-902 states: 
(a) On application of a party showing an agreement described in section 
7-901, Idaho Code, and the opposing party's refusal to arbitrate, the court 
shall order the parties to proceed with arbitration, but if the opposing party 
denies the existence of the agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed 
summarily to the determination of the issue so raised and shall order 
arbitration if found for the moving party, otherwise, the application shall 
be denied 
(b) On application, the court may stay an arbitration proceeding 
commenced or threatened on a showing that there is no agreement to 
arbitrate. Such an issue, when in substantial and bona fide dispute, shall 
be forthwith and summarily tried and the stay ordered if found for the 
moving party. If found for the opposing party, the court shall order the 
parties to proceed to arbitration. Idaho Code § 7-902 (emphasis added). 
While there are competing policies that could be argued to buttress an obligatory 
or permissive interpretation of the statute, I am permitted to determine what the 
legislature intended only if the statute itself is ambiguous. Whether or not a statute is 
ambiguous is a question of law. Silliam v. Sump, 140 Idaho 266 (2004). If the plain 
words of the statute make the legislative intentions clear, there is nothing to construe. 
State v. Quick Transport, Inc., 134 Idaho 240,244 (2000). 1 am not permitted to add or 
delete stahtory provisions by judicial construction because to do so would intrude on the 
quintessential function of the legislature to legislate. Conty v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 182 (2002). The only time the literal interpretation of a 
statute does not prevail is if that interpretation is obviously out of harmony with the 
objective and policy of the statute or leads to an otherwise absurd result. Danaz v. Preist 
River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333,336-37 (2004). It is in the context of these mandates 
that the arbitration statute must be construed. 
There has been nothing presented that persuades me that there are two reasonable 
interpretations of the statute. As a result I conclude it is not ambiguous. See Struhs v. 
Protection Technologies Inc, 133 Idaho 71 5,719 (1999). 
The statute permits but does not require an application to the court. The statute 
says that "[ulpon application of a party.. ." the court must then act. It does not condition 
the viability and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on application to the court. 
The purpose of arbitration is to permit an informal and hopefully less expensive 
resolution of disputes in lieu of more formal court proceedings. Interpreting the statute to 
force a party to invoke a court process if one party objects to the existence of an 
arbitration agreement could defeat the objective of avoiding litigation. What the statute 
does permit is to force a recalcitrant party to participate in the determination of the 
legality of the agreement before arbitration begins. 
The statute unequivocally contemplates that parties or a party can go to arbitration 
or decline to go to arbitration and then question the legality of the arbitration agreement. 
If there had been any doubt that section 902 of the Idaho Arbitration Act was permissive 
rather than obligatory, section 912(5) removes that doubt. It provides that "[ulpon 
application of a party the court shall vacate an award where . . . [tlhere was no arbitration 
agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under section 7- 
902, Idaho Code, and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without 
raising the objection." 
In other words, so long as a party either raises the issue of arbitratability before 
the arbitration occurs or during the arbitration if the objecting party participates, that 
party may move to vacate the arbitration award based on the absence of an agreement to 
arbitrate. See Cody v. Allstate Ins. Co., 113 Idaho 667, 669 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The statute as a whole does not reasonably submit to any other interpretation, 
given the options of preempting an arbitration proceeding before it begins under section 
902 or vacating an award after the arbitration precedes and has been completed under 
section 912(5). 
D. Amended Motion for Reconsideratioit: Choice of Law 
The next issue is whether Delaware law, 6 De1.C. 9 2708, allows a choice of law 
provision in the Agreement that involves less than $100,000 and whether my reliance on 
Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of September 14,2006, was 
therefore in error. 
In my decision I applied Delaware law to the provision in the Credit Card 
Agreement (Agreement) that Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll signed with MBNA. Mr. Capps 
and Ms. Carroll now direct my attention to 6 Del. C. 9 2708. Both parties have briefed 
the issue. 
6 Del. C. 9 2708 provides in part: 
(a) The parties to any contract . . . may agree in writing that the contract . . . shall 
be governed or construed under the laws of this State without regard to the 
principles of conflict of laws, or that the laws of this State shall govern, in whole 
or in part, any or all of their rights . . . if the parties are . . . (i) subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of, or arbitration in, Delaware and, (ii) may be served 
with legal process. 
(b) Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state where the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, 
agreement or other undertaking for which a choice of Delaware law has been 
made in whole or in part and which contains the provision permitted by 
subsection (a) of this section. 
(c) This section shall not apply to any contract . . . (i) to the extent provided to the 
contrary in $ 1-301(c) of this title, or, (ii) involving less than $100,000. 
Section 301 of 1 De1.C. provides: 
The rules of construction and the definitions set forth in this chapter shall be 
observed in the construction of this Code and all other statutes, unless such 
construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General 
Assembly, or repugnant to the Code or to the context of the same statute. 
6 Delaware Code 9 2708 is not a choice of law statute in the traditional sense of 
agreeing to the law that will be used to interpret the agreement. Rather it is a choice of 
Delaware courts as the forum to resolve contractual disputes of $100,000 or more and a 
consent to jurisdiction by those courts for that purpose. Lary  E. Ribstein, Delaware, 
Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of law,  19 Del. J. Corp. L. 999, 1003-1004 (1994). 
According to the synopsis of the statutory amendments enacting 6 Delaware Code section 
2708, its purpose is to "supersede all Delaware common law limitations [due to the lack 
of a material relationship with Delaware] on the enforceability of Delaware choice of law 
provisions . . . , as well as limitations on contractual consent to jurisdiction or service of 
process." 6 Del. C. $ 2708, Synopsis of the Amendments. However this override of 
common law principles applies only to contracts that exceed $100,000.00. See 6 Del. C. 
$ 2708(c) stating that "[tlhis section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or other 
undertaking to the extent [it] . . . (ii) involv[es] less than $100,000."). 
6 Delaware Code Section 2708(c) merely overrides any common law limitations 
on contractual consent to jurisdiction by Delaware courts when contracts are over 
$100,000. It is not intended to nor does it "alter the case law development with respect to 
choice of law provisions in contracts," such as the contracts between the Bank and Mr. 
Capps and Ms. Carroll, that are specifically excepted from the Delaware court 
jurisdiction provisions of 6 Delaware Code section 2708(a) and (c). 6 Del. C. § 2708, 
Synopsis ojthe Amendments. This is made manifest by subsection (e) which specifically 
states that "[tlhis section shall not limit any jurisdiction otherwise existing in a court 
sitting in the State and shall not affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions 
in any contract, agreement or other undertaking." 6 Del. C. 9 2708(e). 
It is uncontested that there is a Delaware choice of law provision in the 
Agreement the parties entered into. This Delaware choice of law provision is authorized 
under 6 Del. C. 5 2708(e). The Delaware statute governing choice of law in matters 
regarding revolving credit provides that "[a] revolving credit plan between a bank and an 
individual borrower shall be governed by the laws of this State." 5 Del. C. § 956. 
Because Idaho is the forum state, I must also consider whether the choice of 
Delaware law conforms to Idaho's choice of law principles. In my Memorandum 
Decision and Order of September 14,2006, I held that using the Delaware choice of law 
clause did not violate Idaho's choice of law principles. I am not persuaded that decision 
was wrong. 
Because I find I did not err in applying Delaware's law, I do not address Mr. 
Capps and Ms. Carroll's discussion of the Idaho Credit Code. 
V. CONCLUSION 
1. Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's motion for reconsideration based on fraud bias, 
unconcsionability, stealth, illusion, and deception is denied for lack of factual and 
legal merit. 
2. Ms. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's amended motion for reconsideration based on lack 
of standing is denied as untimely. 
3. The NAF arbitrators had jurisdiction over the Bank and Mr. Capps and the Bank 
and Ms. Carroll because arbitration agreements existed between both the Bank 
and Mr. Capps and the Bank and Ms. Carroll. 
4. This jurisdiction was neither tolled nor stripped by Mr. Capps' and Ms. Carroll's 
challenges to the existence of arbitration agreements between themselves and the 
bank. 
5. This court had subject matter jurisdiction both to determine whether an arbitration 
agreement existed between the parties and to confirm the arbitration awards 
against Mr. Capps and Ms. Carroll pursuant to the Idaho Arbitration Act, Idaho 
Code Section 7-902. 
6. The parties' Delaware Choice of Law term in their Agreement is valid under 
Delaware Law and is consistent with Idaho's choice of law principles; therefore, 
my reliance on Delaware law in my Memorandum Decision and Order of 
September 2006 was not in error. 
VI. &r 
Mr. Cappss and Ms. CarroII's motions to vacate and for reconsideration and to 
alter the judgment are DENIED. 
ti" It is so ORDERED, this the -day of November, 2007. 
JOHN BRADBURY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
David F. Capps 
Miriam G. Carroll 
104 Jefferson Drive 
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll 
appeal against the above named respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court 
from the District Court's final MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, 
entered in the above entitled action on the 7'h day of November, 2007, and 
its ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD entered in the above 
entitled action by the Honorable Judge John Bradbury presiding. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
that the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are 
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule ?f(a)( l)  I.A.R. 
3. Capps and Carroll intend to assert the following issues on appeal; 
provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal; 
a. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Delaware choice of 
law provision was valid in ldaho Consumer Credit Contracts under 
the ldaho Credit Code. 
b. Whether the trial court erred in finding that MBNA could unilaterally 
amend a Consumer Credit Contract in the State of ldaho. 
c. Whether the trial court erred in deciding that Capps' and Carroll's 
motion to open limited discovery on the issue of standing was not 
timely. 
d. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the National Arbitration 
Forum could determine "that an arbitration agreement existed" 
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between the parties once the existence of an agreement to arbitrate 
was challenged. 
e. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was an agreement 
to arbitrate without a "meeting of the minds". 
f. Whether the trial court erred in finding the arbitration provision, 
which was added by a negative option without effective notice did 
not violate basic contract principles and was substantially and 
procedurally conscionable. 
g. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Capps' and Carroll's 
constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury (concerning the 
original dispute) to be waived through a "negative option" without 
Capps and Carroll both knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
consenting to the waiver. 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following reporter's 
partial transcript: 
(i) The testimony provided by Mr. Capps at the hearing on the 
12 '~  day of July, 2007. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, 
I.A.R. 
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Capps' PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON 
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE entered on the 26th day of July, 
2006 (CV-36747) 
Carroll's BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated the 27th day of June, 
2006 (CV-37320) 
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF 
OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER dated 
the 27th day of June, 2006 (CV-37320) 
Capps' AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR 
EVlDENTlARY HEARING ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
dated the 251h day of July, 2006 (CV-36747) 
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S BRlEF FOR 
EVlDENTlARY ON AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE dated the 25th 
day of July, 2006 (CV-36747) 
Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM 
REBUTTAL dated the 1 7 ' ~  day of August, 2006 (CV-36747) 
Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRlEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION 
TO CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD dated the 5'h day 
of September, 2006 (CV-37320) 
Carroll's AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION dated the lo th  day of October, 2006 (CV- 
36747) 
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I. Capps' and Carroll's AMENDED MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION dated the l o th  day of October, 2006 (CV- 
36747). 
1. Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF POST HEARING 
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA dated the 6'h day of November, 2006 
(CV-36747). 
k. Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MEMORANDUM dated the 
1 3th day of November, 2006 (CV-36747). 
I. The District Court's NOTICE OF HEARING dated the llth day of 
January, 2007 (CV-36747). 
m. Capps' and Carroll's PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF 
5 DEL. CODE § 956 dated the 18 '~  day of January, 2007 (CV- 
36747). 
n. Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF DEL 
CODE § 956 dated the 25th day of January, 2007 (CV-37320). 
o. Capps' BRIEF ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW 
AND THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE dated the 15 '~  day of February, 
2007 including exhibits (CV-36747) 
p. Capps' and Carroll's ADDENDUM TO THE BRIEF ON THE 
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW AND THE IDAHO CREDIT 
CODE dated the 2" day of March, 2007 including exhibits (CV- 
36747). 
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q. Capps' and Carroll's REBUTTAL OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated the lg th  
day of March, 2007 (CV-36747). 
r. Capps' and Carroll's POST HEARING MOTION TO OPEN 
LIMITED DISCOVERY ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING dated the 
24th day of May, 2007 (CV-36747). 
s. Capps' and Carroll's MEMORANDUM ON COURT JURISDICTION 
COVERING DISCOVERY ON STANDING ISSUE dated the 23rd 
day of July, 2007 (CV-36747). 
t. Capps' and Carroll's MOTION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT 
dated the 23'* day of July, 2007 (CV-36747). 
u. Capps' SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the loth day of 
August, 2007 (CV-36747). 
v. Carroll's SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT entered the 10th day of 
August, 2007 (CV-36747). 
7. 1 certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the 
reporter. 
(b) (1) [ ]  That the clerk of the district court has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ I  That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated transcript fee because 
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(c) (1) [ ] That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated fee for the preparation of the record because 
(d) (1) [ ] That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ ] That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
appellate filing fee because 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
Dated this /-day of November, 2007. 
Miriam G. Carroll 
(\ 
State of Idaho 1 
) ss 
County of ldaho ) 
David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll being duly sworn, depose and say: 
That the parties are the appellants in the above-entitled appeal and that all 
statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his and her 
knowledge and belief. 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of November, 2007. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll 
appeal against the above named respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court 
from the District Court's final MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER, 
entered in the above entitled action on the 7th day of November, 2007, and 
its ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION AWARD entered in the above 
entitled action by the Honorable Judge John Bradbury presiding. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
that the judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are 
appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule IlfaKlfl l(a)(8) I.A.R. 
3. Capps and Carroll intend to assert the following issues on appeal; 
provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant 
from asserting other issues on appeal; 
a. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the Delaware choice of 
law provision was valid in ldaho Consumer Credit Contracts under 
the Idaho Credit Code. 
b. Whether the trial court erred in finding that MBNA could unilaterally 
arnend a Consumer Credit Contract in the State of ldaho. 
c. Whether the tr~al court erred in deciding that Capps' and Carroll's 
motion to open limited discovery on the issue of standing was not 
timely. 
d. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the National Arbitration 
Forum could determine "that an arbitration agreement existed" 
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between the parties once the existence of an agreement to arbitrate 
was challenged. 
e. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was an agreement 
to arbitrate without a "meeting of the minds". 
f. Whether the trial court erred in finding the arbitration provision, 
which was added by a negative option without effective notice did 
not violate basic contract principles and was substantially and 
procedurally conscionable. 
g. Whether the trial court erred in allowing Capps' and Carroll's 
constitutionally protected right to a trial by jury (concerning the 
original dispute) to be waived through a "negative option" without 
Capps and Carroll both knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily 
consenting to the waiver. 
4. Noorder has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following reporter's 
partial transcript: 
(i) The testimony provided by Mr. Capps at the hearing on the 
12'h day of July, 2007. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the 
clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under .Rule 28, 
I.A.R. 
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REBUTTAL dated the 1 7 ' ~  day of August, 2006 (CV-36747) 
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August, 2007 (CV-36747). 
7. 1 certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the 
reporter. 
(b) (1) [ 1 That the clerk of the district court has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript. 
(2) [ I  That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated transcript fee because 
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(c) (1) [ 1 That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's 
record has been paid. 
(2) [ I  That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
estimated fee for the preparation of the record because 
(d) (1) [XI That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2) [ I  That the appellant is exempt from paying the 
appellate filing fee because 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
Miriam G. Carroll 
State of Idaho ) 
1 SS. 
County of ldaho ) 
David F. Capps and Miriam G. Carroll being duly sworn, depose and say: 
That the parties are the appellants in the above-entitled abpeal and that all 
statements in this notice of appeal are true and correct to the best of his and her 
knowledge and belief. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF INTERLOCUTO X PPEAL 
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Miriam G. Carroll 
(( 
be 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6 fh day of NorrembA. 2007, 
My commission expires: 
Seal 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, David F. Capps, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a 
true and correct copy of this NOTICE OF APPEAL to the following parties this 
at the following addresses: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson & McColl 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
Miriam G. Carroll 
~laintiff/Appellant, 
VS . 
MBNA America Bank, 
Defendant/Respondent 
) Supreme Court No. 34765 
) 
) 
) NOTICE 
) 
) 
) 
MBNA America Bank, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
) 
vs . ) 
) 
David F. Capps, ) 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
Notice is hereby given that the document requested by 
the appellants "Carroll's DEFENDANT'S BRIEF ON APPLICABILITY OF 
DEL. CODE § 9 5 6  dated the 25th day of January, 2 0 0 7  (CV-37320) ," 
is not included in this clerk's record as it is not on file in 
Case No. CV 3 7 3 2 0 .  
Done this llth December 2 0 0 7 .  
ROSE E. GENRING, CLERK 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled 
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
or delivered by me on \d ((.0'1 to: 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
David F. Capps 
Miriam G. Carroll 
104 Jefferson Drive 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
ROSE E. GEHRING, CLERK 
Date: 1130/2008 
Time: ' 19 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Idaho County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
User: KATHYJ 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
Date Code User Judge 
9/30/2605 NCOC COUNTER New Case Filed - Other Claims John Bradbury 
COUNTER Filing: A1 -Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No John Bradbury 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Carroll, Miriam G 
(plaintiff) Receipt number: 0107432 Dated: 
9/30/2005 Amount: $82.00 (Check) 
SMIS KATHYJ Summons Issued John Bradbury 
11/1/2005 SMRT KATHYJ Proof of Service John Bradbury 
1 1 /4/2005 MlSC KATHYJ Amended Complaint; Demand for Trial by Jury John Bradbury 
S A KATHYJ Another Summons Issued John Bradbury 
1 111 812005 KATHYJ Filing: I IA  - Civil Appearance More Than $1000 John Bradbury 
No Prior Appearance Paid by: Wilson & McColl 
Receipt number: 0108240 Dated: 1111 812005 
Amount: $52.00 (Check) 
12/21/2005 ANSW KATHYJ Answer John Bradbury 
12/29/2005 HRSC KATHYJ Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling John Bradbury 
02/23/2006 01:30 PM) 
ORDR 
111 212006 CERT 
1/13/2006 NOTS 
211 712006 ANSW 
2/24/2006 HRSC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
311 712006 NOTS 
3/27/2006 CERT 
3/29/2006 MOTN 
AFFD 
AFFD 
LODG 
NHRG 
3/30/2006 HRSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
Order for Pretrial Scheduling Conference John Bradbury 
Certificate Of Service 
Notice of Service 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Answers to Defendant's First Set of John Bradbury 
interrogatories and Request for production of 
Documents 
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling held on John Bradbury 
02/23/2006 01:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 0511 112006 02:30 John Bradbury 
PM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/30/2006 08:30 John Bradbury 
AM) 
Scheduling Order John Bradbury 
Notice of Service John Bradbury 
Certificate Of Mailing John Bradbury 
Motion for Summary judgment John Bradbury 
Affidavit of Gregory Canappin Support of Motion John Bradbury 
for Summary judgment 
Affidavit of lisa B. rasmussen in Support of motion John Bradbury 
for,Summary Judgment 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for John Bradbury 
Summary judgment 
Notice Of Hearing John Bradbury 
Hearing Scheduled (~otio; 04/13/2006 03:30 John Bradbury 
PM) 
4/5/2006 MlSC KATHYJ Request for Continuance John Bradbury 
4/6/2006 CONT KATHYJ Hearing result for Motion held on 04/13/2006 John Bradbury 
03:30 PM: Continued 
3'28 
Date: 1/3012008 
Time: ' JAM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Idaho County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA 
User KATHYJ 
, , 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA 
Date 
4/6/2006 
Code User 
KATHYJ 
Judge 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/04/2006 09:OO John Bradbury 
AM) 
Notice of Continuance John Bradbury 
HRSC 
NOTC 
NOTC 
LODG 
CONS 
INHD 
KATHYJ 
ZIMMER 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
Notice of Service John Bradbury 
Answering Brief to Motion for Summary Judgment John Bradbury 
Order Consolidating (w/CV 36827) John Bradbury 
Hearing result for Motion held on 05/04/2006 John Bradbury 
09:OO AM: lnterim Hearing Held 
PreTrial Statement John Bradbury 
Affidavit in Support of Writ of Execution John Bradbury 
MlSC 
AFFD 
WRIT 
MlSC 
INHD 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
HOLMAN 
Writ Issued John Bradbury 
Pretrial Stipulation John Bradbury 
Hearing result for Pretrial held on 0511 112006 John Bradbury 
02:30 PM: lnterim Hearing Held 
Consolidation Of Files (with CV 06-37201) John Bradbury CONS 
CONT 
HOLMAN 
HOLMAN Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 05/30/2006 John Bradbury 
08:30 AM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 08/10/2006 John Bradbury 
08:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 06/22/2006 03:30 John Bradbury 
PM) 
HRSC HOLMAN 
HRSC HOLMAN 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ORDR 
NOTS 
NOTS 
STIP 
STIP 
CONT 
HRSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
Amended Scheduling order 
Amended Scheduling Order 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Notice of Service 
Notice of Service 
Pretrial Stipulation 
Amended Pretrial Stipulation 
Hearing Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial 06/23/2006 09:OO 
AM) 
Hearing result for Pretrial held on 06/23/2006 
09:OO AM: lnterim Hearing Held 
Hearing result for Court Trial held on 08/10/2006 
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
INHD KATHYJ John Bradbury 
HRVC KATHYJ John Bradbury 
NOTC 
NHRG 
HRSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
Notice of Stipulation to bench trial John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (~videhiary 08/10/2006 
08:30 AM) 
Objection to Wording of the Proposed pre-trial 
Order 
John Bradbury KATHYJ 
Date: 1/3012008 Second Judicial District Court - Idaho County 
Time: QAM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 5 Case. CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
Miriam G Carroll vs. ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ m e r i c a  Bank, NA 
Date Code User 
712612006 MISC 
AFFD 
AFFD 
8/3/2006 ORDR 
811 012006 INHD 
ADVS 
811 412006 MlSC 
811 712006 MlSC 
911 412006 CDlS 
911 512006 MEMO 
9/28/2006 MOTN 
NOTC 
NHRG 
HRSC 
AFFD 
AFFD 
CERT 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MEMO 
CERT 
10/10/2006 MlSC . 
1011 712006 MEMO 
1011912006 MEMO 
1012312006 MlSC 
1012612006 MEMO 
HRHD 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
HOLMAN 
HOLMAN 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
a KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
User: KATHYJ 
Plaintiffs Brief for evidenfiary Hearing on 
Agreement to Arbitrate 
Affidavit in Support of plaintiffs brief for 
Evidentiaty hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Brief for 
Evidentiary on Agreement to Arbitrate 
Pretrial Order 
Hearing result for Evidentiary held on 0811012006 
08:30 AM: Interim Hearing Held 
Case Taken Under Advisement 
Post Hearing Memorandum 
Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal 
CIVIL DISPOSITION 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Motion for Reconsideration 
Notice of Motion 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 1012612006 02:OO 
PM) 
Affidavit of Ammount Due as to Miriam Carroll 
Only 
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees as to Miriam Carroll 
Only 
Certificate Of Mailing as to Miriam carroll Only 
Affidavit of Amount Due as to David Capps Only 
Affidavit for Attorney's Fees as to David Capps 
Only 
Memorandum of Costs as to David Capps Only 
Certificate Of Mailing as to David Capps Only 
Amended Motion for Reconsideration 
Memorandum of MBNA America Bank, N. A. in 
opposition to motion for Reconsideration 
~emorandum by MBNAAmerica Bnk, N.A. in 
Opposition to Amended Motion for 
R$consideration 
Rebuttal to memorandum by MBNA America 
Bank, N.A. in Opposition to Amended Motion for 
Recondiseration 
Memorandum by MBNA America Bank, NA in 
Opposition to Amneded Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Hearing result for Motion held on 10/2612006 
02:OO PM: Hearing Held 
3 8 8  
3ohn Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Date: 1/30/2008 
Time: ' '9 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - ldaho County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
User: KATHYJ 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
Date Code User Judge 
post-hearing Memorandum by Plaintiff in John Bradbury 
Opposition to Amended Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Rebuttal of Post-hearing Memorandum by MBNA John Bradbury 
Post-Hearing Memorandum John Bradbury 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 01/25/2007 John Bradbury 
12:OO PM) 
Notice Of Hearing John Bradbury 
Plaintiffs Brief on Applciability of 5 Del. Code John Bradbury 
S956 
Hearing result for Oral Argument held on John Bradbury 
01/25/2007 12:OO PM: Interim Hearing Held 
Notice of Joinder John Bradbury 
Brief on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the John Bradbury 
ldaho Credit Code 
Addendum to the Brief on the Applicability of John Bradbury 
Delaware Law and the ldaho Credit Code 
Memorandum by Mbna America Bank in John Bradbury 
Opposition to Continuing Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Rebuttal of Plaintiffs Memorandum bu MBNA John Bradbury 
America Bank in Opposition to Continuing Motion 
for Reconsideration 
Supplemental Memorandum to Amended Motion John Bradbury 
for Reconsideration 
Response by MBNA America Bank to Latest John Bradbury 
Supplemental Memorandum from Carroll Capps 
Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery John Bradbury 
on the lssue of Standing 
Notice of Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited John Bradbuw 
Discovery on the issue of Standing 
Notice Of Hearing John Bradbury 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/21/2007 01:30 John Bradbury 
PM) 
Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open John Bradbury 
Limited Discovery in the lssue of Standing 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/21/2007 John Bradbury 
01?30 PM: Hearing Held 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/12/2007 11:OO John Bradbury 
AM) 
Notice Of Hearing , John Bradbury 
Hearing result for Motion held on 07/12/2007 John Bradbury 
11:OO AM: Hearing Held 
Memorandum on Court Jurisdiction Covering John Bradbury 
Discovery on Standing lssue 
10/30/2006 MEMO KATHYJ 
1 1/6/2006 MlSC 
11/14/2006 MEMO 
111 1/2007 HRSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
NHRG 
111 812007 MlSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
2/8/2007 NOTC 
2120l2007 MlSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
3/2/2007 MlSC KATHYJ 
3/16/2007 MEMO KATHYJ 
3/20/2007 MlSC KATHYJ 
4/2/2007 MEMO KATHYJ 
411 612007 MISC KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 5/24/2007 MOTN 
NOTC KATHYJ 
NHRG 
5/25/2007 HRSC ' 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
6/8/2007 MlSC 
6/21/2007 HRHD 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 6/22/2007 HRSC 
NHRG 
711 212007 HRHD 
, KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
7/23/2007 MEMO KATHYJ 
Date: 1/30/2008 
Time: ' 'j AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Idaho County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2005-0036747 Current Judge: John Bradbury 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank. NA 
User: KATHYJ 
Miriam G Carroll vs. MBNA America Bank, NA 
Date Code User 
7/23/2007 MOTN KATHYJ Motion to Vacate Void Judgment 
Judge 
John Bradbury 
NOTC 
NHRG 
7/24/2007 HRSC 
8/3/2007 MlSC 
811 0/2007 HRHD 
AFFD 
811 712007 MlSC 
NHRG 
HRSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
Notice of Motion 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Adjudicatory Hearing 
08/09/2007 02:30 PM) 
Opposition to Motion to Vacate Void Judgment 
Hearing result for Adjudicatory Hearing held on 
08/09/2007 02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Supplemental Affidavit (2) 
Opposition to Supplemental Affidavits of Miriam 
G. Carroll and David F. Capps 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/04/2007 01:30 
PM) 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbuw 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbuw 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
HRHD KATHYJ Hearing result for Motion held on 10/04/2007 
01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
DEOP 
CERT 
MEMO 
CERT 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
COUNTER 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Amended Memorandum Decision and Order 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: Carroll, 
Miriam G (plaintiff) Receipt number: 01 19865 
Dated: 11/15/2007 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: 
Carroll, Miriam G (plaintiff) 
MOTN 
NOTC 
ORDR 
ORDR 
ZIMMER 
ZIMMER 
ZIMMER 
ZIMMER 
Motion to Vacate Void Judgment (Verified) John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Notice of Motion 
Appeal Order 
Declination to consider Motion for Want of 
Consideration 
Appeal Order ORDR 
ORDR 
MlSC 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
KATHYJ 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
Order for Consolidation 
Amended Notice of Interlocutory Appeal 
12/13/2007 BNDC COUNTER Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 120279 Dated 
12/13/2007 for 200.00) 
12/20/2007 AFFD HALL Affidavit of Attorney's Fees 
COST HALL Memorandum Of Costs 
AFFD HALL Affidavit of Amount Due 
12/27/2007 JDMT KATHYJ Judgment 
CERT KATHYJ Certificate Of Mailing 
CDlS KATHYJ CIVIL DISPOSITIONc 
. . 3 8 2  
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
John Bradbury 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
Miriam G. Carroll, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Supreme Court No. 34765 
) 
vs . ) Idaho County No. CV 05-36747 
) 
MBNA America Bank, ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Defendant/Respondent ) RE: EXHIBITS 
) 
MBNA America Bank, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
) 
vs . ) 
) 
David F. Capps, ) 
Defendant/Appellant ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
County of Idaho ) 
I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Idaho, hereby certify that the following are all the 
exhibits admitted or rejected to-wit: 
NO EXHIBITS WERE OFFERED IN THIS CASE. 
Dated January 2008. 
ROSE E. GEHRING, Clerk 
BY: ddgyrn  
Deputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE RE: EXHIBITS - 1 
3 8 3  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
) 
Miriam G. Carroll, ) IDAHO COUNTY NO. CV 05-36747 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs . ) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
MBNA America Bank, ) 
Defendant/Respondent ) 
MBNA America Bank, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
David F. Capps 
Defendant/Appellant 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Idaho ) 
I, Rose E. Gehring, Clerk of the District Court of the 
Second Judicial District, of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Idaho, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above entitled cause was corr~piled and bound under my 
direction, and is a true, full and correct Record of the pleadings 
and documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 1 
I, do further certify, that all exhibits, offered or 
admitted in the above entitled cause, will be duly lodged with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the court reporter's 
transcript and the clerk's record, as required by Rule 31 of the 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the seal of said Court at Grangeville, Idaho, this 30th day 
of January 2008. 
ROSE $3. GEHRING, CLERK 
BY: -c' ,' 
Deputy Clerk 
, .... .,".. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE - 2 
JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615 
LISA B. RASMUSSEN, ISB No. 4931 
WILSON McCOLL & RASMUSSEN 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEWIS 
In the Arbitration of: 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DAVID F CAPPS, 
Defendant. ! 
APPLICATION FOR 
CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATION AWARD 
FEE CATEGORY: A1 
FILJNG FEE: $82.00 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., by and through is counsel 
of record, and hereby moves this court, pursuant to Idaho Code 9 7-91 1, for confirmation of the 
arbitration award against the Defendant David F Capps and in support states as follows: 
1, That the Plaintiff is now and at all times pertinent hereto was a foreign 
corporation with its principal place of business located outside the State of Idaho. 
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to 
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose 
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD - 1 
2. The Defendant now and at all pertinent times hereto resided in LEWIS County, 
Idaho. 
3. That the Defendant entered into an credit card agreement with the Plaintiff 
whereby the Plaintiff agreed to extend a revolving line of credit to the Defendant for cash 
advances or the purchase of goods and services. The account was assigned account no. XXXX- 
xxxx-xxxx-4374. 
4. The agreement includes a provision to the effect that any dispute arising out of the 
agreement, its performance or breach, can be submitted to arbitration by the National Arbitration 
Forum. The arbitration hearing is to occur within the federal district that includes the 
Defendant's billing address at the time the claim was filed. A copy of the National Arbitration 
Forum Rules of Procedure are available at www.arb-forum.com or by contacting Plaintiffs 
counsel. 
5. That the Defendant breached the agreement by failing to pay the minimum 
monthly installment as called for in the agreement. 
6. The Plaintiff submitted the matter to arbitration by the National Arbitration 
Forum as specified in the agreement. Following its procedure, a notice of arbitration was served 
upon the Defendant. 
7. The arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum of $28156.49. 
A true and correct copy of the arbitrator's award is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
8. Neither party has sought to vacate or modify the award per Idaho Code 5 7-912 or 
Idaho Code § 7-913. 
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to 
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose 
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD - 2 
9. The arbitration award remains unpaid. 
10. The Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial confirmation of an arbitration award pursuant 
to Idaho Code 3 7-91 1. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff applies for relief as follows: 
1. That the arbitration award be confirmed; 
2. For a money judgment in the sum of $28156.49. 
3. For Plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho 
Code 3 12-120(3), in the amount of $500.00 should this matter be uncontested; 
otherwise, the sum of $135.00 per hour for the time expended on behalf of 
Plaintiff herein, should said action be contested; 
4. For Plaintiffs costs incurred herein; and, 
5. For such other and further relief as to the Court may appear just. 
DATED this2day of December, 2005. 
WILSON McCOLL & RASMUSSEN 
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to 
collect a debt; any information obtained may be used for that purpose 
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATION AWARD - 3 
NATYQNAL 
ARBITMION 
FORUM. 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
C/O Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection 
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre 
Rockville, MD 20850-5775 
CLAIMANT(s), AWARD 
: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v David F Capps 
File Number: FA0506000498945 
Claimant File Number: 5490353603674374 
David F Capps 
Hc 1 1 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536-0000 
The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FWDS: 
That no known conflict of interest exists. 
That on or before 06/16/2005 the Parties entered into a1 agreement providing that this matter shall be 
resolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Forum Code of Procedure. 
That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6. 
That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Forum and served it on the Claimant. 
That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure. 
The Parties have had tile opportunity to present all evidence and information to the Arbitrator. 
That the Arbitrator has reviewed all evidence and information submitted in this case. 
That the informatio~~ and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated. 
Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES: 
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $28,156.49. 
Entered and Affirmed in the State of Idaho 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTTFICATE % a . ~  OF SERVICE This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby 
Honorable Cathy R Silak 
Arbitrator above referenced 
Date: 09/30/2005 
lDAHOCOUNw DISTRICT C( 'r 
FILED 
 AT^ O ' C L O C K ~ . M .  
2G 21186 
ROSE E. GEHRING 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F. CAPPS, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) Case No. 36827 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 
) 
) ORDER CONSOLIDATING 
) CASE NO. 36827 INTO 
Defendant, ) CASE NO. 36747 
Having reviewed the parties and issues of the two cases involved, the 
Plaintiffs Motion to Combine cases is hereby GRANTED. The court hereby 
orders Case No. 36827 be consolidated into Case No. 36747, and that they both 
proceed to trial according to the Scheduling Order issued by this court for case 
No. 36747. 
Dated this day of April, 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The Clerk of the District Court hereby certifies that I have served @p order 
of the court on each of the parties involved by regular U.S. Mail this (;13 day of 
April, 2006, at the following addresses: 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah. ID 83536 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-I 1 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
Jeffrey M. Wilson 
Wilson, McColl & Rasmussen 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) Case No. CV 36747 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
VS . ) 
) ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) Case No. CV 37201 
vs . 1 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS, ) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that case number CV 37201 shall 
be joined with case number CV 36747. All further pleadings and 
filings shall be filed in case number CV 36747. 
Done this May u, 2006 
ORDER FOR CONSOLIDATION 
3 $ 2  
. . 
I, the undersigned Deputy Clerk of the above entitled 
Court, do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
or delivered by me on 5--1(-& to: 
MBNA America Bank 
c/o Wilson, McColl & Rasmussen 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
David Capps 
HC-11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
Miriam Carroll 
HC-11 Box 366 
Kamiah. ID 83536 
/--^ ROSE; E. GEHRING, CLERK 
L@ ,&kt&-.- 
Deputy 
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: i , . c  
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k. '. 
FILED 
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JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB NO. i6i5 
WILSON & McCOLL AWG 1 '4 2006 
420 W. Washington , . 
P.O. Box 1544 . . 
. , Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: 208-345-9100 
. . '  , Attorney for Defendant 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID CAPPS, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 1 
1 Case No. CV 05-36747 
MIRIAM CARROLL, 
Plaintiff, j 
1 
VS. 1 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A. 1 
1 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW the above-named Defendant, MBNA America Bank, N.A., by and through its 
counsel, and submits the following Post I-Iearing Memorandum with respect to this matter. 
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1 ! 
, , 
' ,  : 
. . 
. . 
Per the Court's Pre-Trial 0rde'r filed August 03,2006, this matter was set for an Evidentiary 
Hearing on thcse consolidated cascs on the issue of the existence ofa binding arbitration agree~~leiit 
between these parties. The Pre-Trial Order fi~rther states if the Court so finds the existence of such 
agreement the Arbitration Awards shall be confim~ed, if not, the matter will proceed to trial at a date 
as yet to be determined. MBNA America Bank, N.A. presented the testimony of its witness, Michael 
< 2 
Milnes that uucquivocaIIy established the following: 
1. That as to the Defendant Capps, he opened a cardholder agreement with 
MBNA, which cardholder agreement was subsequently ameuded to 
:.a: ' 
,< . ' 
. ,I< 
include an arbitration provision; 
. . .  
. , a ,  $ 
. ,  :, : : ,  
2. That the origi~lal cardholder agreement and the amended cardholder 
; : :  r .  ,, . ;  .. , . 
. .. 
.. . , 
agreement were mailed to Mr. Capps at the address indicated at the time 
. . .  
; , .  
. , 
, . 
of opening the account; 
, , ,  . ',., . : '  
3. That at no time did Mr. Capps advise MBNA of a change in address of his 
account; 
4. That throughout the life of the account there were more that one occasion 
, . , ,  . 
where representatiires of m N A  had'ti?&plionic contact with Mr. Capps 
. .  . 
. < ,. , , . 
confim~ing his address and phone number; $?, 
5. That in conjunction with forwarding the amended cardholder agreement 
,! :. ,'. .. , 
contilining the arbht ion provision, Mr. Capps was advised in writing of 
. .. . 
his right to "opt* out" of the arbitriilbn provision in the amended 
, . 
, i .  ' . . , . 
, . 
. . .  
., . 
cardholder agreement; 
6 .  That Mr. Capps hidnot iotify MBWl:of his desire to "opt out" of the 
3 : ., / 
. i 
, , 
. , 
. i 
amended cardholder agreement; .:' 
. .. . .  
.,<;,.: t 
, i i l i j  
! '{?.li .  
MST HPARMG MBMOR*NDUM - 2 , . . .  'L i i 3 $) 5 ,,i! ': 
,. . . . , 
...I . "  . ' <,;,.. . . 
Rug 14 06 08:58a Wilson & NcColl 
That Mr. Capps continued to use the MBNA card; 
That as to the Defendant Carroll, at the time she opened her MBNA 
account, it was already subject to the amended cardholder agreement 
providing for arbitration; 
9. That a copy of such cardholder agreement was mailed to Ms. Carroll at the 
time of opening her account; 
10. That the amended cardholder agreement was mailed to Ms. Carroll at the 
address she provided at the time of opening such account; 
11. That at no time did Ms. Carroll advise of any change in her address; 
12. That thereafter, on several occasions, MBNA had telephonic contact with 
Ms. Carroil wherein she confirmed her address; and, 
13. That, afier receipt of the cardholder agreement requiring arbitration, Ms. 
Carroll continued to incur charges on her MBNA credit card. 
The Court has admitted into evidence the amended cardholder agreement containing the 
arbitration provision, as well as the "opt out letter" (see Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2). 
Neither, Ms. Carroll or Mr. Capps offered any testimony rebutting the testimony of MBNA 
wilness Michael Milnes. Inslead, Defendaxit Capps read excerpts from what appeaied to be.-s 
&m briefing andlor other authority he had previously filed with the Court in this matter. Mr. Capps 
also entered into evidence his Exhibit A setting forth certain provisions ofthe laws of the State of 
Delaware. A reading of $952(a) would certainly appearto grant MBNA the statutory authority to 
, . 
. , . >  ., ,:.,, 
amend its cardholder agreement. The terms of the cardholder agreement itself allow for such 
: 2 
. , , .  
.. , 
amendment. Subsection (b)(l) of $952 is not applicable to the issues related to this evidentiary 
proceedings as it relates to changes in interest rates which are irrelevant to this matter. 
POST HEARING MEMORANDUM - 3 
- 1 1  ,396 
Rug 14 06 08:58a Wilson & McColl 
Per the evidence presented at the hearing held August 10,2006, MBNA urgesthat the record 
is un-rebutted as to the issue of an agreement to arbitrate and that this Court should so find. 
DATED this &ay of August, 2006. 
JEFF& id. WILSON 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the L. d ay of August, 2006, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PRE-TRIAL STATEMENT by regular United States mail with the correct postage affixed 
thereon addressed to: 
David F Capps 
Miriam G, Carroll 
HC 1 1 Box 366 
Kamiah ID 83536 , 
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riskno COUNTVDIS~ICT couw 
RL6D 
a ~ c i . ~ ~ > T  o - c ~ o c ~ A . ~ .  
William L. Bishop, Jr. 
BISHOP, WHITE & MARSHALL, P.S. 
POBox 2186 
JUM - 6  2006 
Seattle, Washington 981 11-2186 ROSE E. GEHRING 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle, Washington 98101 
2061622-5306 Fax: 2061622-0354 
8771259-1016 
Idaho State Bar 87242 
IN TI% DISTRICT COURT OF T I E  SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A 
VS. 
M W M  G CARROLL, 
Plaintiff, / 
APPLICATION FOR 
CONFIRMATION i ARBITRATION AWARD 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., by and through is counsel of 
record, William L. Bishop, Jr., and hereby moves this court for confirmation of the arbitration 
award against the Defendant, M W M  G CARROLL, and in favor of the Plaintiff in the sum 
of CV2005-189 pursuant to the National Arbitration Award attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
This application is made pursuant to Idaho Code 5 7-91 1. 
DATED this day of May, 2006. 
BISHOP, WHITE & MARSHALL, P.S 
APPLICATION FOR CONFIRMRTION 
OF ARBITRATION AWARD -1- 
MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
c/o Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P. 
Attorneys in the Practice of Debt Collection 
702 King Farm Blvd, Two Irvington Centre 
Rockville. MD 20850-5775 
CLAIMANT(§), AWARD 
RE: MBNA America Bank, N.A. v Miriam G Carroll 
File Number: FA0503000443990 
Claimant File Number: 4313033111006016 
Miriam G Carroll 
Hc 11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536-9410 
The undersigned Arbitrator in this case FINDS: 
1. That no known conflict of interest exists. 
2. That on or before 0311 712005 the Patties entered into an agreement providing that this matter shall be 
resolved through binding arbitration in accordance with the Forum Code of Procedure. 
3. That the Claimant has filed a Claim with the Forum and served it on the Respondent in accordance with Rule 6 
4. That the Respondent has filed a Response with the Forum and served it on the Claimant. 
5. That the matter has proceeded in accord with the applicable Forum Code of Procedure. 
6. The Parties have had the owortunitv to vresent all evidence and information to the Arbitrator. 
7. That the Arbitrator has reviewed alfeviience and information submitted in this case. 
8. That the information and evidence submitted supports the issuance of an Award as stated. 
Therefore, the Arbitrator ISSUES: 
An Award in favor of the Claimant, for a total amount of $30,241.41. 
Entered in the State of Idaho 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND CERTIFICATE 
OF SERVICE 
This Award was duly entered and the Forum hereby 
certifies that a by first class 
Date: 08/03/2005 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC-11 Box 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 L_ DOC&U;E.jfd 
208-935-7962 
2 8 2088 
HOSE C. GMRlNG 
-- 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T T ~ ~  
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., ) 
) Case No. CV-06-37320 
Plaintiff, ) 
) OPPOSITION TO 
VS. 1 CONFIRMATION OF 
1 AWARD LETTER 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
) 
Defendant, ) 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Miriam G. Carroll, and opposes the confirmation of 
this award letter from the National Arbitration Forum on the grounds that there 
was no valid agreement between the parties to arbitrate this, or any other 
dispute. The award was obtained without an agreement to arbitrate and is null 
and void ab initio. The Defendant lodges the attached brief in support of her 
position and prays that this court will vacate the award letter. 
Dated this 2 4  day of June, 2006. 
,,k, G - C--*(\ 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Miriam G. Carroll, hereby certify, under penalty of perjury, that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of this OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD LETTER 
and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO CONFIRMATION OF AWARD 
LETTER this 27 day of June, 2006, by First Class Certified Mail #7003 
0500 0005 3304 9348 to the attorney for the Plaintiff at the following address: 
William L. Bishop, Jr. 
Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. 
P.O. Box 2186 
Seattle, WA 981 11-286 2/86 
720 Olive Way, Suite 1301 
Seattle, WA 98101 
bv(.;6- G - (?-A\ 
Miriam G. Carroll, Defendant, in propria persona 
: , ,  
JEFFREY M. WILSON, IS 
WILSON & McCOLL 
420 W. Washingtoll 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208-345-9 100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for MBNA Ameri 
. . . . . < 
IN THE DISTRICT ICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF 
MIRIAM G. CARROZ; " 
Plaintiff 
1 . .  
"1 v. 
. ) .  . , . 
MBNA AMERICAN BANK, 
.. ; . . ) 6a$e7bto. CV 05 36747 
. . .  '.. :::.::.i:., r,.;. 
. . .  . . :) , .  ; 
Defendant . . ;. ) ' .  MEMORANDUM OF m N A  
. .. 
. ', . . , .  , j 
. . . , .  , : ..., :. ", 
, ..: :. . , ~ .  ).,, ( " ' i  I , , '  
AMERICA BANK, N.A. 
. . , q , .%:~  . . . .LA . ' : ; . - W f i p o ~ m o ~  TO MOTION 
, . ,:.. 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) ' FOR RECONSIDERATION 
. ,  . 
.. 
\ .*, .?,? ,.I.. .% , , . . ., 1.:: ..'. .. 
: p  . . : ;. : ; . .. .. . 
. , 
. ,. 
' . I  ' .  : 
') v. 
. . 
. . 
, ,.. DAVID F. CAPPS , :, ,,, :; 1 
, ... 
gh its counsel of record 
eration by Defendants CarroI 
and Capps as follow 
. \,?. . 
, , < \ .  ., . , . . 
.: i. ,.. i..i: ;... 
Oct 17 06 02:54p W i (20.@1384-0442 
',: 
. . 
.~ . 
,, . ' . & u \ ~ i . & ~ ~ c ~ ~ o ~  > ..:. 
. . -., , , . , . 
In this Court's September , ,. 14, . . 2006:: . , . . . . cision and Order, sought to 
; .:,, . . 
. .,,. : ,:. .,,. ; i~,Y!.: 
: 
: h i  : , :  
be reexamined by ~efendtibt~'. :, i p ~ n ~  ,ploti~n . . . . .for , ,. reconsideration/amendrnent of 
: , ,  . , .  ,:, . :. judgment, this Cout cha~ct~rizest~~~~tion~of~befendants . -... that resulted in the Decision 
. ,  . :  
and Order as one seeking, "[njwct&~Ke~ipEiilva~ida6n~ the arbitration awards entered in 
favor of MBNA Bank against them i~dividuall~.'' Following its recitation of relevant 
, , 
fact, the Decision and Order thei id&fies:.the 'dispositive issue of Defendants' 
. , 
underlying motion to be whether there was an enforceable/valid arbitration 
.,..,,~.,.... :,;I 
agreeinent/clause between the parti&+bt>.the, tim&Gedispute arose. The Court answered 
. ., : 
. . 8 . 7 2  s . : :  . .. '. ;. . .  . 
that question in the affiinlative, c,on&lud@g that "he arbitration agreement is valid and 
: . , . . , . . . 
' , . , . , ,. l. . ., i*: 
. . , .  \.: .:;<..,.~,. : . .  , .  . .  . . !.. 
enforceable.. . the decision of the arbitratoi is "tilid and knforceable.. .The arbitration 
' . 
, : :  ' 
..,. ,:,,!:,,.Y.. 
award in favor of MBN . . .[and]. .?Mr. Capps is CONIF'RMED.. ." 
This being the Order of s Order (and the Judgments 
. . 
. . /., . l,.< . ., ,,...., : 
. . 
. . . . . . .  . , ' ?  ,;t.,:; > 
expressly based on it) regarding which ~efendants triay'seek reconsiderationlamendment 
by this motion. 
dgnent, Defendants can only 
be asking this Court tent in that September 14, 
P.2d 1030 (Ct. A.pp., 1982). 
11 considering that req&; tify the dispositive issues 
actually adjudicated in that then determine whether, 
MEMORANDUM BY PLAINTIFF RECONSIDERATION - 2 
, .  . ,  
. , 
. , 
, . 
upon reconsideration, the Court's resolution o tuted such "errors of law or 
. . . . : . . , ' , ,  
fact." , . . ! .  
In this case, the Co es as constituting, and upon 
which would be adjudicate 
"1. Mr. Caps and e was no enforceable arbitration 
. . 
: . . . . .,, .;,'<:!,::.:. : 
clause contained in the credit card agreement between the parties at the time the dispute 
arose. 
. . 
2. MBNA Bank alleges that there: was in ftiet .a valid arbitration agreement 
,. ,:*. 
between the parties at the time the 
Accordingly, as regards the instant motion, the sole question is whether the Court 
, ,", 
: . ,  
i " .. , > 
. ~ .  <:i!;;.Z : , \ ' < ; 2 . . ' : < : / : , : , :  :,; " ,:.;',;.:~;.;~.:; .... 
colllmitted error with respect to those issues, in particular whether it committed error in 
:: ; : A , ; ; : , ; , >  .... . 
valid and enforceable." That being the sole 
,: ,.;, >.',r:t:jL ,, : 
is necessarily the sole permissible inquiry in 
, . I . 
this motion for recdiii ould be, as it is, wholly 
. . ,  . . .  
1 . . ,  
. ,  .,,.. t,: !.:.#; ; ,,I>; !,,i,:,,: ,!&:(>,I) ;A:' !! :::, ~ 3 ~ :  :,.:;..: 
In "support" of tli<ir, ~y?ti@fo,~':r<cohsi$eratq of this Court's September 14, 
, .  . ... . ., ,,.,,. ',:i:j:.'>:,:,. ;.;:>., : ,,,,, t.: : . : , ,>  
. , . ., , . . 
. . 
. .. . .,., .<, i:., L:.:,:'!; :?,:;..L:;:: : j;x\L'k8<.:i!i:.; . ; 
2006 Memorandum Decision . q d  Order Defendants first four argume~lts are wholly 
. . . . : . . . . ii;.' i ... ti.. 
. . 
, , .  , . , j , .  ,,,% ::,,:;: ,ig!'~:.:<ji!.,::.~,.~~ ; ;<) $2.:; ~ ~ 2 : : .  ,,
irrelevant to the issues upon which the Court expressly  remised that Decision and Order. 
:. ... ,, . : ~ . ' i > , : ~  ., ,?! . I . >  ~ , .  , . 
. . . .... , ; 
. . , ,  , . 8 ,  . > . . .  ' ..,,.., : - :  - 
2 . , , . , , , .a  :.. ,.t!.>., ..,, !,:?.;.L&:,," . . a  ..~..\.*,>C., . , y  8.! < 
In fact, the first four grounds , . asserted~byDefendants :, , . . '  ,,:i,:...t in "support" of their reconsideration 
, . . . . . /,> 
.., . 
: ,', ,;t.:.; \:.:, 
!, ..;,:;;,.;i;;'.:;,i,)):jd;::t,2~!::~:;::~;t .'y:;.;:r!.:. G:>;:i 
motion are nothing more than attaoksLbn theund&lying debts and the underlying 
. . . .  . .  
. .:. .., !., 
. ,... .,,<.. ';, : t i  h;: r:2<1.3.5!5!:~: ;: 
arbitration of them. They are not the proper sub'ects of this ,motion fro reconsideration. 
. . ? .  .:, J . .  i , - . , . .  
, , .  ,;,, , ,  * , a  . , ' * ;<,a *!,' . 
.. ,. 
: t 
, . .*. .,. , , . , :, .i,-:. ' 
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: ::,*, :,:3: ,, .<:: <,q::,y" .*,< ("t*;, ;:. . , . , , ?  
. .. 
, .: !; :~! <,?? ,.. ,.< F., .t ,rf? :i: ,,., .,, * . r . - " . .  A ,  - ;  " '  ;
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, .  . , 
Instead, such attacks we ct of.a~Maho Code $7-912 or 7-913 n~otion 
to vacate or correct the motion was never made by 
Defendants. While couche deration, Defendants' initial 
arguments in "support" of the instant motion actually seek vacation of the underlying 
4 . . 
., , . .  . ,, , > , ,  . .  . , '  , .  
, . 
arbitration award. That can onfy'occur in the  context of ,a timely filed motion to vacate 
, . . ., . . . . 
: , . . . . . . 
. , .  
, . . , \  .. 
under Idaho Code $7-912.' Of equal if:nG greater importance, these initial arguments of 
. . >  ,. . , . ... ... > . '  
Defendants assert matters that were notissues upon which the Court expressly premised 
. . 
. . .: , . . . .  , 
its September 14, 20 and so thesematters cannot be before it for 
. . 
, . . , . ,  
reconsideration now. ntkeb ,the issues upon which it made its 
determination. Defendants' extraneous to those issues. 
The first four ar , (mis)captioned as one for 
. , .  : :  , : : I .  . : ' :, 5 , :  . . 
reconsideration or, alternativily, to,altei 01,:ameid judgment, are actually attacks on the 
', . . . ,, , 
.... . . , ,  
...,, 
. : 
underlying debt and the arbitration , ,  ., ,pro<ess wherein that debt was adjudicated. Setting 
. .., .~ 
,. ; , . :  ,....'.,' . . ;r,:+.;". 
aside the various labels that ~efind&g&e;to.make;this,~~ment, those are Defendants' 
. .: ..; !; ::: .,,,, , , :: :. , . 
initial claims - that they did not io.w& thgidgbt, that no court was called upon to compel 
the arbitration and that 
. . 
r :was bia$&, .eyen "unconscionable," in ruling 
. : i ' , .  . , . . ' . .. . 
: : :  , . . . "  .<, , ., 
otherwise. By this motion, they purportedly , ,  . , s ial "reconsideration" of those 
, . . ' .  ' 
. ,. ~ ,'. 
. . ' ..,, ..:, , 
,, .,. !;". .. : , .~ ,.... , , .  
matters. Such review is impermissihie.i~~1Jnese ci 
, , .  I . ' /  
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, .:. . .  , 
Oot 17 0 6  0 2 : 5 4 p  willon $.:~cd'011,  ( 2 n 8  I 3 8 4 - 0 4 4 2  
, . ' , 
. . .  , .  
> .  , . . .  
Firstly, it should be i@t~~i,fli'kt~'in$'judiciil~feview of any arbitration award "is 
. . 
, .  , : ~. 
limited." Driver v. SI Corn., 139 Idaho 423, 426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003), citing 
. .  . 
., . , i 
Chicoine v.  inna all, 127 Idaho 225, 22% 899.P.2d.438, 440 (1995). In fact, "the 
arbitrator's decision is binding on the reviewing court both as to questions of law and 
fact." Id., citing Huphes v. Hughes, 123 Idaho 711, 713, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009 
. ..,. '.~,... , : , . 
. . . ,  C ,  . : "  .,: + . '  . 
(Ct.App.1993). "Even wherea reviewingcourt might consider some of the arbitrator's 
, , ,  
rulings on questions of law to be error, the arbitrator's decision is nevertheless binding on 
. . 
, . ,  . .  . 
the reviewing court." Id., citing Bineham Counw Cornm'n v. Interstate Electric Co., 105 
. . ,  .. 
. . # ...: 
. . . . . . . .  t . ,  , ; 1 3. ..; . . . . . ,; 
Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983). Furtherand perhaps most importantly in this case -- 
' .. . . . . , ,. ; . . ., .:, . :. , 
such limited review as the d&rt is  legislatively allowed is only pe~~xitted at all when one 
, , .  . ,  
. / :  , !.. ,<  , ;  
. i .  .. .; . . .: , . . . . . ' .  .. 
properly and timely seeks it, i.e., when one files an Idaho Code $7-912 or 7-913 motion 
. . , ... 
I .  . . ,.,,. ... * ., , . . . :'!. 
to vacate or correct the underlying arbitration aw,artl within ninety days of the award's 
. . 
. . 
. . 
. . 
.' : !  .,., ! ? 3 . : :  . . .  .*!,i:. i !  
issuance. ~efendantifil&i iic?iudb . . niiitionmd it is now too late to do so. 'The 90-day 
. . ; . : .  
. . 
. . . .. , . . .% . . , .. :. . . . 
. , ,  
:. . 
. . , . . ,  i ' , . ' ,  i,.. , . , . :  ~ : ' ' . ! , '  ' '  , ' ,. 
time limitation under I. C. $7-9.12must be strictly $%rued, and acts as an absolute bar 
. 1 
: , . , : :  , , ; . ! . .,. :. , a , . . .  
to a luotion to vacate that fails.& n ~ e e t t h e t i i ~ ~ ~  requirement.. . Idaho Code section 7-913 
is materially the 
Interstate Elechic 
Further, this requir 
no agreement to arbitrate at 
all. Such a claim doe atory filing requirements of 
Code provisions, including 
ation agreement exists, a 
t .:.,.;,, L'. '!.,$, . , . ' 
Oct 17 06 02:55p ~ i , ~ ' ~ $ n  ~ , i . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ l $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ :  :L;.!;i: , (2n91384-0442 P- 8 
, , I 
. .,: . , 
party belatedly objecting to$indifig.;j$$it&afikn . . ?;: :$s{$pped." . . .  Cadv v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
. . . .  . 
113 Idaho 667, 747 P.2d 76 (Ct.' .A&.,. . i987), cii& Ariiona Public Service Comoanv v. 
Gammons, 519 P.2d 1165 (A&; .. :&$.;]1$:?4).'. . ., . .*>I..  ,.. 
. . 
Accordingly, Defebd&ts . .  . nts of their motion for 
. .  . . .  
"reconsideration" are made n'texi, at the wrong time and are not a matter 
. . .  . ,  
. . . , '  
! <: ,,... : t .t,<,: " !, :j; ? '  .:,.: : 
of "reconsideration" in any event. ~tt'ack on the underlying debts of Defendants to 
. , 
Plaintiff, in addition to the &b&d$@l'aspectk of the- ar6itration of them, were properly 
. .  . 
.,. ' ,  ' 
matters to have been asserted by~6fe1idai1tts . . i n a  tnotion to vacate or correct the 
,, , ~, . . 
: , , ,  . . . " .  ' .: 
. . , ... ;',,.;.;,, < .  ,, . : :  : . , .  w : ; ,  - . 
arbitration award B inghb  County , . Com'n v. Intetstate Elec. Co., a Div. of the L.E. 
, .,,. ! . . ... i'. ;;, j';.;:.l),> ,'. <;, : 2 ' . .". 
Mvers Co., supra at 39, citing State Deot. of~dm~nistmtion v. Sightes, 416 N.E.2d 445 
i ,!I. . . , 
, . : ;  ' 4  
. . , : .. .'; (Ind.Aa~. 1981 ). ~efendants' fa~lure: to file s;cfi. i.'inoti&n is "an absolute bar" to their 
. . 
i : 
present attacks on the cess. pacific' Alaska Seafoods. Inc. v. Vic 
Hoskins Trucking. In 0 ~ . 3 d  1073, 1076 (2003). Defendants' 
.. :,. , .  . 
argument of these matiers n of amotion seeking reconsideration of a 
. .. 
. ~ , : \ , .  ,. . , 
court order that did n address, such "issues" is misplaced. 
Additionally, of course, which this Court premised its 
September 14,2006 "reconsidered." 
Defendants' first 'r motion for reconsideration 
do not support such a parently did not owethe debt 
,to MBNA, that a co arbitration, that the arbitrator 
.,. . , :<. . .  
"displayed bias" and/ onscionable" cannot be 
made the subject of this rno nt, they were not the issues 
. .  . , , ,. .>..., 
. <, . . . . ;x;,'), , !,i:' : ! 
.. . , . 
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1 . . .  . * , .  
. , 
. , 
. .  , 
. . , . 
, . 
upon which the Court premised'its necision . . , and Orde~ .which the Defendants purportedly 
. , 
. . 
seek to have reconsidered, There is nothing to ''reconsider" with respect to these 
. . 
arguments. 
,., . . 
, . . 7 .  ' 
, . . .  ,. ;, ...,.. < . f j . !  
Defendants' fifth argument is the speculative assertion that cl-edit card holders in 
general do not typically read materials enclosed with their monthly credit card bill, the 
apparent point being that Defendants did not know of MBNA's amendment to the credit 
,.. . .  
, . ,  . .;.;. >;:,: ;.,,!:i;:2:!..::. :: !,,. .:j<.;!.j*.,'.: 
card agreement adding an arbitration clause. While no evidence or proof of this generic 
. . , , ,  . 
. . .  
. , 
. . . . . > , ; : : i . .'.. ,,,.. ,, 
assertion is offered, it is irrelevant in any event. AS thls Court correctly pointed out in its 
September 14, 2006 Decision and Order, Delaware law, expressly admitted by all parties 
. . 
to govern the instant dispute, t MBNA could add an arbitration 
provision by un ent and that notice of such 
amendment coul envelope with the monthly 
. , 
, , .  , c::..,:,~.::..;:; <:::.' , ,. : : , :   ..,.. .,. 
billing. 5 Del. C. sec.'9'52(a). Defendant's fifth. a~gunient, that this Delaware law is 
the underlying credit card 
agreement is "illuso to be able to teiminate the 
. . 
: ,<>,,.] ;;;:;.\: ,Cil,:,! : ', ,./ 
- <,, .LV!> :.:,: ;~, ;,: ;::.;q* . , ' , 
agreement whereas 'that same agreement does ! not expIicitly state that MBNA must give 
. .  , . 
: . ,  .,. . , , ,,., ;:: .,: i i , ,  ., . 
. , ,  .:c ..,. : : i ,L4  +l>! ,.! : . A , :  ,,.s.*, 2 ,;!> >$. .... ti.:.: i.; . . . I 
notice when it seeks toi tem~nate,~\e.. ,ag~@nt. $t.:is s6mewhaf: difficult to understand 
. . ,.,, ,i,::::, .. :<\> y , :;,t.:, .."::.T, : '. 
. . . . . . .. . .: . . ", ." ... . .. , .. 
, :..:: ' ;,,., .<:!:<y.fi:, ::,,,' 
. L?.. . .c,..,, 
c,;,;s ;: :j?<! .:v:;< ..,,,: 
this "argument," much Gss . . .  rebut .. ..,, it..-bueitis :.: %I .. . .,: irrelevant . ,  -I. f6 this motion to reconsider in any 
..,., *.. , . . .  . ,,. ,.. ,,.., . s f .  : 
. , ,  , . . . 
, , ~ . . l , . : ; , l . {  ;,,{!,[; <:Sc<;~.,:,;;,i<,, ,, >(:ri[ ,j.! ;!;.. . 
event. Firstly, attacking some proyisionof t~eunderlyingagreement would properly have 
.. . 
,,, , : .  
, ,~ : !  ,'('.;:::;:.;: .:!:. ', . , L ? Z S  
, , ,;< >, ..< ,, ,, ,. , 
. . .  .i:.., . ; ,  ..;i?.'fc;ji:;~iiL?; i :J., ~.,r3!.i?:ia<,':.~,>; 
. . ,  
. . . . _ > : : . / i  
, .. 
: ... . . . I '  :...... ;, , :,I:%, ;.:c::, :.: ;,?: a.l: :..l.:!i  
... ;;r 
....:!:(.;:,!y. :i,!;<.,i;;yjilii ii t.i7i;. i t  @?I$+>,;. 
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. , 
. . .  . . 
. ., . 
. . 
. . . .  
. , .  , . ' . , .  . 
been the subject of a motion . . . .  to  :vacate the award,. Defendants never filed any such 
, ,. ,. . 
, :.: : , .  , ' . I . : ,  . 
motion. Secondly, Defendants never rajsed this argpment in the judicial proceedings and 
,,.! : ' ,  , ~ .  :,.. . . . . . . . . . . .  
they have thus waived any righi i& . . . . . .  0 $ ~ ~ ~ i i ' i ~ o w . ~ $ h i r d ~ ~ ,  ... there is absolutely no authority 
. ' : : . . . .  
(or logic) for Defendant's contentioilin .., . ally event. Fourthly, whether MBNA had to give 
: . . .  
. ' *  , .; : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
notice (or not) to terminate the' cidit bard agreemetit and/or whether the cardholders had 
. . . . .  . . . . .  
,3 .,+. ;::: .,.. . .  ': 
to do the santc, or not, is utterly meaningless in the instant case because MBNA never did 
. . . .  . . 
. , .  
tet~llinate the agreement, nor did ~efendants, . . . . . .  ~ i f t h l ~ ,  this Court painstakingly interpreted 
the credit card agreement between the parties, with specific reference to Delaware law, in 
. . 
. , 
. , . : , '  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
its September 14, 2006 Decision.bd Order, indicating with particularity why and how 
, - 
. . :  . . .  : . . . .  
the arbitration provision between theseparties came to be effectively and lawfully placed 
in their cardholder a eement, 'or lack thereof, or the 
. , 
. .  : . : . . . . . . . . .  
manner in which it could, or could . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,not, be, accomp.li,shed; by one party or the other, truly 
. . . . . . . . . . . . .  
had no bearing upon nor relevahie ,..> to. ..,, thit,adj<dic,ati&. .... ! . , . . .  . .  Defendants' 12' hour assertion of 
.. . . ,  . ... 
. . .  ! . .  . . ,  : , . ,: 
some mysterious lack-of-termination-notice symmetry is,.meaningless in the extreme. 
. . . . .  
. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,,: .8., 
Defendants' seventh and final argument fares no better. In fact, it is nothing more 
than an attempted su s." No evidence is provided to 
support Defendants' ass arguments, to the extent that 
those generic assertions , no law is cited to support 
these "arguments." Nothin nor fact. Instead, Defendants 
appear to rehash irrelevan rejected by this court and 
, . . >  .. 
.... >\>..'> .. !. ..*.. . . , j l P i , .  . 
somehow conclude froill this that'th'6~o~rtihould. . . . . . . .  therefore reverse itself. Such baseless 
, ,,..i,.-.. , 
and immaterial assertions callno 
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"Where Defendant fails to provide my new information in support of bis motion 
I 
I for reconsideration and instead essentially maintains that the district court was wrong in 
I 
their decision and asks that the district Court reverse itself and rule in favor of defendant, 
this is an inappropriate use of Rule 60(b) as a disguised substitute for an appeal."- 
State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3d 761 (Ct. App., 2005). Defendants' proper legal remedy at -
. , i,?. 8 ,  .,. , < 
. . .,; /.. ": .. .u * *. 
this juncture is not to solicit this Court - yet again - to finally agree with their already 
judicially rejected and wholly unsupported legal conclusions and factual speculations, but 
rather to proceed with an appeal. The instant motion for reconsideration cannot be 
. , i < j  . .". 
: c . .  :. , " :  , . , .>:. .' .i. . , , ,ll:'l. .. 
lawfully used as "a disguised substikte for atimely appeal." In re Estate of Bade& 117 
. . 
.. . . :,,: ,.~i...,::',.::;;!.t' 2 :, ,~:,;>, :>:,.> , .  
Idaho 1091,793 P . Z ~  1263 (Ct.App., 1990). See also, Bubak v. Evans, 117 Idaho 510, 
, . 
, . 
. .., . . . ' ~ ; ; . , ~ , l . ~ : , ,  <i:&:'..', : .  '. 2::: ..:j<;i:. 
788 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App., 1989). 
Defendants' deof  failures. Most, if not all, of 
.;,;.,;::, . ;:,:) $... ;,,><>;;Gi :: ,,, ,y:~.t:i,2.:,:' ., , 
them should have' been made in thecontext of an Idaho Code $7-912 motion to vacate. 
.::,?>.,,!. 'j%::? i.-(! 2 i;;,<:.;,:,>.[ 
No such motion has beei'filed and i t  is, now too, latq:to do so. Additionally, all of the 
:. z . .  ,.: , : . .  . , ' I .  . ~ ) (  , .  
arguments lack eith 
, 3 . .  .; . . . assertions made, and most of 
.:.,:$ . .  , i , .  ; - '  
..., 3L, < , 7  '. 
the arguments lack'h e ajsq :.irrel'eFant. This Court specifically 
, . . . .  ,,:,: 
. , .  . ,  (2 :,,,,., : , s . .  
indicated the issues up* . whibh . itprqnised its S$ptember. 14,2006 Decision and Order. 
. . . . . . . . ?-. .:,, :,?,,.~ , P >  ., . ,;,:, , 3 , ,. . . ,  , 
Defe~idants facial1 Orde~..yet fail to address its foundational 
,.;; 3 , "  .. 
, . , 
.I) ., , , . . . , 
and dispositive issues. 
, ~ ..,. ' . .. 
. .  . 
. , .  
," ,. ,: ;$,,,~ ,.-.. i ,:: '". 
. , - .  , . . 
& ,  .,., ,. . . I. j . , ; !  , 
. , 
. . 
... , 
. . .  .,-.. , ,  i: ,.6i; ;:ii ,,& i ;  IX, . s.: i::i>.:..r<. , . ! ,:. 
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IDAHO COUMY DISTRICT COURT 
FILED 
 AT^; L *,CLOCKA.M. 
QCT 1 9  2006 
T 
EPUly 
Telephone 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 * 
Attorneys for MBNA America Bank, N.A. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLI;, : .. ,  ::. : '. 1. ) 
,. , .  .. . 
. . . 1  : , 
Plaintiff; ) . Case No. CV 05 36747 
1 
v. 1 
MBNA AMERICAN BANK, 
j 
1 
1 
Defendant ) MEMORANDUM BY MBNA 
1 AMERICA BANK, N.A. IN 
) OPPOSITION TO AMENDED 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, ) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
) 
Plaintiff 1 
1 
DAVID F. CAPPS 1 
Defendant 
Comes Now MBNA,AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record 
, , 
. . 
recited above, and hereby oppose? the ~mebdhd  Motion for Reconsideration by 
*.: :, 
. ! .  , 
Defendants Carroll and Capps as follows: , . . " : . , . , . , .  .   ..  
. .. , 
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I. 
. . .INTRODUCTION .:,& .% : ,.L: t 
In this Court's September. F4i llt:2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, sought to 
be reexamined by Defendants' instant ainended motion for reconsideration/amendinent of 
judgment, this Court characterizes the underlying motion of Defendants that resulted in 
the Court's Decision . . . . . . .  andt;Oi;der..as , .  , ..... one seeking "injunctive relief invalidating the 
. . 
arbitration awards entered in favor of MBNA Bank against them individually." Following 
its recitation of relevant fact, the Decision and Order then identiiied the dispositive issue 
of Defendants' underlying motion to be whether there was an enforceabie/valid 
arbitration clause between the parti+d.~ti~$he:time:~heidisP~te arose. The Court answered 
' . ' i  ,.>! :..... ,..,.< ;:<,:,: . . . .  q j ,  ,{. ; ! .  ,..., .. ...:.. . . . , . t. 
that question in the affihative, ~dncluding tiat "the axbitration agreement is valid and 
: ' . : ; , ; >  : ;  , . r ,  , 
enforceable ... tile decision of the arbitrator is valid and enforceable ... The arbitration 
. . . . . . .  L.. .,,.!, 1.:.  . 
: 1 % : .  , .: . . . . . .  ! ........................... 
award in favor of MBNA against Ms. Carroll.. .[and].. .Mr. Capps is' CONIFRMED.. ." 
,. . 
,,. . 
. , 
, . !. . , ,  . a .  i . . !  ... ; . . .  ., ... ,. 
This being the Order of tlie' Cou&'~lf.is necessarily only this Order (and the Judgments 
. ,. - 
. . , , ,, \>, % ,. ;. .,. 
. .  , ,  ,<. , ..cz \ . t i  ,',r!:.$'x: i . , ,  : ... :;i . :  
expressly based on it) regarding which ~efendants niay seek reconsideration/amendment 
. . .  
: , , :  . . . .  % , >  ,:.c ;!;,.,j: ;,,?!.\ :,;. . . . .  . !c; ~L., .... >~ : 
by this motion. 
' . , ! , ,  : , .<  ;..;,,;(.i<.l> ! i i ..:, !. i('i yi><.!.:, 
11. 
.: . . . . .  
~ - , . 
, ,  .,', !i;;!.$*::f v,;? <:,2+:,4::!'.>.:;,s'::! .; '. j:,.:. ' . , j ' ! i ! ~ ,  
BY their ainended; ,moLion ,for ' rec 
i i i :  ii.:,.Oi. . i . .  .$  
dinent of judgment, 
. .  . . .  
.,.;>,, . .  ,>:: ..;< :!LC. <:~>.;,!::>,:,:..: :. 
Defendants can only be askulgtbis . . .  Cqui? to "co 
: :i., i,. ..; ;:: 
offact and law" existent in its 
. .  . .  .:. 
. . . .  . . .  
. ;i;i : .., ...... 
,, , ., ,.,Lb !!LA i?>.,S. <. ' . . .  
September 14, 2006 DecisiouandOrder. , ,, , Idaho 259, 646 P.2d 1030 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  bri'.;:., ..'.?:. . , i i  
. . . . .  ..*;. ;'i< ,. . . .  i 
. . .  
. .,. :.!\> (,(;~??-i,;, ;,.. .::;.:;c.,; ; .$?'%,. {I:,:;,; :c. 
(Ct. App., 1982). In considering . . . . . . . . .  that ." . % request it is !herefore necessary to frrst identify the 
. . . . . . . .  ..,.< ,, ;:/: 1. , a '  : ;,. .!,:;!i: .: :. . 
. .  , ?:,;i)&;.h: .;,i;;i,, L j  :s , i ;$ ,> : ! :  , , i . . :  
dispositive issue(s) adtually ad5djcated in that ~+isidn'$hd ,Order so that one can then 
:;:, i . ' < , >  ,;;:#...j:j;<:. .$; . .  , , \ I  .,.A: ; ./....; ?, . . . .  
, . . < ! ' . .  ' , ,  , 
. . 
. . ,  
, .. 
determine whether, upon re o~rt~:6~~esolutioi1 ... . of thein constituted such 
"errors of law or fact." 
tified two issues as constituting, and up011 
.. . . ,  . 
en$ ttiii'tjieri was no enforceable arbitration 
rties at the time the dispute 
..;. .~ .: :' ..:,.>. 1 .. ,. : .! , . 
. . .,.. , 
arose. . , ; . ,  : . .  . , . ,  
. . :  
. .  . . 
. ... i . :  . : . , ? . .  
2. MBNA Bank illeggs that: there wa valid arbitration agreement 
. .  . 
. .., , 
, .,,.;, .,:;:;:.,;(>4,:;:~i[,,:,{;, '! 
between the parties at the time the dispute arose. 
, .:: . r l 
:, . . ,  ., , : ~ .  
Accordingly, as regards: the,instan$:alllended motion, the sole question is whether 
the Court committed articular whether it committed 
error in concluding th ent ?s vaiid and enforceable."  hat being 
the sole basis of the necessarily the sole material 
inquiry in this amended Anything else would be, 
as it is, wholly irrelevant to the 0 
DEFENDANTS' NEW CL DELAWARE CHOICE 
oice of law provision is not 
valid" is without merit. 
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. , 
Firstly, Defendants have &Ire$&$ '%f&ulatdd -tb. this Court in this action regarding 
this very issue that ~e lawbr i  law $id'gij;r&n ththe 6ontiict between the parties. As stated 
.' , .., '. 
, . 
. ,. . . . . , 
by this Court on page 5 of its ~e~teinb$: 14, 2006 Memorandun1 Decision and Order, 
"The original contract also included a choice of law provision stating that Delaware law 
: :  . .  , : 
would govern the rights and ob~i~atibds k d e r  the'cbintract. See Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 
. . 
/: ~ ' .  
. , .  
, . . . ,. ,,,; !., c: :. '; .I: : , 
2. Neither Ms. Cairo11 ilor Mr. Capfls. &ie"contesting that Delaware law applies; indeed, 
, . 
. , , . , . .  
a 
they affirmatively state that it does; $ 6 ~  Pi.dintifFs Post Hearing Memorandum Rebuttal 
and Plaintiffs Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate." Defendants 
. . :; .,.... k.'.' ' "" .,. . . 
. ,;.. s : y & : i :  '!'! , I .  . . .  
having so stipulated and having then failed to prevail, it would be unfair, illogical and 
inequitable in the extreme' to s to now entirely reverse themselves and 
see if they do any better with at very issue. Defendants 
', , . . . .  , ' . , , . ' .  . ' 3  .. . . .,. ", 
have already stipulated, and this Cougthas. accepted their stipulation, that "Delaware law 
would goveil1 the ri ct." Now that this matter has 
. , 
, , . .  . ,? , .  >s3;:' :(:.i:.,. ~2 
, .. . . .. . .......,. , ... :. :;:,!: .,., !: . . .  :
been finally adjudicated, they sliou1d:not be allowed to somehow withdraw their 
> . . .  :i: _ , .  
: :*;:. (<. ,,!~..:.:>. :> ,,,,; p;,,; ! !  : :, ; . .  ., , 
stipulation and claim exactly the opposite. 
i . ~li"' ' ' '  '  
Secondly, the oily " Dpfmdants ,,b. .. in purported support of their 
.... , 
. . 
, . :.\ * ,;.:', !.;,~1~.5%,.! :: >,,:,*fi.: 
new assertion that the ~ i l a w a r e  . chojcp . qflpw provisipn. is not valid contradicts that very 
. . . .  . 
claim. Defendants cite ting parties may designate 
their choice of law butt  ntracts less than $100,000. 
,, ,,,  . ,~..'::. :..:;?\;.:i, $*:\>;: 2,; !,!,.i ;i:+,;r ? , '  , 
Defendants then assert - co~ec'tly . . . .  . $  . . .  in ; I ' . - i - . i  this ,.. . pctrticul&.- . . , .  that the underlying contract 
. . . .;>.....;.. ; ,  .L."". . \ ...., 9;: ..:& 
,.,,,, , ,,,< :!:*!*:ii,{t>i;,:;.,ji,i; :.< ;;ir, {>,::,,!;,.:,. : 
between Plaintiff anh ~efend,~ts:j-nvo'lv'e$:tess ; . . .  ~ , % ; . : < , .  than $100,000, thus concluding that this 
. .( 1 ;, . , . , '  . i i '  : :  
. . . . . ,.. / 
~ , .  
~ ...,.., ,,, >.:G;!;;,i ::..:;;K < 
section is inapplicable. T~at.assertion;is alsp cox 
,'';:.:,. , .  :,:,:;,,;.,; ".',..$*" <? '  it does not lead to the 
. . ,,.> . .< 2. is: , : .  : . . 
. . .. , : < '  .' . . 
.:,< ' . , ! ,  ?!&T. !'! ;:.!<,v,.<c< 
> .  
.. . , >  (, .;,;; ,<,... 
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, 
. . .  
. . . . . : . , , . ? :  
conclusion Defendants desire. That is becausb, in positing this shaky syllogism, 
. ,  ,, , ,  
. . ,  . 
Defendants have convenienflygnu~~~d~~t~e:.$al,,mce . , . . , . ,  9E6 Do1 C. $2708, i.o., section (e) of 
. )  , ! , , i ~ , . , J .  , : . , .  . . . , . . . , . .  ' 
1:. - . :I"... : :.: 
that same Code provision which recites tllat '"Thi$ijwtion shall not. .. affect the validity 
. . .  ,.,:,: ,,.. . ' 
of any other choice of law provisio~'in. any co$$t$ct, ,agreement or other undettaking." 
i , '  i : : :  .. . 
. . ,. . 
Defendants' own citation of authoaty -their only:p@ported authority for the proposition 
. 3 , .  
, . .  
- :.:, j . % .  , 
. . : .  
, , 
: . , . . . .. .. . 
stated - specifically contradicts their ~wn.~ro~osition!IYefendants are sill~ply incorrect in 
. .. , :,. 
. . . . 
their 12" hour attack on the'validity of cJioice of?Iatv ,provisions in Delaware. Delaware 
, . 
, . . ,... 
. . ,  , 
specifically recognizes choiceof-law $~ovisions.:See, e.g., Gloucester I-ioldinp Cam. V. 
. . .  . .,  . 
. , 
, .. j . , , . . .:.*. , ' , 2' 2' . :' 
. ., , 
U.S. Taoe and Stickv Products, LLC, 832 A.2d 116, l i 4  (~el.~h.,2003), citing VGS. Inc. 
. . ; . .  ., .st,*,,:.. . ' ' 
V. 2003 WL 7232k5, at',7'&.jni':d3 , , .  (ijei:ch. ~ e b .  28, 2003) and Turtur v. 
, , ,  ..,,. ~ (22 
.1:. : : .  , ' 
Thirdly, in addition tothe ofity!for choice of law provisions found in 
: , , . ., , . ; .  .' >,:L .,: . : <,,..  , .:.: .,,. .: 
6 Del C. §2708(e), G Del C. ~l-301~.also~~e~~res~1~1pio~ides , .. . . that "parties may agree that 
, . ., , .. 
, . ,..,.. ,. ,,.. 
. , .  . , , , . ,%'j 
the law either of this State or of such 0th;; itate b i  nation shail govern their rights and 
. . .  , 
, , . . , . . . .  , .  , .. ,, ,  
. , , > '  ' , . . . . :  
. I .. : . , duties." . . . . 
, ,, 
. , 
.,:, , : . . 
Fourthly, considehng , , ,  , . ~ e f e h d a n t 8 n e k  . , ,~ .. .. ifiir-the-fact ." . argument that Idaho law 
should somehow be conside 
is valid, it should be noted t 
e.g., Idaho Code 828-1-301(a). 
366, 368-369, 913 P.2d 582, mi-Kote, Inc. v. Energywav~ 
Corp., 1 16 Idaho 56, 77 of the rule set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of 
MEMORANDUM BY PLNNTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO 
AMENDEL) MOTION FOR RECOI\'SIDERATION - 5 
Oct 19 06 01:4Qp W i  l ~ . - , n  '(20.P-,384-0442 
~ ~ 
. . 
This rule provides in relevaitpatti {(l)The la state chosen by the parties to 
govern their conkactual righ&c;,;a$$$*ities 'will be applied if the particular issue is one 
: : !  .& 
..... , I , )  . ,  , . , 
. . . . . .  
. . . . .  
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed 
to that issue'." See also, ~es ta t~ inent  (s,econh) if conflicts of Laws 5 187 (1971) 
' .  > ........ 
. . . . 
. . 
.,; 
("contracting parties may choose the law to be appli<dto their agreement"). 
, . 
. . . .  ;,>,.,.,,:.: i ... .. 
The balance of ~efindants'  first atgunlentlik6wiSe misses the mark. In the instant 
. . 
case, the contract between the parties was formed when the cardholder agreement was 
* ,  > 
entered into. There is no dispute that this occurred. That agreement specifies, validly for 
. . . .  
!.;..:,,.;,. ,;:. ::; ' " , . .  ,,'.,, : ,: ; t ; ; ':; :)> !,!I,: 
the reasons stated above, that. Blaware'law governs that agreement, which law dictates 
, . ,, . 
..... .,%, :,;;+;, :,<,c, t . . ; : ; i c : +  '\; L .  :;: ,.,!;,p,:.'.. .. 
how such cardholder agreements Fat b e  modified. This Court specifically determined that 
. .. . . . . . . .  
, . ' ,  '. *.$ ! ::;,'+j!ft,: !;s,: ; ,::; ,,. t , ; ..S:!,Y,:.. v. ,. 
the lnodification in this case (adding an arbitratik provision) was accomplished in 
accordance with that concerning "meeting of the 
minds," etc. ail go to is no such issue here. 
NO party has ever questioned t ed between Plaintiff and 
! 
., . . 
. .......... 
.. . . .  ..:b .......... \,.;,j .:I .::a '2,;ltr;?;, 4;. 
Defendants. Further, ~e'fendants' citations to theeffect that acontractuai modification in 
general requires "cons evant in this case, i.e., the 
; +  :,:. ; 5 , i , .  
L.,<>,:; &..<,, ;,;~ , , * % & ,  .:,,;,, i!.;T... \', ' C y s s  :j,;,.,:, : :, 
cases cited address common,law .., contract lawin i;eqeral. In'this case, however, we have 
: ............... ' . ; . .  i .  
. . , .  . ., ,,,.. ( C  ^ , 
, :  ,,.;.,:!<-+;i!;!ii>; ;:$jx :,:.. .. , ,<,>,.# .. . . J Z  '.! A .. fix; :$- ;,,! 
specific statutory law which. speciQcally a&lresses hgv in a cardholder agreenlent such 
. , , .s;.: ;,; ;.,. :: , :,,,,, -,,; ,. ,,\ . , 3 : ; 1  .,<:"',': 
. , .  . 
.,;.. ciic:i; (,,:#? .?.r : . ,  * Y , ,  * ' . , ~  ,. .. . .s. .  , . ,,, . ; $2 rsri,;; :::...: r. .. 
. ...,., 
as this one, that agreement . . .  pan be ....... mod~fied. ~ . ,  f h ~  "face of those specific statutory >.'.,. s . , . . . .  >..$ , . . .  . . .  .. . .  i', :>:, 
. 
. . 
,,:I,:: ,., ..' . .  . . . . .  
. I t.:, r .  <,$,," >>.,> z>;,w ;c.:ql&\:<.\>. ., ,,
provisions, which pro inea.were ., , . . , ,;,< : ~. : followed, .., general common law 
, . 
J<>r:,Ji:, >:;; . : 
contract principles are ...... 
,8 1 ,.;.,:,<2 ,. , : 
! .< ,..,. 
.;& ,.,*:, i < > ! ' .  ,,> 
. , . , , , . . 
,..:<.'! !:.,y!f;.;l :; ,! j,.rfe-l. rp .,. 
.,,/ L '  a&.: 
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, , . .  
. ., 
For each, and certainly foyaI1,:of tl~ese . reasons,.. Defendants' first argument in 
. , : . : .  ,,',~. , , , . . , , .. . 
their amended motion for 
. . 
.. . . .. . . . 
, . . .  !%,i . .  . . . ,  .,. , ,  .. . ,  
DEFENDANTS' NEXTF~URARGUMENTS:ARE WHOLLY IRRELEVANT 
.. . . ,,, ,.. , 
., : , . . . , . , . ,  :. .. .. / ,.,,. . 
. . .. 
In "support" of their .nibti& for, reconsidtiraiion of this Court's September 14, 
: ... . 
. .  . 
. , . . ~ .  > ;%; ,,,,.< ::,; . . , :,' 
2006 Memorandum Decision andlOider, Defendants'. next' four arguments (numbered no. 
, , . ,  
2 through 5 in their brief) .are wholly irrelevant to  the issues upon which the Court 
, ,  . 
, ,  . .  
expressIy premised that Decision and; Order. In fact, .these. four grotu~ds are nothing more 
. , 
. . 
, . .,,;~ :. , ... ;.'L,2::,,;:g;% . : 
than attacks on the underl$&.:debts and the unde~lyi$g,a~bitration of them. They are not 
: :.,.i.:'.,.::.I :' ,:<:, ,.!:.,:,': 
the proper subjects of this amend$d,m&ion: , .  , . . . I . :  .,.., , .  for reconsideration. Instead, attacks such as 
.' ,. 
these could only have properly been the subject of an Idaho Code $97-9121 7-913 motion 
, .  . . . 
, . . . , .  
:'::;:!::.. ;!><L,:,~..>..:>:..:.:.: 
to vacate or correct the underlying .arbitrat~.~li 'motion was never made by 
... . 
. . , . I  ; i , .  
.. :,.. 
. c  ,,:. . :: ,.. . 
. . .  , Defendants. , 
, ., . . ,  . ,. 
, . 
. "  . . 
, . : .  i .  i.,. .., . ' .  l i  : . . . 
While couched as an arnerided.jmtion for:rec&&deration, Defendants' arguments 
i .  i.;;; . .  , ;  , ; ;, .,.: , 
numbered 2 through 5 in ac&ality seek a "actation of the &derlying arbitration award, 
relief not available to vacate. Of equal if not 
greater importance, that were not issues upon 
which the Court expre ecision and Order. That 
being the case, these reconsideration now. They 
are irrelevant to the 0 sidered. The Court expressly 
identified the issues upon These four arguments of 
Defendants are entirely ex 
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. . 
. ~ .. 
These four arguments'of Defendant's amended motion, (mis)captioned as one for 
reconsideration or, alternatively, to alter . , . , ..., :or . arnena judgment, are nothing more than 
, .., 
: ;  ' . . i . .  
: . ' : . . *  
attacks on the underlying :debt and the: arbitration process wherein that debt was 
. . 
adjudicated. Setting aside the.vafio~s:l~bds that Dpfeiidants use to make this argument, 
i ,.: , 8 . .  ? ~ :  
. ,.., .:, 
those are Defendants' did not owe the debt, that no court was 
,.. , 
called upon to c that the ahitrator was biased, even 
"unconscionable," in ruling othenvise. By this motion, Defendants claim to seek judicial 
"reconsideration" of those matters. In actuality, they ask the Court to second-guess and 
. . .  . ? (  . '  : . : : . .  . i ; . : . : .  ; ... ; .,, 
reverse the arbitrator. Such judicial "reconsideration" is impenllissible in these 
. ,. .. 
, . 
I ,  . ' : L . . ; . ! , ~  ,< 8 ..,, t:: :. 
. . 
, . h i ?  ".. '. 
circumstances. . . .  , , 
, . 
,,,. , , . . ~  . : . ,  .:., 
,...,,,.' ..., '*.. <~ ,;.,. ., ti;.;::,: Cjl' .,: 
Firstly, it should be noted that any judicial review of any arbitration award "is 
, , .  <., .. i,.,.,,: ,;'::...:!.<>"!:,, ,,:~YJ::' :.. 
limited." g i v e r  v. SI COQ: 139 -Td&oo 423, 1024, 1027 (2003), citing 
. . j::,;.;::!:,.:.!:.;<:!i~! . !.s:!..::.. ~. \:;<:. ;':::\, .!.,, 
Chicoine v. ~ictnaii ,  127 . . ,.. Idaho.. .. 225, 227, 899 P.2d 438, 440 (1995). In fact, "the 
,s. o .  .,,.. .,... < ., 
.> 
,. 
,:,, .:j:,' :~~~i.~~,:;~,:,!~;:> : ,. . ,. . . .  . 
....~*,. , 
arbitrator's decision isbinding onthe reviewing court botli as to questions of law and 
. , . . . , . . . 
. /  . . : : : t , . , . .  . . 
Idaho.711, 7i3, 851 P.2d 1007, 1009 
der some of the arbitrator's 
is nevertheless binding on 
the reviewing court." Id., citing,Bingham:Countv CO& v. Interstate Electric Co., 105 
. 3 , ;  : , . : : .<:..:<.,,, . k > > .  
. .  , . ,  1 
, . 
. . 
, , , , : ! . :. ,!:.,:!~:->, : 
Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 , .. ( ~ 9 ~ 3 ) . , ~ q t h q ~ " a k d  . . perhaps most importantly in this case -- 
i . , . , .  :.,;:21 !,:.,,..!>:<::;:, ,;,,,';.~.?..a .. , .  :
:: .t:>!-?:i:., ,!:;I .'~,.i:.~<: A:: l < i ;  .!.>:I ;,. . : 
such limited review GtEie'ToUrt . ; : . .  . is legislativeli a1 
$,.. ...~~i~~;.::j,:... .  1 ;  I... > ,., nIy permitted at all wile11 one 
~. ,  - ..,. , 
, .,I 
. i . . i  :: 2: :  &..A,, , 
properly and timely seekstit, i e when one files . . . , . 
. , > > . 
de 87-912 or 7-913 motion 
. 3 ' ; : :  . . l,LL<c, ,  % , < ~ ,  
: . i ;  ,.,. . . .-.  . * ~  , , ,  . 
. . 
.. ,: , ,<v; , ,<>.  ,'. ,,L..' i. '. ' 
.. ... . i..,.. ;.,>I :! :Ybi: :: : 8.. 
to vacate or correct the underljrii~g arbitratioh award witl~b, ninety days of the award's 
: , I  : , : ,2.::;<>i: .:,,.., . : 
. . 
. .  . 
, : , ' A "  .;. .. 
. , . . . : ,  I i; .f:c.~? '? i ; . 1 
.. ... ., " 
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,,. . . . 
issuance. Defendants fil $'is o w  too late to do so. 'The 90-day 
time limitation under I. C.. ~7;~j~:@$g~'lre':8@ictl~ , . c@&.tnied, and acts as an absolute bar 
. . 
. . .  
, . . . . , , . . , ,. 
: !>'.:.,.: ;:., >,, .,,,.'!!,:! .. , 
to a motion to vacate that fails , tg.meet , the time rec$ire~nent. .. Idaho Code section 7-913 
is materially the same." Driver v. S I  Corn.,, s 
2 ,. . ,  :'.,: . < ' .  
g Bingkam County Comm'n v. 
, ,  .,.... . < . '  ," 
. , 
. . Interstate Electric Co, supia.at'39. . . 
. . .  , , . , ,  , ' . 
.' 
! 
. . .  ( .  . . . 
, . . + , ,  " ' . * . .  C ' . . L  
Further, this . ., reqpire,@te$ , . . .  . , to . . .  hhae .., properly . and timely filed a motion to vacate or 
, , 
amend applies even when,: . . ,... herq,,r).efendants . . . .  claim , . ,  that there is no agreement to 
arbitrate at all. Such a claim: , .  d0es;ilot':e~em~t ..; % . . . . , .  . Defendants . from the mandatory filing 
. . 
.., , . <  .:. . .&..,,.:,,, :. 
. . . : ' .  . , . ' 
, . .  
. . . . .  , . .  ' 
requirements of Idaho Code 47-912 or $7-913. III fact, so mandatory are these Code 
. . :. . ., , - .. . .:: I ,'i< , .. . , . . . 
. , , : :  2 , .  , . ..I .. 
provisions, including theirninety-day. fiI&grequirenient, that "even where no arbitration 
.'. ; . . , . ., .: :*>. . > ~ . . .  .., 
' .,. . ~ .  ,* ,:,., :. . ,,;\:,. , , . ...' I:;'.. ..:, . 
agreement exists, a party belatedly objecting to binding arbitration is estopped." 
. . .. , . 
. \ :  . , .  . . 
Allstate hs. Co., 113 1 d a h d ! 6 ~ 7 , ~ ~ ~ $ ~ $ d  $6 (ct:.App, 1987), citing Arizona Public 
. . 
, . , ,  , 
Service Comoanv v. Gamnions, 5 1 9 ~ : ~ d  1.165 (Ariz:App:; 1974). 
. . . . r : :  ,.; . . ,.;. '. 
: . . , . , . .  . ,  
. . , . . ,  :. .'; : .  ' , . : :  .. '. 
Accordingly, ~ k f e ~ d ~ ? .  . . argument nos. 2 through 5 -- that they did not owe the 
biased, even "un~onscion 
tile wrong time and are not n any event. Attacks on the 
underlying debts of Defe 
arbitration of them, were p 
state Deut. of Administsation 
v. Sizhtes, 416 N.E.2d re to file such a motion is 
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. . 
"an absolute bar" to th eiiiiderlying arbitration process. Pacific 
Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. ~ i c : ~ o s k i n s : : ~ m ~ k i i ~ .  ............ ;. .,,.. : . . .  ., Iixc., 139 Idaho 472, 475, 80 P.3d 1073, 
:,;',(,:'.. : .: : " 
. . . . . .  s.:,.; 
1076 (2003). Defendants' argument of these matters now, in the context of a motion 
. . 
. , 
. . 
seeking reconsideration of a:coG ?rd& that did not adjudicate, or even address, such 
"issues" is misplaced. These were not matters upon which this Court premised its 
. . , ,  , ? : : ,  ,. 
. . .  
_ , . I .  ., 1 
September 14,2006 Decisioli and OrdeinoW sought to. be "reconsidered." The Court did 
. . 
not render ib September 14, 2006 Decision and Order on the matters Defendants attempt 
to raise by these argu , there is nothing to "reconsider" regarding 
. . 
tl~em. 
,. . 
, . i c :  ,,., . 
.:;-:,, :~ :  :.; :;,:>.~;.i.:;>>.:t:'4, :.c e i  :.:..:'. Defendants' initial ar@mnit$!m. lK$iit,@ort", df tbeir motion for reconsideration do 
< :  , . :. . 
. . . .  . , .... i . .  
, .  . ,  ... ' . L . , .  . . " . . . .  ,. ,, , , . . 
not support such a motion at a11. Their claims thatthey apparently did not owe the debt to 
, . . . . . . . . . . .  Li i  , ' . :  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
MBNA, that a court was got c.al.l&d. upon to ' c ~ r n ~ e 1  arbitration, that the arbitrator 
. . . , 
.. : > , $ I . .  . 
"displayed bias" a was ionlehow "unconscionable" cannot 
. . .  
. .: ! ,,., :x t;<., 
successfully trigger a " r  dedision that itself did not address those 
. . .  ,:. 
. . .  
. . . . . . . .  ...:.,.* !:;:,~$ i,;$;::.;>;!a:*:': : ,; ..;. i.... ::; . 
matters in any event. Thes'e, ~ 9 i d ' ~ x o t  ,the issues upon which the Court premised its 
. ., 
L:!.~.~i.,;>.:i , , . s , ~ , : ~ ~ ; ~ . . , ~ ~ ; : ~ ! , . ~ ! ~ ,  ,; ,,:, ::, . ......... 
Decision and order which ,: . . the, , :  : , , , , .  pqfenda$$ ~b ,$#.:. purportedly ., seek to have reconsidered. There 
is notlling to "reconsid 
~~ , 
, , , , ..,. ., ~ , .' ,. .*. 
. . .  
. . 
, , ~ : ,  
. . . .  % , .  . . . . . .  
' I  .,: 
: .  ., . 
., . .  
. . . . . . .  
,.,. : , .,::. , :,.,, c:.....l...~.lrt ,!. !, ;,,, ':. 
DEFENDANTS7 LAST THREE ARGUMENTS A& A ~ S O  WHOLLY RUULEVANT 
i . . .  .::i.i .. ii;:... . C - . .  ! ~ .  . , . ,  
, ,  <ii:,.ij: , , ? L . . ~ ! , ,  . . . .  t, . . .  ; , * ., . ; , , . . , 
~ef&dai~ts '  ixth a w m e n f ~ ~ ~ s t ~ ~ , ~ s p ~ c u l a t i v ~  gssertion that credit card holders in 
. . .  L . .  , : . . . . . . .  : r . ;  . :  : ,. . 
. , 
. . .  2 i  . a  ..< '..;>.?!<;;:JF~:, ; ,!: ......' >.." :. . : 
general do not typically . read;mat#ti;iks'e$clased ., .. .  wjtl~, ,:,:. t1ieir monthly credit card bill, the 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  ,,.<;::,::: d : ' : . ~ !  . . . . . . :  ; \><.. .. 
, . , . . , , . A ., . . 
.. ,.: . , . 
' ,  , , > , > % :  !<.:;>,;:' : <.; , ' .-'!' 
apparent point being t h a t ' ~ ~ f e n d a n ~ , d l d  ., d , .  , , , > .  ! # a : ,  not kno 's amendment to the oredit 
. . , 
. , :,, ,>,., 9 , :  .# ..>{.'\..'...'$,.;, < : '; , 
, t,.,..:. .,:L.>,;ii:.!(.;i,.j; ,c:p; ,.;, 
. . . . . . . . . .  
........ 
; . , .  , 2 . .  . . :  . . . .  . ,.,,, ,: ,, 
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. . 
,,., ,::.,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  i 
card agreenlent adding an arl$trqti$a;$1$sq. . . .  .%ij$fiv evidence or proof of this generic 
. . . . . .  
, . . : . :  
assertion is offered, it is irrele"iitid'inY'6vent. As 'this Court correctly pointed out in its 
September 14, 2006 D d&:lkw, expressly admitted by all parties 
; ;, ,: ,,'i , ' ' 
to govern the instant d i s p ~ t e , ~ ~ e ~ i f r b f i l ~ ~ r 6 ~ i d ~  that MBNA could add an arbitration 
. . . . .  
. . I 
. . . .  , 
,:. . 
provision by unilaterally amending the. ckdit card agreement and that notice of such 
, , 
. . . . . . . . .  
:, : . ; <  . ' 2 
' . >; . ,, .% ,-:. . 
amend~nent could lawfully tih . eff&ti+efy , 6e se~it in the envelope with the monthly 
. . .  , 
billing. 5 Del. C. sec. 952(a). Defendant's fifth argument, that this Delaware law is 
. , , . ;  .. 
, . 
apparently unfair, is wholly irrele~aint:in~~&6.~roceedrn~. 
Defendants' sevelltl~ that the underlying credit card 
agreement is "illusory" bec e to be able to terminate the 
agreement whereas th e that MBNA must give 
notice when it seeks to t at difficult to understand 
. . . . . . . . .  
this "argument," much is. irrelevant to this amended motion to 
reconsider in any event. ine provision of the underlying agreeinent 
. . . . . . .  
would properly have bee otion to vacate the award. Defendants never 
filed any such motion. S ed this argument in the judicial 
.. ': .:.. I . . .  ; 
proceedings and they hav y right. to assert it now. Thirdly, there is 
. . . .  
. .  .:,,, ,.,x;,, 
. . . .  .; ..i:?, :.'L,.:..r:...'., :. !. . .  
absolutely no authority (pi ~. :  jogic);:.for: .D,cjfe~$ant's. contention in any event. Fourthly, 
.............. !...i!,,i:. 9r . . .  ) ..#L . . : . . .  
whether MBNA had to giv erminate the credit card agreement andlor 
whether the cardholders h utterly meaningless in the instant 
case because MBNA nev ement, nor did Defendants. 
Termination, or lack thereof, nothing to do with this 
. . . . . .  ..: .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
;),::: ..... '8:. ........ : 
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., ., , , .  .; 
case. Fifthly, this Court painstakidg~:i~t$rpr~ted't~~:cr@dit ard agreement between the 
. . 
. . . . . . .  
parties, with specific reference to ?elaware: l?w,,.i~ itqiS$ptember 14, 2006 Decision and 
,. , . ' ;, . ,; ,,, 
. . 
. . .  
. . . .  
Order, indicating with partic~liriiy4hy"&$ bow.the,-arbitration provision between these 
. . 
.. > . 
parties came to be effecti placed in their cardholder agreement. 
. . .  
Temlination of the agree or' the ~l~anner in which it could, or could 
,,, , >,\ .. <'. . .: ' S  . . , .  . 
. ., , : .: . >, l~i * :. ,. , 
not, be accon~plished, by one party or tlie'ofhei, hha:110 bearing upon nor relevance to ,that 
. . 
adjudication. Defendants' 12 '~  hour assertion of some mysterious lack-of-termination- 
notice symmetry is meaningless in the extrenle. 
. . , .  . . 
. . i . :  :,.; . .:i.,;i.c'. . ! ::t,. . . . .  
I .  . . . .  , . . . . . . . . .  i ,.ij L . . . . . . . .  
Defendants' eighth and final argument faires no, better. In fact, it is nothing more 
. . , . . . 
..? :ii, " 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  i ::;::j"':ii.: . . . . .  ,.,.. .,.?~.!" . 
than a11 attempted summary of the piecdipg . . . . .  six '[ij&neit$:" No evidence is provided to 
, . 
, (2" . ~ i< j ;~~ ' .  
support Defendants' cuinhative , . , .  , arguments, to the extent that 
. . . .  . ,  . ,  
, .+  .. .....% \ .  > .:.,. . . . . . . . . . . .  
., ........... ; : . . .  . .  . .  i 
those generic assertions canlbe~und@to.q~: ., , at all. . . Likewise, no law is citcd to support 
. . ,  ; :  , ., . . . . . .  
; ; ; ;  j ; ; :  t ; :i?: 'X ,,.: , : 
these "arguments." Nothing nkw i s  presgnted, neither law nor fact. Instead, Defendants 
; .., .'~,~;:.,.;!,:.' > 
, . ,,:._. ,. 
....... ;>:<:.'>, :j; fya> ;::;.;,. :.: !;i,:;. ,;.: 
appear to rehash irrelevant argGments'already mide and rejected by this court and 
, . .*, i . . 
, . 
. . . .  
. ,,., ..: . ; 3, : , ! 
son~ehow conclude from this that the C o u ~ .  should therefore reverse itself. Such baseless 
. . 
, . 
. .  , . . . . . . . . . . . . .  '"'" 
..,, ,,i l i i i i  .... ..l*O.i -; 
and immaterial assertions . cannot . . . . . . . . . .  supportjhereliefr~~~ested. :,tL:,;. '  . 
. . , . : .  
. . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . .  
. ., . . .  .. ., :.': :.:..*.;, ...A>..,. ,.!, . ,.k:.- ... 1. . : . . 
. . .  . 3 > : ,  i I .  <.iD..  ,,t llV.J,.>!< ,,, 
"Where Defendant fails to pro:vi&.any new i,nfonption in support of his motion 
. .  . . . . . . .  ..; ; '  . : .  ."I i: 
.,. . 
, [ ........ . .,\! : .............. J L ? , ,  < >t>t,~.;d.;,; ;: '5;3:$~'i.l,.!oi~ 
for reconsideration and instead ............... . . . . .  esst?ntialj,~:qajntairrs. ,: .... that the district court was wrong in 
.:.>.-,... is.;., . I  s .!$:!; 9;::.::. 
. . .  . .  
~. 
..,, 
< A ; , :  <<:!~;<)r, <>;., :):!,>/ (if i1;y ,< ~ ~ l ? , ; : i : ~ : ~ , , , L  : 
their decision and asks that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  theedistrict courtrever$e itself and rule in favor of defendant, 
& ,  ..,:!', .>%';::.. >' ,.,.. ~ . . : , : i  . . . . . . .  .... . 
. . . . . . . .  :j . .  
... . , ,n.;  :. 9, . ;,: +i . ; . .  
:,,:; <:$I-: J,? l?!;;:, .> { t .  : .i:;,!L 
this is an inappropriate ,, use : . ,. of,Ru$60(jb);as:.a , . . dishised substitute for an appeal." 
.: !,;:' .$A;,;;< ,,u{~:'%>?( t < :4is:: ! ' ; ~ : . < 2 , : . .  . ......... , . ,  . #  . 
. . . .  
, .;.,;::,; ;I;.?.; j,:; q>.{y,~>;~;.~ :; ::'i$,~:;' ;;i.i; , ,: State. 141 Idaho 670, 1'15 . . ?,.,.,. F 3d,'761;(&; ................. .App., 2005)..,.Def~pdants' proper legal remedy at 
. . . . . . . . . . .  : : ... !li!. i.;,::, :; .;.,ci l;c i:,~ . . . . . .  
. . , ,  . . 
. . 
.......:. !i ? ;  . >;!&$i,:nf;< zji:< .; . i;iia<x; kaJ.*h8 ; 
this juncture is not to solicit tl$~''Courf- yeragainB-to finally agree with their already 
: : , .. ,..:(;< ;:>;;;<:$,',{ ;\ :, ;.;&Q,?;,:,,' ., ; 
. ., . . .  -> 
, : ,, : ;.:, !,(,>;!.; !kK< *,.<!~':-f ! f:, >,(j ?.>L<;rc$::,:  
, . 
. . . .  
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1 
. . . ,. . 
. . .  , : 2 . . . . . . . . . .  i .  judicially rejected and whollljr:u$sgpported legal co&qlbsiofis 1 . i :  : and factual speculations, but 
. , 
. . . . . . . . .  , : : . .  
rather to proceed with an 
lawfully used as "a disguise 
Idaho 1091, 793 P.2d 1263 (C 
788 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App., 
. . 
I / . . , :.',::'.'.', 
DEFENDANTS' . . AFFDAVRiIIAS . . . . . . . . .  NO MERIT 
. .  , 
. . 
. .  >  , ., 
The October 10, 2 it is i,nadmissible and should be wholly 
,,.. ' , ,  , 
,,rs. ,&.., ::&:~ , . 
1 .... .?,.$,. .......... 
disregarded. It consists ent ersonal"inelevancies J and rote speculation. 
. . .  
It cannot support any of the 
Defendants' ar res. Their initial claim, 180 
degrees from that to which they e&pr~sl$ . .  .., stipu ~ erlying proceedings - that 
. . 
, < ;  , , : . ;  . , . , . .  ,&, 
. . , .  
the Delaware choice of law pi.di;lsioii is'invdid 
. , '  .. 
. ., .:: 
erit.' Whether one applies the 
. . . .  
. . . . . .  
. . 
. , .., 
,; . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
law of Delaware or Idaho,.yhqtber ..... , . ,v . ,  statutory ..... or inquiry, such a choice of 
. . . . . . . . . . . .  r . . ' . i .  . !.: 
;<". 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
............ , . . i  ..: .. :,v.l,s#,: :..,.!:I.: 
law provision is most assuredly valid: Most, if not all of the remainder of Defendants' 
. . , ; r, '. , . 
. . . . . . . . . .  
arguments should have be ~itext,,,#an  . , . . . , Idaho , . , code' Ij7-9 12 motioil to 
.. ,; , . , ,  : v  .... 
,:. . 
vacate. No such motion has b n6w.$oq"iate'to do so. Additionally, all of 
... . .?I.j!J; t?..:. : 
. ,. ..*:,.' 
. . .  
. . .  
n r , r r  : 'i ' these arguments lack eith rtty~,.fcfithe generic assertions made, and 
most of the argumen Iso irrelevant. This Court 
specifically indicated eptember 14,2006 Decision 
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. . 
? 
. . . . 
~l 
. : .' 
and Order. Defendants facia dkrition" ofthat Order yet fail to address its 
foundational and dispositive~issues,.:;~ ;l,:;; . : , , , ,, 
. . .  
. . . . . . .  . .  .:, 
. , . . :  
. . .  
. . :. 
. . :  r . .  
In the context of a motion for reconsideration, what Defendants are actually 
attempting to do is appeal this Couftls . earlier - .  Decision . . . .  and Order. The law does not ailow 
. , .  ' , , ,. \ 
. . . . .  
then1 to do so before this Court and the fact , . that they ate& se cannot lead to a different, 
, .. ..., . . . .  
. . v, ,:: c::. ;! ': ..; , , .  
more pe~nissive conclusion: "Pro se, litigants in . . . . . . . .  Idaho arc hcld to the same standards and 
! I  . 
rules as those represented by attomeys~. The failure to abide by the rules may not be 
excused simply because appellantappears . , prose and may not be aware of the rules." && 
. . > .  , &. 
, , :  
, ;  . .  .!, . 3 .  ' . , .  ' :.,<.: 
. , . .  r , . .  ;,Li..:,?.: <L'.>*> ~ . ~ .  
v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 878 P.2d 813 (Ct. App., 1994). In the instant case, Defendants 
. . . . . .  
.............. 
have not "abid[ed] by the' rules." T&eji,ijti&npt . . to ['appeal" this Court's September 14, 
: .  
::; > , :~ : , a  ;:::< >:.< .:. .:%!:!.r,t,;fi::: i, . !  
2006 Decision and order by means of a motion for reconsideration which asserts 
? 
! : , , , ; , . . ? 1 .  ' .... &: ....I.. 
............... - .  ................ . . . .A ( ;  .. . . " . L .  . .  
"grbunds" unrelated tb the 0rdefsoughtto~berecqflsidered and that could only be heard 
;>,.\; ,, .(. >.., 
. ,A<,  , b ,  - ,< I  < '  : 
in a #7-912 motion t s iiof any:c&e authority allow them to do 
.< ..',I<:,.!., > , ' ' iL' &.$. 3. 2 , .  . .  !
SO. . . . . . .  
,.., , : !. . ,.*, ,,'i<:,;;> $ J ....... :.,. . . . . . .  
'..'U...i. !f ,>,.tt%.. C..) t...' : 1 ......... 
Defendants' 'motion is'wifh~ut inerit and should be denied. 
,, !, $$ ! .,. 
. ; .. &, . ,.:f$;Q~: ;'. .... .- 
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IBAH0,COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
&~24 Z E c K 1 . M .  
IN THE DISTRICT ,. , ,. %.,: , C ~ ~ ~ T :  , . . . . . .  Q~F .@E A SECOND .JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
. . , . ,  . . 
. ~, 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, . . ,  
, .  
,,.)j~tj i;.;,;.; ;.?\<#,:,. ; .; ,', 
Plaintiff 
, '  1 
, . ., ~ 1 .  , . 
'1 
. . 
v. . : , . ' . )  : ,;,, 
. . 
. .~ . .  j Case No. CV 05 36747 
MBNA AMERICANBANK, . , , . . . ,  ~ , ,  . ! :,:, ) . , . , 
. . : l j  
, . ,  , . ,  ). POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM BY 
'Defendant , .. - j PLAINTIFF IN OPPOSITION TO AMENDED 
. . ' , '(,;>;;k' :;,,,;!.k.; ) , MOTION , ,~%:>.. -. . . .  FOR RECONSIDERATION 
..: ., .. . 
" , . . (:.,?: ;?;k< I:), .. ' s . 8 : )  ,:L !. 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
DAVID F. CAPPS :. j:. , .., : !: ?:*,; 
.* ? ' . ' , . \ , , 2 .  
: .. , 
,. 4 
Defendant . :. ; , ..) 
:!:.i' 
. ,.. 
. < ,;,;.,c ; ..j. .., r , 
-. 
\' ,#.*, ' .\.i ,: , , , , .:, ! , :,:; .., . . . . 
... .. :., i 5 , .  3, . . , ' ' ." 
Comes NOW:'MBNA'AME:RICA . . , .  1 . BANK: . F'.J,. by . @&through . . . .  : its counsel of record 
. , . . .  
. . 
. . . ,".' . i . .*i , l ._ . 
, . , .: s ~ i  ;L,<'.s;,:.:!., ; , , , , . . .. .
recited above, and hereby submitsfhi$ ~ o ~ t ~ ~ e i $ ~ ~ ~ ~ d i ~ ~ ~ a n d p r n .  ,.. regarding Delaware 
. ......... . ...,,7.i.p7..;~..: .\.," ..<..< .sr , ' %  a , "  .... , ,, 
. , . 
. , . , . .  
..,:.. ,:,' :I., ., k;,: ..i.,.*,&::: ,,;.!>?:,.! ij..!i,. . 
. ... ,,.. ,. >,,..: , , > . ,  2<.:p., 
choice-of-law provisio~~s.+~a~~d . .,, .., .,.. . reIited.matt$fs, as follows: 
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I 
ants' amended' motion for 
reconsideration, the er Delaware law there is a 
$100,000 account mi nd an agreement. The 
coilcem is unfound nts confirmation of the 
arbitration award i 
As this Court has already found, the instant credit card agreement contains a 
Delaware choice-of-law provis' 
, . ,  
are Code §952(a) provides that 
. 1 :  
a bank "may at any time and cb agreement in any respect," 
including modifying regard to "arbitzation or other 
, \ .. , , : ; ,r'.;i:,,,::. . . ,  I,.. , .: .;,, ,. 
alternative dispute resolution mech&isms,br other!matt&s of any kind whatsoever." The 
latter amendment ontemplated by the parties or 
addressed by the reement or be "integral t~ the 
relationship betwee 
,, . ,  ) : . .  ~ 
. " : . , : : -., %, ~ . ., % '  ,". 
Herein, M B N A ~ ~ ~ ,  in acfhal factj'amend~the credit card agreement between the 
. . 
. . i :  , 
, ; ,  , , ; . ,, , , . 
parties to add an arbitration clause, all in ritxtordince with   el aware law. It is understood 
. : ! :, ,.i,. ..;',..;::'?, ;>, ,.: , .. 
: : . :  , :::;. :':;.:.,.h: ;:j:l<$j,:!: : ;!, , .;!,~l:$ t::? ,), 
that the Court now qu~stioi~s, . whe*: ! 5 ; r D e l a w ~  Code §952(a) permitting such an 
. , , ; . . s ,  ., . . ' 
to accounts equaling or 
exceeding $100,000 
urt may be alluding is 6 Del C. 
e their choice of law, but that 
such section does no 0. Note that this section does 
not provide for the i provision in contracts less 
: ,  
/' 
/ Oct  3 0  0 6  05:26p Wilc [20P1384-0442  .p . 5  
than $100,000. It only proviies;.thatthis pai%icuIar :subsection is inapplicable in such 
. . .  
cases. Additionally, that this Code(sub)section ., does not negate the validity of Delaware 
. . , .  , .  . . 
choice-of-law provisions in contr'acts.16~~ than $100,000 is specifically demonstrated by 
. . 
. , .  . 
. .  . , . .. . . 
.. , \ ,  > ;  :.. . ' , . j  <:!: ,. ..:,.. . . , , 
subsection (e) of this same .. . . Codeisection ,...,.:. ,, . ,  which , . . expressly . ,  provides that: "This scction 
. . . . .  , ' i .. .. . , $ ~ , ,  , ,.. 
, . 
.. ,. . : ..,. ' .  > ;  :,;;; ', ', . . 
. . : .  
shall not ... affect the vaiidity'ioFariy otQercch~i&'bf law provisions in any contract, 
. : : .  , ' , %  ' ;:, ~' 
. . 
. ., ,: ,$,, ;<, 'i.? p:<; c;\-: : .; 
agreement or other undertaking." 
:. . 
, . , . 
Accordingly, any contemplation that the Delaware choiccof-law provision in the 
instant credit card agreement could be invalid because the contract was for less than 
. ,,  ,. 
,; ,:,*, ;i:u:j. !:;;j!:.$,;i;.,: < ,::,;!.>.!, .::;;> :,.., 
$loOK is erroneous ~d is specifically rebutted by 6 Del C. $2708(e). Any contemplation 
..:,.;'L':.i ‘ i  . 
that 6 Del C. $2708 doe choice-of-law provision in contracts less 
A 
, ,!<, )Lt;; ><jj;i,c,,:(>:,;: :>I;?:.$ ';[ ;, : :,)()3(\;; i 
than $100K is not suppoGedAy .that .yery,sfatute.,.That is not what subsection (a) of the 
, 8.x: >.jW:. . ,  , 
.,,, ,J..L,'. t) 3 , , , ) : . > .  :,:b:;.::;r; -. 2 : <.'!<<(;;'",. : 
statute says and, additio$ally, subsectioli (e) of th* same Code section provides that 
,i,c ..,,. ,,,: ~ 5 ' .  j i ! , z 9  ..n<; ,?,it ,.>;j ,ci:;$iV:. : ,:j!c,,:, .i;: :,, 
'This section shall not;.. . aff& . the valld~ty!of anyother choice of law provisions in any 
, . .;, ' ,  2:;; :. 
. . 
. . '  ,...... 3.' 
.: ...... >:., L'..,i'j. 
contract, agreement or other uiidertaking,".in any event. 
. , . , . , , ., ., 
,,,,, ~ .,.,,,,: ?;:;:;;.>1&;:.i<?,,: t~hgt.!;: !><:j:,\j;b, ., 
The Delaware Choice-of-Law Prons lo~  
, , . . 
, , . ".., "., ,., .: ' - 5  :?;. i.-.'$: i ,  ~):;~<;:,l,,:.. ,:, 
: .,,..<, a..<,,. ,-. ,,., ..#. . \. ,.,>,. ,,, 
The Delaware , clp,ice;,of:la~ , , 8  . , . , ,  ,; z :  ! .  provisiol~ !:J!::, .., ,,, in .,.*.:? the credit ; , ,# .  . card agreement between the 
%,, ,c.i, .  i < :  :,;.iy<.;,fi<;.;l:.*; p,:,\>.\!ij ,< 1, 6 *. ;& :,.
parties is valid because: . " . . . ._._,.... 
. , 
. ~. , 1  ! : j \ , .  t:!.:' . . , .  . . . , . , . . ,  ' . '  
, , 
.J<)-;S g;.t 8,iiC> :; ;< ;:. 2;:;:i :::.of .,,, (a) $2708(a) does not provide, that,. ch~ic~of-law,.provisions in eontracts less than 
.,;~:{,;$ ;fi ;*,:., ;:::.:.:,:.;v . , . .  21 % .  , l t ~ ~  b . f $ , . ; % ,  , I > .  , , 
, ,.;i!j)p>,.,r~~2g~; 5%;,,: ?!, &.:J~:j ; 2  .: ,,,,, :,':!,>!: ;,; , .;<: 
$100K are invalid. it,:mgreIy;states that . fBe , sectibll , * . ' . .  is it~applicable to contracts less than 
,, .,<:pt .r". \.,4;4,.:,, :.:.::."r 
. . . .. 
..:,.>, . 
c. , i .:. . , , 
,.;..i,..i,~.tt~,p;#J[~i> Fi,ij>;&;c:$!rc i.; ;: i, > *>,L,*5b. ,J: .>:., 
that amount. Further, :, 1Q:siibsecfion k,T,.i!i: yv8 2.';~i~ !. '(e) t ,,. thCfi'e?pr&ssly c7$,i:.2 . L;;'~p i,ndicates that the section does not 
~.  . '(.. . , ., ! : 
t . , :  ;."' ,'" ;":,<. \.ri)::;g;,!y ..< .;?:,:>. 2 ,:-*< ::,is; : . . .r ,.A1 ;:."i. 5 .  ..*. 
"affect the validity of any . . ..,..9.. &th6i;:c@o% of 1aiy prov'isions in any contract." AND 
. ,, ..) . , r, !<$,." . . .  . . 
..,. . . 
,.>;! $:[;, i;l,~.a':!!,: , l d L  : .-,,.<. ~, ' $', ;i7 > < .  <:. ,;:,;,.., " ; C,!'i, (b) ~ d d i t i o ' d l ~ ,  6 Del C. $Yi.30l:pro~ides express statutory autholity for 
, , , ,,<,:?.,:;,:!j;<>;,;i>?\;!,' (!, *;;:!~:s,.~";.<~: ~ . . ~ "  , 
,.I. ( . ", 
,.:. iJ;i L#, ..&,kX! n $ U  , >: ..!l , i  
contractual Delaw&e-cEoi6E.6f'IK~fiiSVTs5~ by, stating that "parties may agree that the 
:,::>,;':,,$<): :;<;'t~;,!.<-!- <;>;.!.:>: ,i; i::c.:<;<;:.)y<' ',. . 
. . 
, . . . 
. . , , , . .. . . , , 
' ,..,.... ; i z : , i \ . .  
.. X." c.23 4$.,...,,.,!;:%,, 
. ,. . ,, 
. . 
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. . ,  
, . 
I . , :  - ,  
.. . , . . , .  :.,: 
law either of this State ther state or nation shall govern their rights and 
. . , :.,. 
duties." AND , . . .. , ..:. $... . ,  . . . 
. , 
. . .  
, . .  5 ,., 
. . ~ ,  ,;.,:,: .; :;: :.:.:, : ' ~ . ,  . ,,,., : % 
to be coiltrolling C'This Court 
e laws of Idaho" - Defendants' 
e-of-law provisions. See, e.g., 
. 1::- 
, . . : . . , j  
Ward v. Puremo Co., 128 Id 8-369,913 P.2d 582,584 - 585 (1996): "In 
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Defendant's motion for reconsideration should be denied. 
DATED this - %day of ~ctober,  2006 
WILSON & McCOLL 
. ., 
~. , , .  
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A. 1 
1 NO. CV 06-37320 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
) ON THE APPLICABILITY OF 
v. 1 DELAWARE LAW AND THE 
1 IDAHO CREDIT CODE 
) 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
1 
Defendant. 
1 
1 
Comes Now MBNA America Bank, ("MBNA"), by and through its counsel of record 
recited above, and hereby submits its Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware law and 
the Idaho Credit Code, and related matters, as follows: 
INTRODUCTION 
The matter at hand is awaiting confirmation pursuant to Idaho Code 97-91 1 of the 
arbitration award entered in favor of MBNA by the National Arbitration Forum and against 
Defendant Miriam Carroll on August 3,2005 in the amount of $30,241.41. CV 05-36747 is a 
similar case presently before this Court and involves Plaintiff MBNA and Defendant Miriam 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON 
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Carroll and Mr. David Capps on separate MBNA credit accounts. Subsequent to this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order dated September 14,2006 filed solely in CV 05-36747, 
wherein this Court applied Delaware law after stipulation of the parties and confirmed MBNA's 
arbitration awards in related case CV 05-36747, Defendants Miriam Carroll and David Capps 
brought a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among other things, that Idaho law should apply 
to their respective cases at the exclusion of Delaware law. During a joint hearing held on 
January 25,2006 on both the present case and CV 05-36747, the Court requested further briefing 
on the issues of 1) Idaho's ability to apply Delaware law, and 2) to the applicability of the Idaho 
Credit Code to the facts in these cases. 
Idaho law unquestionably permits the application of Delaware law to the present case and 
to similar case CV 05-36747. Under Delaware law, this Court has already concluded that 
MBNA was authorized to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants. An application of the 
Idaho Credit Code to these cases is unsupported in the Idaho case law but would provide an 
identical result. MBNA was permitted to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants 
Miriam Carroll and David Capps under both Delaware and Idaho law to include the arbitration 
provision governing dispute resolution. 
IDA110 LAIV EXPRESSLY PEI1iVlI'l'S CIIOICI<-OF-LA\\' CON1'RACrUAL 
P1tOI'lSlONS AND L)EL2%\4'AIIE LAW SlIOULI) THEKFOllE BE Al'l'LlED 
The Defendants state in their Brief on the Applicability of 5 Del. Code $956, pg. 5, that 
this Court should render its d i n g  in this case based upon the rulings of the Idaho State Supreme 
Court. In regard lo Idaho's endorsement of contractual choice-of-law provisions, we completely 
agree. Idaho laws permits the application of Delaware law through the parties contractual 
choice-of-law provision found in their original credit card agreement. See MBNA 's Credit Card 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON 
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Agreement, Exhibit 1 to Plaintif's Certijication in Support of Conjrmation of Arbitration 
Award, pg. 8. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Ward v. Purego expressly authorized contractual choice-of- 
law provisions similar to that contained in the original credit card agreement between MBNA 
and the Defendants. See, e.g. Ward v. Pureno Co., 128 Idaho 366,368-369,913 P.2d 582,584- 
585 (1996) holding that "In Cerami-Kote, Inc. V. Energywave Corp., 11 6 Idaho 56,773 P.2d 
1 143 (1 989), we approved of the rule set forth in the Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws 5 
187. Id. at 58 n. 1,773 P.2d at 1145 n.1. This rule provides in relevant part that: "(1) The law of 
the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the 
particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their 
agreement directed to that issue." See also, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 8 187 
(1971) ("contracting parties may choose the law to be applied to their agreement"). As such, 
Idaho law clearly authorizes the application of Delaware law in its choice-of-law endorsement 
and conflict of law rules. Delaware law should therefore apply to this case and to CV 05-36747 
as contracted to and intended by the parties. 
OTHER JURISDICTIONS AUTHORIZE THE APPLICATION OF DELAWARE LAW 
IN FACTUALLY ANALAGOUS CASES 
This Court may find it instructive that several jurisdictions that also recognize choice-of- 
law contractual provisions have routinely upheld Delaware's statutory scheme of permitting 
banks to unilaterally amend credit card agreements to add arbitration agreements, where, as here. 
the cardholder is given notice of the amendment, and the agreement is subject to an "opt out" 
provision, that permits the cardholder the choice of whether to accept or reject the amendment. 
See eg. Johnson v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA. N.A. 784 N.Y.S.2d 921,2004 N.Y. Misc. 
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LEXIS 133, Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001), Pick v. Discovery 
Financial Services, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777,2001 WL 1180278 (D Del2001); Joseph 
v. MBNA America Bank, N.A., 148 Ohio App. 3d 4090, 775 N.E. 2d 550 (2002). The rules set 
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in m, supra, in conjunction with the Court's ratification of 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws 5 187 expressly permit and establish the path for 
a similar holding here. 
APPLICATION OF TIIE IDAHO CREDIT CODE TO THIS CASE IS UNFOUNDED 
The Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration filed in CV 05-36747 and subsequent 
briefing is void of legal authority but full of unsubstantiated argument that 3 28-41-201(8)(a) of 
the Idaho Credit Code should he applied to demonstrate that the contractual parties' choice-of- 
law provision is invalid. See Dejkndant 's Briefon Applicability o f 5  Del. Code $956, pg. 3, 
After thorough and extensive research, Plaintiffs counsel found no Idaho case law support for 
the Defendants proposition. The Idaho Credit Code should accordingly not be applied to 
invalidate a choice-of-law provision in a consumer credit card agreement in direct opposition to 
the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in m, supra, and the state's adoption of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 187. 
Purpose: 
An application of the Idaho Credit Code to this case is not supported by the stated 
purposes of the statute. The absence of Idaho case law applying the nearly twenty year old Idaho 
Credit Code to Delaware financial institutions such as MBNA or its competitors supports this 
suggestion. As set forth in Idaho Code § 28-41-102 and in relevant part, 
This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and 
policies. (2) The underlying purposes and policies of this act are: 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM ON 
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(c) To protect debtors against unfair practices by some suppliers of 
credit, having due regard for the interests of legitimate and scrupulous 
creditors; (emphasis ours) 
The Idaho Credit Code was thereby not intended to be applied universally to all creditors who 
transact business with Idaho residents. The Idaho Credit Code is arguably intended to 
supplement the rights and protections of Idaho debtors in situations where creditors are not those 
already strictly regulated by the federal government. 
Jurisdiction: 
The Idaho Credit Code need not be applied to these cases. Idaho Code 5 28-41-203 sets 
forth the limits ofjurisdiction for the Idaho Credit Code as follows: 
The courts of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any creditor with respect to any 
conduct of the creditor subject to this act or with respect to any claim arising from a 
transaction subject to this act. (emphasis ours) 
Thus jurisdiction of this Court is therefore permissive and not mandatory. 
When viewed in conjunction with Idaho's adopted conflict of law principles and choice- 
of-law permissions as set forth herein, application of the Idaho Credit Code to these cases is 
unnecessary, superseded by established laws, and without established legal authority in Idaho. 
The Court is entitled to avoid application of the Idaho Credit Code. 
MBNA WAS EN'L'ITLEI) TO AMEND ITS AGREEMENT 
I'URSUANT 1'0 THE IDAHO CREDIT CODE 
In the event the Court determines that the Idaho Credit Code applies in this case, then 
MBNA should prevail, consistent with the Court's analysis and conclusion stated in its 
September 14,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order in CV 05-36747. MBNA was 
authorized to amend its credit agreement with the Defendants under Idaho law and specifically 
the Idaho Credit Code. 
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The Idaho Code 928-43-203 states as follows: 
CHANGE IN TERMS OF OPEN-END CONSUMER CREDIT ACCOUNTS. Whether 
or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor may change the 
terms of an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred 
before or after the effective date of the change. (emphasis ours) 
The Idaho Code 928-41-301 defines open-end credit as an arrangement pursuant to 
which: 
(a) A creditor may permit a debtor, from time to time, to purchase on 
credit from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card, or to obtain loans 
from the creditor or pursuant to a credit card; 
(b) The amounts financed and the finance and other appropriate charges 
are debited to an account; 
(c) The finance charge, if made, is computed on the account periodically; 
and 
(d) Either the debtor has the privilege of paying in full or in 
installments or the creditor periodically imposes charges computed on the 
account for delaying payment and permits the debtor to continue to 
purchase on credit. 
Idaho Code $28-43-203 provides authority for MBNA to amend its agreement. The 
arrangement between MBNA and the Defendants matches the definition of an open-end credit 
agreement as set forth above. Ifthe Idaho Credit Code is found to apply, MBNA properly 
amended its agreement pursuant to Idaho Code $28-43-203. 
CONCLUSION 
Delaware law should apply to the present matter and to similar case CV 05-36747. If the 
Court determines that the Idaho Credit Code should apply, MBNA was authorized to amend its 
credit card agreement with the Defendants. The Defendant thereafter failed to follow all of the 
statutory procedures to challenge the Arbitration process. MBNA is entitled to confirmation of 
> 
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the arbitration award entered by the National Arbitration Forum against Defendant Miriam 
Carroll. 
DATED this ____ day of February, 2007. 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, and DAVID ) 
CAPPS, 
Plaintiffs 
v. 1 
) Case No. CV05 36747 
MBNA AMERICAN BANK, 1 
) NOTICE OF JOINDER 
Defendant ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
Plaintiff 
) 
1 
v. 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS 
Defendant 
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record 
recited above, and hereby gives the Court Notice that it joins in the filing of the 
Memorandum on the Applicability of Delaware Law and the Idaho Credit Code filed by 
the firm Bishop, White & Marshall, P.S. in their case MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. 
NOTICE OF JOINDER - 1 
Miriam Carroll, case number CV 06-37320. 
DATED this L ' d a y  of February, 2007. 
WILSON & McCOLL 
Att e for Plaintiff V 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of February, 2007, I caused to be 
served the following parties of record a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing 
document by placing the same in the United States Mail, sufficient postage affixed 
thereon and addressed to: 
David F Capps 
Miriam G, Carroll 
HC 11 Box 366 
Kamiah ID 83536 
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JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615 %%Q AT i DI  54 OO'CLOCKA.M. 
WILSON & MCCOLL , .  I@# 1 6 2007 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Q 
URT 
Boise, Idaho 83701 I DEPUTY 
Telephone 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for MBNA America Bank 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDANO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
1 
MBNA 1 
) 
v. 
1 Case No. CV 05 36747 
MBNA AMERICAN BANK, 1 
1 MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA 
Defendant ) BANK IN OPPOSITION TO CONTINUING 
1 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 
MBN A ) 
) 
v. 1 
1 
DAVID F. CAPPS 1 
1 
Defendant 1 
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record recited 
above, and hereby submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Continuing Motion for 
Reconsideration regarding Delaware choice-of-law provisions, and related matters, as follows: 
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I. 
APPLICABILITY OF DELAWARE LAW 
Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps (hereafter "CarrolllCapps") concede, as they must, 
the existence of a Delaware choice-of-law provision in the credit card agreement between the 
parties. Nevertheless, entirely reversing their earlier position, they have recently contested the 
applicability of Delaware law. They may not do so. 
Firstly, CarrollICapps already stipulated to this Court that Delaware law did govern the 
contract between the parties. As stated by this Court on page 5 of its September 14, 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order, "The original contract also included a choice of law provision 
stating that Delaware law would govem the rights and obligations under the contract. See 
MBNA's Exhibits 1 and 2. Neither Ms. Carroll nor Mr. Capps are contesting that Delaware law 
applies; indeed, they affirmatively state that it does. See MBNA's Post Hearing Memorandum 
Rebuttal and MBNA's Brief for Evidentiary Hearing on Agreement to Arbitrate." CarrolllCapps 
having so stipulated and having then failed to prevail, it would be unfair, illogical and 
inequitable in the extreme to allow Carroll/Capps to now entirely reverse themselves and see if 
they do any better after taking a 180 degree position on that issue. CarrollICapps stipulated and 
this Court accepted their stipulation that "Delaware law would govern the rights and obligations 
under the contract." Now that this matter has been finally adjadicated, CarrollICapps should not 
be allowed to somehow withdraw their stipulation and claim exactly the opposite. 
Secondly, CarrollICapps have waived any "right" to now argue any supposed limitation 
of 6 Del C. $2708 and/or any purported applicability of Idaho law (in particular the Idaho Credit 
Act - LC. $28-41-101 et seq.) regarding the applicability of Delaware law. This is because these 
arguments were not raised before the September 14, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order 
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION 
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now sought to be reconsidered and, regarding the Idaho Credit Act in particular, that argument 
was not raised in Carroll/Cappsl initial brief in support of their own motion for reconsideration 
despite the express requirement of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7@)(3) that a brief in support 
of a motion be filed no less than fourteen days before the hearing. CarrollICapps first raised the 
Idaho Credit Act argument on the literal eve of the first hearing of their motion for 
reconsideration. Such an assertion is and remains untimely .CarroII/Capps have waived any right 
to make such an argument and it is prejudicially unfair to MBNA to allow them to do so. 
11. 
THE DELAWARE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IS VALID 
Carroll/Capps assert that the Delaware choice-of-law provision, admittedly in the credit 
card agreement between the parties, is nevertheless invalid, claiming that 6 Del. Code $2708 
"prohibits contracts less than $100,000 from containing a Delaware choice-of-law provision." 
CarrollICapps have raised this same objection on at least two previous occasions, MBNA has 
provided legal argument on both occasions demonstrating that Carroll/Capps' repeated assertion 
in this regard is legally wrong and the Court has rejected this same argument by Carroll/Capps 
on those previous occasions. This argument is no more meritorious the third time around. 
Firstly, 6 Del. Code $2708(a) does not provide that choice-of-law provisions in contracts 
less than $100,000 are invalid. It merely states that the section is inapplicable to contracts less 
than that amount. Secondly, its subsection (e) then expressly indicates that the section does not 
"affect the validity of any other choice of law provisions in any contract" and, in this case, of 
course, it is undisputed that the contract between the parties does have such a choice-of-law 
provision. Thirdly, 6 Del C. $1-301 provides express statutory authority for contractual Delaware 
choice of law provisions by stating that "parties may agree that the law either of this State or of 
MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION 
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such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties." Fourthly, 5 Delaware Code 5956 
provides that a revolving credit plan between a bank and a11 individual borrower shall be 
governed by the laws of this state. §941(1) defines the term "bank," §941(4) "individual 
borrower" and §941(3) "revolving credit plan," a11 terms applicable in this case. Fifthly, 
Delaware case law likewise upholds Delaware choice-of-law provisions. See, e.g., Gloucester 
Holdinn Corp. v. U.S. Tape and Sticky Products. LLC, 832 A.2d 116, 124 (Del.Ch.,2003), citing 
VGS, Inc. v. Castiel, 2003 WL 723285, at 7 & n. 29 (Del.Ch. Feb. 28, 2003) and Turtur v. 
Rothschild Renistry Int'l, Inc., 26 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir.1994). Delaware law appl~es in this case 
because the agreement between the parties expressly so provides and that provision is valid. 
111. 
IDAHO RECOGNITION OF CHOICE-OF-LAW PROVISIONS 
CarrollICapps also cite Idaho Code $28-41-201(8) for the proposition that "the Delaware 
choice-of-law provision is also invalid under Idaho law." Initially it should be noted that such an 
assertion is oxymoronic in this case because the agreement expressly provides that Delaware law 
applies and, therefore, Idaho law, whatever it is on this point, is necessarily irrelevant in 
enforcing that Delaware choice-of-law provision. Having said that, however, the law is clear that 
Idaho law also upholds such choice-of-law provisions. 
Intentionally or otherwise, CarrollICapps mis-read Idaho Code $28-41-201(8) which, in 
truth, provides that an agreement may be invalidated if it provides that the laws of another state 
applies, and that the parties consent to the jurisdiction of another state, and that fixes venue. The 
contractual provision in this case, however, only contains the first of those three elements, i.e., a 
Delaware choice-of-law provision. Obviously, given that the instant action is proceeding in this 
Idaho state court, the contractual provision in the credit card agreement between the parties does 
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not fix jurisdiction in any other state (the second element) nor does it fix venue in Delaware (the 
third element). CarrollICapps' claim that "the Delaware choice-of-law provision is also invalid 
under Idaho law" continues to be without support or merit. 
CarrollICapps also attempt to minimize the holding of the Ward v. Purearo Co. case [I28 
Idaho 366, 368-369, 913 P.2d 582,584 - 585 (1996)l cited in MBNA's previous briefs, 
CarrollICapps now claiming that the contract therein involved was a "business based contract," 
not a "credit card agreement." This distinction, if it is one, is meaningless. The Ward v. Purearo 
Co. decision specifically holds that Idaho will recognize contractual choice-of-law provisions - 
-
"In Cerami-Kote, Inc. v. Energywave Carp., 116 ldaho 56,773 P.2d 1143 (1989), we approved 
of the rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws $187. Id. at 58 n. 1, 773 
P.2d at 1145 n. 1. This rule provides in relevant part: '(1) The law of the state chosen by the 
parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one 
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that 
issue'." See also, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws $ 187 (1971) ("contracting parties 
may choose the law to be applied to their agreement"). 
Iv. 
IDAHO LAW LEADS TO THE SAME RESULT 
Carroll/Capps seek to invalidate the Delaware choice-of-law provision so that they can 
avoid the legal determination already reached by this Court that the arbitration clause in the 
credit card agreement was achieved in accordance with Delaware law and valid. And, while 
MBNA continues to believe, for all of the reasons recited above, that Delaware law does apply, 
ultimately, this same judicial result - a valid, enforceable arbitration clause --would likewise 
flow from an appli'cation of Idaho law. In that specific regard, Idaho Code $28-43-203 provides: 
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"Whether or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor may change the terms of 
an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred before or after the 
effective date of the change." This Court has already factually determined that this is precisely 
what occurred in this case. Thus, even if, arguendo, the Idaho Credit Act were to he applied in 
this instance, the result -- a valid arbitration clause -- is the same. 
Lastly in this regard, on page ten of their latest brief, Carroll/Capps cite Yellowpine 
Water User's Association v. Imel, 105 Idaho 349, 670 P.2d 54 (1983) and, through the careful 
placement of quotation marks, appear to suggest that this case stands for the proposition that the 
Idaho Credit Act does not authorize the addition of new terms to an agreement. That case says no 
such thing. That case has absolutely nothing to do with the Idaho Credit Act. That case does not 
contain the language recited in the brief of Carroll/Capps. In actual fact, without any need to 
manipulate quotation marks so as to suggest law that does not exist, Idaho Code 528-43-203 
specifically recites that "Whether or not a change is authorized by prior agreement, a creditor 
may change the terms of an open-end consumer credit account applying to any balance incurred 
before or after the effective date of the change." There is no case law, including the Yellowpine 
case, that provides otherwise. 
Idaho law does not apply in this case but, if it did, it too would uphold the arbitration 
provisions of the credit card agreement between the parties. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, CarrollICapps' latest brief adds nothing new. They again attack the manner in 
which the arbitration clause came to be a part of the credit card agreement, a repeated claim that 
has previously been well briefed, repeatedly argued and judicially rejected. This Court has 
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laboriously detailed in its previous Memorandum Decision and Order how, why and when the 
arbitration clause properly and lawfully became a part of the credit card agreement between the 
parties. As before, what CarrollICapps continue to attempt to achieve, essentially only changing 
the titles hut not the substance of their arguments, is a judicial review and overturning of the 
underlying arbitration award. That, of course, could only have been achieved through the 
mechanism of a timely Idaho Code 97-912 motion to vacate, something never filed by 
CarrolllCapps. Driver v. SI Corn., 139 Idaho 423, 426, 80 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2003); Binnham 
County Comm'n v. Interstate Electric Co., 105 Idaho 36, 665 P.2d 1046 (1983). 
The Court's most recent inquiry was quite limited. MBNA has addressed it above. In 
their latest brief, however, CarrollICapps have again gone well beyond anything remotely 
relevant to any issue and certainly beyond the Collrt's inquiry. It is respectfully suggested that 
this case does not turn on the September 27, 2001 results of the Lake, Snell, Perry & Associates 
survey of 800 AT&T customers in California, nor on the "not for publication" New Jersey case 
involving Discover Bank, nor on the other irrelevancies now argued by CarrolliCapps. 
In their latest "brief," Defendant have added nothing relevant and have instead continued 
to rehash the same arguments already made by them and rejected by this court. In the facial 
context of what appears to be a continuing motion for reconsideration, CarroIllCapps continue to 
attempt to appeal this Court's earlier Memorandum Decision and Order. The law does not allow 
them to do so. "A party may not use a motlon [to reconsider] as a substitute for a tlmely appeal." 
Bubak v. Evans, 117 Idaho 510, 788 P.2d 1333 (Ct. App., 1989). "Where Defendant fails to 
provide any new information in support of his motion for reconsideration and instead essentially 
maintains that the district court was wrong in their decision and asks that the district court 
reverse itself and rule in favor 'of defendant, this is an inappropriate use of Rule 60(b) as a 
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disguised substitute for an appeal." Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 115 P.3d 761 (Ct. App., 2005). 
CarrolUCapps' proper legal remedy at this juncture is not to solicit this Court - yet again - to 
finally agree with their already judicially rejected and wholly unsupported legal conclusions and 
factual speculations, but rather to proceed with an appeal. The instant motion for reconsideration 
cannot be lawfully used as "a disguised substitute for a timely appeal." In re Estate of Baglev, 
117 Idaho 1091,793 P.2d 1263 (Ct. App., 1990). 
The fact that CarrollICapps are pro se cannot lead to a different, more permissive 
conclusion. It is irrelevant that a pro se litigant may be faced with "more of a challenge than a 
non-attorney could handle." Everhart v. Washington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho 
273,275,939 P.2d 849, 851 (1997). The burden remains the same. Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 
387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). "Prose litigants in Idaho are held to the same standards and 
rules as those represented by attorneys. The failure to abide by the rules may not be excused 
simply because appellant appearspro se and may not be aware of the rules." Ade v. Batten, 126 
Idaho 114, 878 P.2d 813 (Ct. App., 1994). h the instant case, CarrolUCapps have not "abid[ed] 
by the rules." They attempt to "appeal" this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order by means 
of a motion for reconsideration which asserts "grounds" unrelated to the Order sought to be 
reconsidered. Neither the Rules nor any case authority allow them to do so. 
CarrolliCapps' motion for reconsideration shouid be denied. 
DATED this bay of March, 2007 
WILSON & McCOLL 
Att rn for MBNA America Bank, N.A. v.  
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
y' I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tile day of March, 2007, I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM BY MBNA AMERICA BANK IN OPPOSITION TO 
CONTINUING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION by regular United States mail with the 
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
Miriam G. Carroll 
David F. Capps 
HC-11 BOX 366 
Kamiah, ID 83536 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF lDAHO 
Case No. CV 05 36747 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, ) 
Plaintiff 1 
) 
v. ) 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 
) RESPONSE BY MBNA AMERICA BANK 
Defendant 1 TO LATEST SUPPLEMENTAL 
1 MEMORANDUM FROM CARROLLICAPPS 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
) 
Plaintiff 1 
v. 
1 
DAVID F. CAPPS 
1 
Defendant 1 
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record 
recited above, and hereby submits this Response to the April 2, 2007 "Supplemental 
Memorandum to Amended Motion for Reconsideration" from CarrollICapps as follows: 
RESPONSE BY MBNA AMERICA BANK TO LATEST SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM FROM CARROLLICAPPS 
I. 
INTRODUC TION 
On September 14, 2006, after the matter had been fully briefed and argued by all 
parties, this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order confirming the arbitration 
awards that had been granted in favor of MBNA and against each of Miriam G. Carroll 
and David F. Capps on, respectively, August 3, 2005 and September 30, 2005. The 
following month, Cmoll/Capps filed a motion for reconsideration of that Memorandum 
Decision and Order. Since then, they have virtually continuously filed an entire 
succession of "briefs" raising an entire variety of new and different arguments, some 
contrary to their earlier asserted legal theories and arguments. MBNA has, in turn, fully 
responded to each of those briefs and the Court is respectfully directed to each of those 
responses as to those matters. 
Cmoll/Capps have now filed yet another brief, this one entitled "Supplemental 
Memorandum to Amended Motion for Reconsideration." The following Memorandum of 
MBNA is submitted in brief response to it. 
11. 
WAlVER 
CarrolliCapps have waived any right to now assert their latest argument, labeled 
by them as "standing." 
Tliis action was commenced approximately nineteen months ago. This COW'S 
Memorandum Decision and Order was issued approximately seven months. Now, for the 
first rime, Carroll/Capps seek to raise something they characterize as "standing," 
claiming, apparently, that MBNA lacks "standing" in this action. Completely apart from 
the lack of substantive merit of such an argument, it is now far too late for CarrollICapps 
to attempt to make it. They long ago waived any possible right to assert this claim and 
affirmative defense. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses be 
affirmatively and timely asserted. The purpose of such a rule "is to alert the parties 
concerning the issues of fact to be tried and to afford them an opportunity to present 
evidence to meet those defenses." Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 164, 559 P.2d 1123, 
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1132 (1976). By requiring CanolWCapps to have earlier pled this matter, this would have 
allowed MBNA to introduce evidence of its own to defeat such a preliminary assertion. 
All of this is entirely subverted, however, by CarrolWCapps' 12" hour sudden assertion of 
some "standing" argument. See, e.g., Primary Health Network. Inc. v. State, Deut. of 
A&&., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 (2002). And, of course, CmolWCapps' "failure to 
raise an affirmative defense ordinarily results in a waiver of the defense." Hartwell Com. 
V. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 686 P.2d 79 (Ct. App., 1984). 
Further, with respect to the affirmative defense of "standing" in particular, Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a) requires that " when a party desires to raise an issue as to 
legal existence of any party or capacity of any party to sue or be sued, he shall do so by 
specific negative averment including supporting particulars.. . [and] that lack of capacity 
to sue must be specially pleaded." Dairy Equipment Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 
301, 442 P.2d 437 (1968), citing Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a). For the previous 
eighteen month existence of this action, including through and since the Court's 
September 14,2006 Memorandum Decision and Order, CanolllCapps have failed to raise 
or plead this new claim of lack of standing. That failure to timely raise such an objection 
results in a waiver of any right to claim it now. Such has been the law of Idaho for 
decades. See, ee.g., Shaw Supvlv Co. v. Morgan, 48 Idaho 412,282 P. 492 (1929); kldkf 
Lumber & Mfg. Co.. v. Nickerson, 13 Idaho 682,93 P. 24 (1907). 
By not earlier asserting it, CarrolWCapps have clearly waived any right to now 
assert that MBNA lacks standing. 
111. 
LACK OF SUBSTANTIVE MERIT 
In addition to Carroll/Capps having procedurally waived any right to make any 
standing argument at this time, that late claim also has no substantive merit. 
Although difficult to understand, it appears that CarrolWCapps' argument is 
premised on their assertion that "Capps and Carroll have not found MBNA listed as a 
licensed debt collector in the State of Idaho." CanolllCapps do not explain in their latest 
brief how or why MBNA purportedly is a debt collector nor why it should purportedly 
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be state licensed as such. CarrollICapps instead engage in rote speculation, contending, 
without apparent meaning, that "There is no evidence or reason that the account 
receivables of both Capps and Carroll would not have been sold to the Master Trust." 
The undersigned is frankly uncertain as to meaning of that statement but, if it is intended 
to suggest that MBNA should therefore be state licensed as a debt collector, MBNA 
responds that such a conclusion is on its face premised on nothing more than speculation 
without proof and, in any event, MBNA is a national association subject to the regulatory 
power of the United States. See, e.g., Steward v. Atlantic Nat. Bank of Boston, 27 F.2d 
224, 228 (9Ih Cir., 1928). MBNA is incorporated under the laws of the United States, not 
under the laws of the state of Idaho. As such, it is governed by laws of the U.S. 
Congress, not Idaho state laws. See, e.g., Twin Falls Nat. Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573, 
258 P. 526, 526 (1927) providing that the foreign corporation registration laws there at 
issue were not intended to apply to a national association. The Court held likewise in 
Home Owner's Loan Cornoration v. Stookey, 59 Idaho 267, 81 P.2d 1096, 1100 - 
1101 (1938) wherein this same issue was raised and the court commented that 
"Respondent is incorporated under the laws of the United States.. .It is said in C.J., Vol. 
14-a, page 1214, sec. 3924: 'A corporation created by an act of congress with powers 
coextensive with the Union.. .is not a foreign corporation within any state of the Union.. . 
as for example ... the business of banking conducted by a national bank'," citing 
Falls Nat. Bank v. Reed, 44 Idaho 573, 258 P. 526 (1927); Federal Land Bank of 
Spokane v. Statelen, 191 Wash. 155, 70 P.2d 1053. The Court in Federal Land Bank of 
Spokane v. Parsons, 116 Idaho 545, 548, 777 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Ct. App., 1989) is in 
accord, stating that "We do not agree that the bank needs a certificate of authority. First, 
the bank is not a 'foreign corporation.' ... See also Twin f i l l s  National Bank v. Heed, 44 
Idaho 573, 576, 258 P. 526, 527 (1927) (national bank doing business in Idaho under 
authority of Congress is not the type of business to which state registration laws were 
intended to apply)." 
Ultimately, it is constitutionally questionable whether a state could lawllly 
impose any "debt collector" permit requirements on an entity created by federal law and 
subject to the regulatory power of the federal government. As recently stated by the 
Ninth Circuit in Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 
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558 -559 (9" Cir., 2002): "Congress has legislated in the field of banking from the days 
of MfCulloch v. Maiyland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 325-26,426-27,4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), 
creating an extensive federal statutory and regulatory scheme. The history of national 
banking legislation has been 'one of interpreting grants of both enumerated and 
incidental 'powers' to national banks as grants of authority not normally limited by, but 
rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.' Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 
32, 116 S.Ct. 1103, 134 L.Ed.2d 237 (1996) (citations omitted). Indeed, since the 
passage of the National Bank Act in 1864, the federal presence in banking has been 
significant. See id. at 32-33, 116 S.Ct. 1103 ... because there has been a 'history of 
significant federal presence' in national banking, the presumption against preemption of 
state law is inapplicable." 
"National banks are necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United 
States." First Nat. Bank in Plant Citv. Fla. v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 90 S.Ct. 337, 24 
L.Ed.2d 312, reh. den., 396 U.S. 1047, 90 S.Ct. 677, 24 L.Ed.2d 693 (1969). "The 
National Banking Act constitutes by itself a complete system for the establishment and 
government of national banks." Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 60 S.Ct. 480, 84 
L.Ed. 694, reh den. 309 U.S. 697, 60 S.Ct. 611, 84 L.Ed. 1036 (1940). See also, -of 
Grand Rapids, Mich., v. McCurdy, 136 F.2d 615 (1943); Dinan v. First Nat. Bank of 
&@&, 117 F.2d 459, cert. den.315 U.S. 824, 62 S.Ct. 622, 86 L.Ed. 1220 (1941); Stein 
v. Delano, 35 F.Supp. 260, aff'd 121 F.2d 975, cert. den. 314 U.S. 655, 62 S.Ct. 106, 86 
L.Ed. 525, reh. den. 314 U.S. 711,62 S.Ct. 178, 86 L.Ed. 569, reh. den. 314U.S. 713,62 
S.Ct. 359,86 L.Ed. 568 (1940). 
MBNA is not a debt collector, any 1 2 ' ~  hour claim to the contrary is based solely 
on speculation and any state permitting requirements applicable to debt collectors is pre- 
empted by federal law regarding a federally chartered banking institution such as MBNA 
in any event. 
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CONCLUSION 
The latest arguments of CarrollJCapps have no more merit than the preceding 
ones. Their motion seeking reconsideration of this Court's September 14, 2006 
Memorandum Decision and Order should be denied. 
DATED this - 1.5 day of April, 2007 
WILSON & McCOLL 
/---\ 
B yu[h 'h.,, 
JEF M. WILSON 
~ t t d &  for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this *day of April, 2007, I hereby certify that I served the following 
document(s), hereinafter described to the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to 
each of the following parties by method indicated below: 
Document(s): RESPONSE BY MBNA AMERICA BANK TO LATEST 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FROM CARROLUCAPPS 
Partv served: Miriam G. Carroll [ U.S. Mails 
David F. Capps 
3' 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
HC-1 I Box 366 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Kamiah, ID 83536 [ ] Facsimile (208-926-4169) 
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WILSON & McCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208-345-91 00 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for MBNA AMERICA BANK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
1 
Plaintiff ) Case No. CV 05 36747 
1 
V. ) 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
1 OPPOSITION TO POST- 
Defendant 1 HEARING MOTION TO 
OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY 
1 ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
1 
Plaintiff 1 
v. 
1 
1 
1 
DAVID F. CAPPS 1 
1 
Defendant 1 
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record 
recited above, and hereby submits this Opposition to the May 24, 2007 "Post-Hearing 
Motion to Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" from CarrolliCapps as 
follows: 
OPPOSITION TO POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY 1 
ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING 
MBNA hereby incorporates its April 16,2007 "Response by MBNA America 
Bank to Latest Supplemental Memorandum from CarrollICapps," in which it was argued 
that CarrollICapps have procedurally waived any right to make a standing argument, and 
that the late claim has no substantive merit. For those reasons alone, the "Motion to 
Open Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" should be denied. 
Furlher, CarrollICapps have not cited to one iota of procedural authority andlor 
precedent which would allow for discovery this late in the case. In fact, pursuant to the 
Court's latest Amended Scheduling Order, entered May 15,2006, it was ordered that 
"Discovery shall be completed no later than June 8, 2006." Now, approximately one (1) 
year from the Court's discovery cut-off date, CarrollICapps are seeking to open 
discovery. This simply cannot be allowed. For these reasons alone, the "Motion to Open 
Limited Discovery on the Issue of Standing" should be denied. 
DATED this (day of June, 2007 
WILSON & McCOLL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
OPPOSITION TO POST-HEARING MOTION TO OPEN LIMITED DISCOVERY 2 
ON THE ISSUE OF STANDING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this I day of June, 2007, 1 hereby certify that I served the following 
document(s), hereinafter described to the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to 
each of the following parties by method indicated below: 
Document(s): Opposition to Post-Hearing Motion to Open Limited Discovery on 
the Issue of Standing 
Party served: Miriam G. Carroll @ U.S. Mails 
David F. Capps [ ] Hand-Delivered 
HC-I 1 Box 366 [ ] Overnight Mail 
Kamiah, ID 83536 ] Facsimile (208-926-4169) 
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iDAHOC0UNN DISTRICT COURT 
AT 
JEFFREY M. WILSON, ISB No. 1615 
ALEC T. PECIIOTA, ISB No. 7176 BUG 17' 2007 
WILSON & McCOLL 
420 W. Washington 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208-345-9100 
Facsimile: 208-384-0442 
Attorneys for MBNA AMERICA BANK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
MIRIAM G. CARROLL, 1 
1 
Plaintiff 1 Case No. CV 05 36747 
1 
v. 1 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
1 OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
Defendant 1 AFFIDAVITS OF MIRIAM G. 
CARROLL AND DAVID F. CAPPS 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, 1 
1 
Plaintiff 1 
1 
V. 1 
) 
DAVID F. CAPPS 1 
1 
Defendant 1 
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt; 
any information obtailted may be used for that purpose. 
OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS OF MIRIAM G. CARROLL AND 
DAVID F. CAPPS - 1 
Comes Now MBNA AMERICA BANK, by and through its counsel of record 
recited above, and hereby submits this Opposition to the two (2) August 10, 2007 
"Supplemental Affidavits" from CarrollICapps as follows: 
First, Carroll/Capps fail to designate exactly which pending motionlpleading they 
are supplementing with the aforementioned affidavits. Recently, on August 9,2007, the 
Court heard arguments regarding CarrolWCapps' Motion to Vacate Void Judgment, 
which was taken under advisement. However, the Court did not grant (nor was it 
requested) the parties leave to file additional briefing or a supporting affidavits. 
Accordingly, the Court should not consider CarrollICapps' most recent "Supplemental 
Affidavits" filed on August 10,2007, as such are filed with no reference to a pending 
motion and/or pleading, and such have not been approved by the Court for filing. 
Second, the Court should not consider CarrollICapps' most recent "Supplemental 
Affidavits" as an evidentiary hearing has already been held on the issues covered therein. 
Further, a Memorandum Decision and Order has already been issued by the Court in 
favor of MBNA as a result of the evidentiary hearing. The "Supplemental Affidavits" are 
simply procedurally untimely. 
DATED this day of August, 2007 
WILSON & McCOLL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
This communication is from a debt eollector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt; 
any information obtained may be used for that purpose. 
OPPOSITION TO SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVITS OF MIRIAM G. CARROLL AND 
DAVID F. CAPPS - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this fi day of August, 2007, I hereby certify that I served the following 
document(s), hereinafter described to the addressee indicated, by delivering the same to 
each of the following parties by method indicated below: 
Document(s): Opposition to Affidavits of Miriam G. Carroll and David F. Capps 
Party served: Miriam G. Carroll [XI U.S. Mails 
David F. Capps [ ] Hand-Delivered 
HC-I I Box 366 [ 1 Overnight Mail 
Kamiah, ID 83536 [ ] Facsimile (208-926-4169) 
This communication is from a debt collector, the purpose of which is to collect a debt; 
any information obtained may be used for that purpose. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO 
DAVID F. CAPPS, and MIRIAM G. 1 
CARROLL, 1 
Case No. CV 36747 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 JUDGMENT 
VS. 1 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
) 
1 
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A., 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
vs. 1 
1 
DAVID F. CAPPS, AND M W M  G. 1 
CARROLL, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
The Court having entered its Order Granting Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, and good 
cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED That said Plaintiff have and 
recover from the Defendants judgment as follows: 
Principal as to David Capps only 
Principal as to Miriam Carroll only 
Costs 
Attorney's fees 
Total judgment $73,488.91 
said judgment to bear interest at the statutory rate from the date hereof. 
DATED This 
/"1 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &day of L , 2007,  I ma~led a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT b y k ~ ~ u n i t e d  statesmail with the 
correct postage affixed thereon addressed to: 
JEFFREY M. WILSON 
ALEC T. PECHOTA 
Wilson & McColl 
P.O. Box 1544 
Boise, ID 83701 
David F: Capps, 
Miriam G. Carroll 
HC 11 Box 366 
Kamiah. ID 83536 
i: 
Lj,/.eab,O 4 &p'" (;;Yii:it- 
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'ROSE 1E. GEHRING @j,q /C- 
JUDGMENT - 2 -  
